











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 







Motor activation in language processing:  
Effects of handedness, experience, and planning 
 























I hereby declare that this thesis is of my own composition, and that it contains no 
material previously submitted for the award of any other degree. The work reported in his 
thesis has been executed by myself, except where due acknowledgement is made in the text. 
 
 
Madeleine E. L. Beveridge 
Edinburgh, 1
st






















Embodied Cognition accounts propose that motor activation contributes to semantic 
representations in action language (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). However, the nature of this 
activation remains largely unspecified: in particular, which processes result in relevant 
activation? Long-term motor experience (e.g., the comprehender’s dominant hand), short-
term motor experience (e.g., the hand the comprehender has recently used), and action 
planning (e.g., the hand the comprehender is planning to use) are all potential candidates. 
This thesis uses a range of psycholinguistic methods (e.g., timed sentence-picture matching, 
two-alternative forced-choice sentence-picture matching, spoken sensibility judgements) to 
distinguish between these possibilities.   
A first set of experiments investigated how comprehenders’ handedness affects their 
interpretation of sentences describing manual actions (e.g., I am slicing the tomato). 
Participants matched sentences of actions to pictures of that action. The Body-Specificity 
Hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009; Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010) predicts that right-
handed and left-handed comprehenders will interpret manual action sentences differently, 
according to whether they would perform that action with their right or their left hand. 
However, we found that comprehenders appear to interpret manual action sentences 
according to the hand they use to respond to the task, and not the hand they would typically 
use to perform manual actions. In addition, this effect was stronger for first-person than 
third-person sentences, implying that the effect of motor activation is moderated by 
linguistic context.  
A second set of experiments used the same paradigm but manipulated at what point 
comprehenders knew which hand they would use to respond to the sentences: during 
sentence processing, or after sentence processing was complete. We replicated the finding 
that comprehenders interpret manual action sentences according to their response hand, and 




comprehenders knew their response hand during sentence processing. In both sets of 
experiments, there was no effect of whether the picture of the action was presented from an 
egocentric or allocentric perspective, implying that action sentences are encoded for what 
effector (in this case, hand) will be used in the action, but not necessarily from what 
perspective the action will occur. 
A third set of experiments investigated the existence of a causal role of action planning-
based activation on sentence processing. Many studies have shown an effect of language 
processing on action execution (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg et al., 2008), but 
a fully embodied theory of language also predicts an effect of motor activation on language 
processing. Here, right-handed participants made spoken judgements about sentences while 
planning an action with their right or left hand that matched or did not match the action 
described in the sentence. An effect of response hand on accuracy was found when the task 
required participants to explicitly judge the congruency of sentence and the action they were 
preparing, but not otherwise.  These results corroborate recent research suggesting that 
activation of embodied lexical representations may be goal-driven rather than an automatic 
aspect of language processing (Hoedemaker & Gordon, 2013). 
Overall, the experiments presented in this thesis suggest a possible role for planning-
based motor activation in sentence processing, in line with embodied approaches; however, 
the results challenge strong accounts of embodiment by suggesting that the effect of 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1. Focus of the thesis 
How do we understand a sentence such as I am slicing the tomato? Psycholinguists 
have debated fiercely whether levels of processing within language (e.g., semantics versus 
phonology in lexical access) are independent stages in processing (Frazier, 1987; Levelt, 
Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999), or form part of an interactive system in which one level of 
processing can interact with other levels (Dell, 1986; Macdonald, Paerlmutter, & Seidenberg, 
1994). However, language itself has typically been conceived as a self-contained cognitive 
module involving computations over amodal symbols (Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1984).  
In recent years however, this conception of an independent and amodal language 
system has been increasingly challenged by embodied approaches to cognition in general, 
and language in particular (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Pulvermüller & 
Fadiga, 2010; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). These embodied cognition accounts of language 
processing have provided vast quantities of empirical data indicating that the language 
system is less independent, and less amodal, than had been assumed. However, the theories 
have arguably been less successful in providing positive evidence that allows us to specify in 
detail the mechanisms and constraints under which embodied approaches to language might 
operate. In this thesis, I report 9 experiments which aim to answer the following questions 
about embodied language processing: (1) from whose perspective (e.g., agent, observer) do 
comprehenders interpret action language?; (2) what are the contributions of long-term motor 
experience, short-term motor experience, and action planning, to the way comprehenders 
interpret action language?; and (3) does activation of the motor system play a causal role in 
action language comprehension?  
Philosophers and cognitive scientists have provided various definitions of embodied 




what all such accounts have in common is a rejection of amodal symbols as the basis for 
cognition (Barsalou, 2008). In traditional cognitive science, perceptual input is somehow 
translated into amodal representations (a “language of thought”; Fodor, 1975), which are 
stored and manipulated outside of the sensorimotor systems (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & 
Wilson, 2003). In embodied approaches such as Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou, 
1999), these amodal symbols are absent, and cognitive processing instead involves 
perceptual symbols: modal representations of concepts in their original perceptual coding. 
These perceptual symbols are then combined and reactivated to produce simulations of that 
perceptual or motor experience. The little understood process of translating modal input to 
amodal symbol is therefore no longer necessary. Note that simulation, in this context, refers 
to the effortless and unconscious recruiting of sensorimotor systems (Jeannerod, 2006), 
rather than an effortful and deliberate state of imagining such as might be present in mental 
imagery (see e.g., Willems, Toni, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010 for differences between action 
verb understanding and mental imagery). 
One consequence of rejecting amodal symbols, is that embodied accounts also reject 
the cognitive “sandwich” (Hurley, 2001) and, as a result, the modularity principle. Cognitive 
science has traditionally ignored the possibility of interaction between perception, action, 
and “higher-level” cognitive processes, because of the view that cognition constitutes the 
important “meat” between the input of perception, and the output of action (Shapiro, 2010). 
Crucially, in this traditional modular view, the perception and action systems do not 
contribute to cognitive processes such as language comprehension. However, increasing 
amounts of evidence suggest that language processing interacts with the perceptual and 
motor systems in a way that goes beyond this perception-cognition-action scheme (Willems 
& Francken, 2012). For example, comprehenders are typically faster to respond to images 
that match the orientation or shape that was implied in an earlier sentence, suggesting that 
language comprehension involves a perceptual simulation of the described events (for a 




language is processed in distributed neural networks rather than being restricted to language-
only structures (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2005) challenges the traditional view of language 
processing as modular and amodal. 
In response to this growing body of empirical work, many researchers now reject the 
strict delineation between language and action (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Willems & Hagoort, 2007). These embodied 
approaches to language are often treated as a single cohort, placed in opposition to modular, 
amodal accounts of language. However, researchers are becoming increasingly aware that 
this simple dichotomy between embodied and non-embodied language is not particularly 
useful: rather, we should be exploring how, and under what circumstances, the language and 
action systems interact with one another (Willems & Francken, 2012). Therefore, the aim of 
this thesis is not to prove or disprove embodied accounts of language processing. Instead, I 
aim to establish some of the constraints that govern the language-action interaction, notably: 
the perspective adopted by the comprehender (Chapter 5), motor planning versus motor 
experience as a source of motor resonance (Chapter 6), and the potential for a causal 
relationship between action and language (Chapter 7). 
The activation of the motor system in response to perceptual stimuli is known as 
motor resonance (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). However, since language is a 
referential system, there are in fact two levels at which this resonance could occur: 
communicative motor resonance – that is, activation in response to the articulatory gestures 
involved in the speech act; and referential motor resonance – that is, activation in response to 
the actions described in a particular utterance (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). This distinction is 
also made in discussions of “vehicle” (form) and “content” (semantic meaning) levels of 
embodiment (Gallese, 2008; Pickering & Garrod, 2009). When Pickering and Garrod (2007, 
2013) argue that language comprehenders recruit the production system to predict what the 
speaker will say next, they are speaking in terms of communicative motor resonance (see 




Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967; D’Ausilio, Craighero, & Fadiga, 2012). However, 
when researchers investigate the potential for interaction between action and semantics, they 
are speaking in terms of referential motor resonance. In the current thesis therefore, we use 
the term motor resonance in the referential, rather than communicative, sense. How these 
two forms of motor resonance (communicative and referential) might combine in language 
comprehension is an avenue that should be explored in future research (see Chapter 8), but is 
beyond the scope of the thesis.  
1.2. Chapter by chapter overview 
The thesis is concerned with the question, how do comprehenders understand 
sentences describing simple actions, such as I am slicing the tomato? This question is broken 
down into specific research questions, with each research question being addressed in a 
different empirical chapter. In Chapter 2, I review the literature. I provide an overview of 
motor resonance in action observation, outlining issues concerning the distinction between 
representations of self and other. This distinction will important when investigating what 
perspective (e.g., agent or observer) comprehenders adopt in action language. I then review 
the evidence for interaction between the language and action systems, covering 
neurophysiological evidence for shared neural resources, as well as behavioural evidence 
and patient studies suggesting that the two systems interact with one another at a causal 
level. I end the chapter by addressing the instability of results in this field, and discussing the 
flexibility of embodied language representations, and the possibility that motor resonance 
might help us predict future actions. 
Chapter 3 is a theoretical development, in which I bring together research into 
spatial perspective taking, and research into embodied perspective taking in action language. 
I discuss the different action perspectives available to comprehenders, and the situations in 




comprehenders can only run a full action simulation when they have sufficient spatial 
grounding, and I discuss the role of situation models in providing this grounding. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the analysis methods used throughout the 
empirical chapters. I provide a brief summary of linear mixed effects models, as 
implemented in R, and motivate the use of maximal random effect structure wherever this 
results in a converged model (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). 
In Chapter 5, I present 4 experiments in which I empirically address the question of 
whose perspective (agent versus observer) comprehenders adopt, by having left- and right-
handed participants respond to action sentences presented in the first- and third-person. 
Results suggest that participants adopted an embodied agent’s perspective, but that this 
perspective is more likely to be adopted for first-person sentences than for third-person 
sentences. The results from this chapter also suggest that this perspective is grounded in the 
current motor context of the task, rather than in the participants’ long-term motor experience. 
In Chapter 6, I present 3 experiments investigating whether the key factor in current 
motor context is short-term motor experience, or current motor plan. Results showed that the 
embodied effects only emerged when participants were able to form a motor plan during 
sentence processing, and showed no effect of short-term motor experience. When a motor 
plan was present during sentence processing, the results also replicated the finding that 
comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s perspective, which is stronger for first-person 
sentences. 
In Chapter 7, I report three experiments in which I tested whether there was any 
evidence that motor activation plays a causal role in online language comprehension. I found 
some evidence that a planned action affected accuracy in a sentence categorisation task, but 
only when the task explicitly probed the congruency between planned action and the 





In Chapter 8, I summarize the data presented in Chapters 5 – 7, and discuss the 
implications of these studies for embodied accounts of language processing, as well as 
directions for future research. 
1.3. Collaborations and presentations 
Chapter 3 is based on a theoretical article published with Martin Pickering, in 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. Apart from some minor modifications and an additional 
paragraph on pp. 101-102, the chapter is identical to the published paper. As a result of this, 
some of the introductory text in this chapter may briefly repeat ideas or summaries from 
Chapter 2. The published paper is part of a research topic on Perspective Taking: Building a 
neurocognitive framework for integrating the “social” and the “spatial”, and can be found 
at the following link:  
 Beveridge, M.E.L. & Pickering, M.J. (2013) Perspective taking in language: Linking 
the spatial and action domains. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 577. 
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00577. 
 
The experiments in Chapters 5 and 6 are based on collaborative work with Daniel 
Casasanto and Roberto Bottini, and selected studies (notably Experiments 2a, 2b, 4, and 5) 
have been presented at the following conferences and workshops: 
 Beveridge, M.E.L., Casasanto, D., Bottini, R, & Pickering, M.J. (2013). Motor plans 
and linguistic perspective-taking in sentence processing: A causal role in 
comprehension. Talk presented at the 26th CUNY Annual Conference on Human 
Sentence Processing, University of South Carolina. 
 Beveridge, M.E.L., Casasanto, D., Bottini, R, & Pickering, M.J. (2012). Body-
specificity in action sentences. Talk presented at the 4th Embodied and Situated 




 Beveridge, M.E.L., Casasanto, D., Bottini, R, & Pickering, M.J. (2012). Body-
specificity in simple action sentences. Talk presented at the 11th Psycholinguistics in 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
Increasing amounts of evidence suggest some sort of link between language and 
action (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). However, the nature of this link is not at all clear. Findings 
appear to vary depending on the precise task or the timing of stimuli, and theories rarely 
specify what type of effect (e.g., facilitation or interference) they predict. In order to move 
forward, researchers must move beyond demonstrating yet more embodied effects, but 
instead begin to investigate the constraints and contextual factors that appear to influence 
such effects (Willems & Francken, 2012). Only this way will we be able to begin to integrate 
the numerous empirical findings from embodied cognition, into a mechanistic and 
explanatory account of language comprehension. My aim in this thesis is to begin to specify 
some of these constraints. Specifically, I will investigate what perspective comprehenders 
adopt when interpreting action language sentences, and whether this perspective varies with 
the subject of the sentence (comparing first-person and third-person sentences). I will also 
investigate whether language processing interacts with motor planning, or motor experience. 
Finally, I will investigate a possible causal role of motor resonance on online sentence 
comprehension.  
Before addressing these questions empirically, it is useful to gain an overview of the 
field as it stands. The recent upsurge in interest in embodied approaches to language grew 
out of findings from a literature apparently quite unconnected with language: action 
observation. The discovery of mirror neurons (see section 2.2.1) helped bring about a 
paradigm shift in which people began to view action and perception as related, rather than 
distinct systems (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). As a result of this paradigm shift, 




be more closely related to action than had been thought (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). The 
literature on action perception therefore includes several parallels with the literature on 
action language comprehension; many of the debates and key questions concerning the 
former, also appear when investigating the latter. As a result of these parallels, I will begin 
the literature review by discussing some of the key findings and implications of the action 
perception literature (section 2.2).  
Next, in section 2.3, I review the evidence for a link between language and action. I 
begin by discussing whether language can be seen as a form of action perception. I move on 
to discuss evidence from brain imaging that suggests distributed processing of language, and 
shared resources between the language and action systems. I end by outlining behavioural 
evidence for an action-language link. Here, I review both the evidence for an effect of 
language on action, including an overview of work on affordances; and the (much sparser) 
evidence for an effect of action on language.  
Finally, in section 2.4, I discuss the instability that characterises much of the 
research into embodied approaches to language. I also note that for some researchers, the 
apparent flexibility of embodied representations suggests that simulations might help 
listeners to predict future actions. I therefore discuss whether simulation could be viewed as 
having a predictive component, as well as re-enacting previous experience. 
2.2. Motor resonance in perception 
Slicing a tomato and watching my friend slice a tomato appear to be clearly distinct 
events. In the first case, I know that it is me performing the action, and that I have control 
over how the action is performed. In the second case, I know that it is my friend performing 
the action, and that I am a mere bystander. However, over the past fifteen years, theories of 
action understanding have increasingly argued that the same mental representations are 
involved in both performing and in perceiving actions (e.g., Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Prinz & 




execution. This recruitment of the motor system in tasks other than action planning and 
execution is known as motor resonance (e.g., Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). The finding of motor 
resonance has played a key role in shaping theories of motor cognition, which propose that 
action understanding involves simulating actions, either our own or other people’s 
(Jeannerod, 2001; Jeannerod, 2006). These simulated actions are also known in the literature 
as covert actions (Jeannerod, 2006). 
Research into motor resonance in perception has influenced embodied accounts of 
language processing in several ways. First, the fact that the motor system may be recruited 
for a task that is a step removed from performing an action (i.e., perceiving an action) raises 
the possibility that the motor system might also be recruited during other tasks removed from 
performing an action (i.e., understanding a linguistic description of an action). In particular, 
language may be understood through internal simulations (e.g., Barsalou, 1999) similar to 
the covert actions thought to occur during action perception (Jeannerod, 2001; Jeannerod, 
2006). Second, although research has highlighted the overlap between self- and other-
generated actions (motor resonance may allow us a “first person grasp” of other people’s 
actions; Anquetil & Jeannerod, 2007; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010), studies have also 
suggested that the motor system may be differentially involved in imagining self- versus 
other generated actions (Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Ruby & Decety, 2001). Therefore, if 
the motor system is involved in language processing, it may be differentially involved in 
processing self-referential language (e.g., I am slicing the tomato), compared with third-
person language (e.g. he is slicing the tomato).  
In the rest of this section, I therefore provide an overview of research into motor 
resonance during action perception (“mirror-matching”; Bouquet, Shipley, Capa, & 
Marshall, 2011; Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006). I begin by looking at 






2.2.1. Mirror matching 
Mirror neurons in non-human primates 
In the 1990s, researchers discovered a group of neurons in the ventral premotor 
cortex (area F5) of macaque monkeys, which fire both when a monkey performs a particular 
action, and when the monkey observes that action being performed by another monkey or 
human (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Unlike canonical 
neurons, which respond to the physical presence of an object, the mirror neurons discovered 
in area F5 respond specifically to interaction with an object (Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & 
Sakata, 1995; Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). The mere sight of an object does not lead to 
mirror neuron activity; neither does mimed action (e.g., making a grasping motion in the 
absence of an object) or simultaneously moving a hand and an object separately from one 
another (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; for a review of mirror neurons and 
their properties, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Further research has suggested that 
mirror neurons might also exist in the inferior parietal lobe of the monkey brain (Fogassi et 
al., 2005). 
Evidence for mirror-matching in humans 
The discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys led researchers to hypothesise that a 
similar observation-execution matching system exists in humans. Mirror neurons were 
identified in monkeys (and more recently, song birds; Prather et al., 2008) using single cell 
recordings, however this technique has only recently been applied to human participants. 
Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, and Fried (2010) recorded activity from single 
neurons in the medial frontal and temporal cortices of epilepsy patients as they observed or 
executed (a) hand movements or (b) facial expressions. A subset of these neurons (~7%) was 




neurons responded selectively to the observation and execution of either hand movements, or 
facial expressions). These findings constitute the first piece of direct evidence for the 
existence of mirror neurons in humans. However, they are far from conclusive. Although the 
findings suggest effector specificity in mirror-matching, they do not demonstrate the 
selectivity to particular movements or goals which is held to be a crucial part of the mirror 
neuron hypothesis (Dinstein, Thomas, Behrmann, & Haeger, 2008). Future work on single 
cell recordings in humans may provide further evidence for their existence, but at present, 
the ontological status of mirror neurons in humans is still debated (e.g., Hickok, 2009).  
In the absence of other direct evidence for the existence of mirror neurons in 
humans, researchers have relied on brain imaging and electrophysiological techniques to 
infer the existence of a human mirror-matching system similar to that observed in monkeys. 
The lack of direct evidence for mirror neurons in human is, of course, problematic for 
researchers wishing to characterise the physiology of the human brain. However, indirect 
evidence such as that outlined below may in fact be more relevant than direct evidence in 
characterising the cognitive processes involved in action perception. For example, studies 
using electroencephalography (EGG) have demonstrated that action observation results in a 
similar inhibition of mu rhythm (typically present during rest, and inhibited during 
movement) as action execution (Altshuler, 2000; Cochin, Barthelemy, Lejeune, Roux, & 
Martineau, 1998; Cochin, Barthelemy, & Roux, 1999). Hari and Salmelin (1997) found that 
participants undergoing magnetoencephalography (MEG) experienced similar post-stimulus 
rebound effects for action observation as for action execution.  
Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi and Rizzolatti (1995) stimulated the left motor cortex of 
participants using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Application of TMS results in 
the production, by affected muscles, of neuroelectrical signals called motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs). The amplitude of these MEPs is directly proportional to the level of activity in the 
motor cortex at that time (Papeo, Vallesi, Isaja, & Rumiati, 2009). Therefore, if observing an 




should display different degrees of MEP activation in action observation versus object 
observation. Fadiga et al. tested this claim by applying TMS to the left motor cortex, and 
measuring the resulting MEPs from participants’ hand muscles as they observed non-object-
directed hand movements, object-directed hand movements, or stationary objects. 
Participants displayed increased MEPs relative to baseline for both types of movement, but 
not for object observation (see also Strafella & Paus, 2000).  
Note that these results contrast with findings from non-human primates, in which 
non-object-directed movement typically does not trigger mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al., 
2001). Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010) argue that whereas mirror neurons in monkeys 
respond to the goal of an action, the posited mirror system in humans can code either an 
action’s goal, or the component movements leading to the accomplishment of that goal. The 
latter premise allows the possibility of activation triggered by movement without an object 
(and which therefore does not accomplish a goal), as observed by Fadiga et al. (1995). The 
proposal that mirror neurons in monkeys code for goals rather than lower level actions is 
supported by research demonstrating first, that the same neurons fire when performing 
actions using normal pliers, as when using modified pliers that require the opposite actions to 
achieve the same goal (Umiltà et al., 2008), and second, that different neurons fire in 
response to a “feeding” grasping movement than to a kinematically equivalent grasping 
movement with a different goal (Fogassi et al., 2005). However, the differences in 
methodologies employed by these researchers (i.e., indirect methods in humans versus direct 
methods in monkeys) make it difficult to draw firm conclusions about differences between 
the human and non-human systems.  
Attempts to localise the mirror-matching system in humans using function magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) have implicated the 
premotor and parietal cortices (e.g., Dinstein, Hasson, Rubin, & Heeger, 2007; Gazzola & 
Keysers, 2009; Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Iacoboni et al., 2005). 




matching system. First, the use of fMRI and PET does not allow researchers to differentiate 
activation in the same cells (i.e., mirror neurons) during both observation and execution, 
from activation in distinct neural populations in the same area. In the original non-human 
primate studies, only a small population of cells in area F5 (~17%) were found to have 
mirror properties (Gallese et al., 1996). It therefore does not follow that any and all 
activation in homologue areas in humans during action observation and execution can be 
attributed to mirror neurons. Recent studies have begun using repetition suppression as a 
means of overcoming this criticism (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009). 
However, a related problem is that most of the studies finding activation in the 
premotor and parietal cortices have, for theoretical reasons, looked for activation specifically 
in those areas. Thus, researchers presuppose the existence of a mirror-matching system in a 
particular area of the brain, and attribute any activation found in that area to this posited 
mirror-matching system (Dinstein et al., 2008). Similar arguments about the limitations of 
neural localisation emerge when trying to demonstrate that the language and action systems 
share neural resources (section 2.3.3), and highlight the importance of synthesising research 
from a range of methodologies, including behavioural experiments. 
How specific is mirror-matching? 
Interestingly, research suggests that activation of the motor system in action 
perception is not a generalised phenomenon. Instead, activation appears specific to the 
particular action being observed. This specificity is important, as it suggests that motor 
system involvement in language might code for the particular actions being described and 
perhaps also, the particular effector used to perform an action. In support of specificity, 
Buccino et al., (2001) found fMRI evidence suggesting that mirror-matching is sensitive to 
the effector involved (e.g., hand, mouth or foot). Participants observed video clips of object-
directed movement, non-object-directed movement, or stationary objects. Both classes of 




cortex. In other words, clips of hand movements resulted in activation in areas associated 
with planning and executing hand movements, clips of foot movements resulted in activation 
in areas associated with planning and executing foot movements, and clips of mouth 
movements resulted in activation in areas associated with planning and executing mouth 
movements. Studies using TMS have suggested that mirror-matching is sensitive to not only 
the type of effector involved, but the laterality of that effector (e.g., left or right hand; Aziz-
Zadeh, Maeda, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2002), the effector orientation (e.g., same as 
or different to that of the participant; Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone, 2002), and 
the particular muscle involved in the task (e.g., handwriting versus arm movement; Strafella 
& Paus, 2000).   
The finding that mirror-matching appears to code the particular effector, and even 
muscle, involved in the observed action, has led researchers to question whether mirror-
matching extends to actions outside a participant’s own motor repertoire. For example, 
monkeys show activation of mirror neurons when observing a human performing the same 
act (di Pellegrino et al., 1992), but what about when an animal observes actions that it is not 
capable of performing itself? Buccino et al., (2004) showed video clips of humans, monkeys, 
and dogs performing biting gestures, or communicative mouth gestures (speech mouthing, 
lip-smacking, barking, respectively) to human participants undergoing fMRI. While the 
biting movements all corresponded to actions within the human motor repertoire, the 
communicative gestures could be divided into those that are part of the human motor 
repertoire (i.e., speech mouthing, lip smacking), and those that are not (i.e., barking). Results 
showed that observing clips of biting movements elicited similar neuronal activity in the 
human participants, regardless of the species in the clip. However, of the communicative 
gestures, speech mouthing and lip-smacking produced similar activity to one another, while 
barking produced a distinct pattern of activity, in areas associated with visual, rather than 




repertoire may be coded differently (e.g., in terms of perceptual features) than actions within 
an observer’s motor repertoire (e.g., in terms of goals or motor processing). 
The role of mirror neurons in action understanding 
Early research on mirror neurons focused on the correspondence between executed 
and observed actions. However, more recent studies suggest that mirror neurons also fire in 
response to action-related sounds, such as peanut breaking or paper ripping (Keysers et al., 
2003; Kohler et al., 2002; for a review of the link between actions and their sounds, see 
Aglioti & Pazzaglia, 2010). Umiltà et al. (2001) had monkeys observe actions in which the 
final part of the action (e.g., the point at which the experimenter’s hand grasped an apple) 
was obscured. The authors found that a subset of previously identified mirror neurons 
discharged, even though the hand-object interaction was not visible to the monkey. The fact 
that mirror neurons can also fire in response to actions that are not fully observed suggests 
that the role of mirror neurons might not be restricted to aiding imitation, which would 
depend on the presence of visible hand-object interaction (e.g., Jeannerod, 1994). Mirror 
matching might instead be instrumental in action understanding (e.g., Rizzolatti et al., 2001; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Umiltà et al., 2001). According to this view, mirror-matching 
allows an observer to understand an observed action by mapping it onto their motor 
repertoire (cf. Buccino et al., 2004). The observed action triggers the motor system to 
“resonate” (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1999), which allows the observer to infer 
the agent’s goal and, therefore, understand the action (Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Fogassi et 
al., 2005; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). In this view, mirror-matching plays a causal role in action 
understanding, by allowing an observer to simulate performing the action herself, and thus 
understand the agent’s goal (e.g., Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Jeannerod, 2006). Such a 
suggestion is of great interest to advocates of embodied approaches to language: if motor 




then a similar mechanism might also help us to understand descriptions about actions that 
are not observed. 
However, Csibra (2007) proposes an alternative account, in which mirror-matching 
occurs after action understanding, because an observer already understands the intended goal 
of the agent (for a similar critique of the mirror meuron hypothesis as applied to social 
cognition, see e.g., Jacob, 2008, 2009). In this view, mirror-matching helps us predict and 
monitor an agent’s future actions through a type of emulation (Prinz, 2006; see also Wilson 
& Knoblich, 2005), but it does not help us to understand the current action. Moreover, 
Hickok (2009) argues that the studies purporting to show that mirror-matching is involved in 
action understanding in fact show that activation of the mirror system is not necessary for 
action understanding. For example, Buccino et al., (2004) found activation of the motor 
system when participants observed human and chimp lip-smacking, but not dog barking. 
Presumably however, participants still understood the dog’s action of barking – unless by 
“understanding”, Buccino and colleagues mean something above and beyond the usual 
meaning of the word. A precise definition of what this action understanding entails is 
therefore required, since a definition in which it is taken to mean activation of the motor 
system, is unsatisfactorily circular.  
We will encounter these issues again in relation to action language understanding. 
For example, if motor simulation is taken as constituting action language comprehension, 
then the implication is that participants in experimental conditions where motor simulation is 
not present, do not understand the linguistic stimuli in those conditions. In section 2.3.2, I 
will discuss how Taylor and Zwaan's (2009, 2013) proposal of fault-tolerant language 
comprehension might help us resolve this issue. Similarly, the debate about the causal status 
of mirror-matching in action understanding, echoes a similarly fraught debate about the 
functional role of motor activation in action language understanding (sections 2.3.2. – 2.3.5). 




such a functional role for motor resonance in online language comprehension. In the 
meantime however, I continue to review evidence for a link between action and perception. 
2.2.2. Effects of perception on action 
The research outlined above suggests that there may be a link between action and 
perception in humans, but it does not provide any evidence as to the direction of this 
relationship. In the following section, I outline evidence that observing an action leads to 
activation of the motor system: an effect of perception on action.  
Explanations of the perception-action link 
It is important to bear in mind that the research outlined below need not be 
interpreted as proof of a mirror neuron system in humans (see e.g., Hickok, 2009, 2010, for 
problems with this approach). Although the results are consistent with a human mirror 
neuron system, other theories make similar behavioural predictions, without committing to 
any particular claim about the neurological underpinnings of these predictions (Craighero, 
Bello, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 2002). For example, motor cognition claims that people perform 
unconscious motor simulations (covert actions) of other people’s actions, resulting in shared 
representations between self- and other-generated actions. Although recent formulations of 
this approach (e.g., Jeannerod, 2006) have drawn on mirror neurons as a possible mechanism 
through which motor simulations occur, they are not the only possibility. One could advocate 
the basic premise of motor cognition (simulations) without committing to the existence of 
specific mirror neurons in humans. Similarly, ideomotor theories of action such as Theory of 
Event Coding (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) stress the link 
between the internal image or perceptual consequences of an action, and the action itself, but 
remain agnostic as to the neural mechanism underpinning this link. Whether or not mirror 
neurons do underpin the link between action and perception is beyond the scope of this 




cognition for embodied approaches to language, we make no specific attempt to evaluate or 
distinguish between these different approaches to motor resonance (see, e.g., Jeannerod, 
2006, p. 134-135 for differences between the two accounts).  
Automatic imitation 
Imitation in a social context has been widely studied: Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
coined the term Chameleon Effect to capture the fact that in a social setting, people tend to 
unknowingly adopt the characteristics of the person they are engaging with. Such mimicry 
has been demonstrated, for example, for gestures and body movements (e.g., Bernieri, 1988; 
Shockley, Santana, & Fowler, 2003), and for facial expressions (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & 
Mullet, 1986; Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998), even following unconscious perception of 
masked facial expressions (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). In cognitive psychology, 
researchers have employed various terms to capture the finding that observing someone 
perform an action makes it more likely that the observer will perform that action herself: 
e.g., automatic imitation (Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005), visuomotor priming 
(Craighero, Fadiga, Umilta, & Rizzolatti, 1996), and motor contagion (Blakemore & Frith, 
2005); see Heyes (2011) for a review. For clarity’s sake, we use the term motor resonance to 
refer to activation of the motor system in non-motor tasks, generally, and automatic imitation 
to refer to the specific case of motor resonance during action observation.  
Research has, over the past decade, provided ample evidence for automatic 
imitation. For example, people are faster to respond to clips of human body movement if the 
response (e.g., opening or closing their hand) matches the movement shown in the video 
(e.g., a hand opening or a hand closing), even when the observed movement is irrelevant to 
the task (Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). Similar results have been found in a go/ no 
go paradigm (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001), using static images rather than video clips 
(Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003), and using auditory rather than visual stimuli (Drost, 




Whereas the studies outlined above showed a congruency advantage (actions are 
more likely to be performed, or performed more easily, having observed congruent actions), 
Kilner, Paulignan and Blakemore (2003) found the opposite effect. They studied the effect of 
perception on action by measuring variance in the kinematics of performed movements: 
participants executed arm movements while observing congruent or incongruent arm 
movements performed by a human or a robotic arm. Observing incongruent arm movements 
performed by a human arm led to significantly more variance in participant’s own arm 
movements relative to baseline (see also Kilner, Hamilton, & Blakemore, 2007). Congruent 
arm movements and incongruent robotic arm movements had no effect. The difference in 
direction of effect between this and other studies (congruency versus incongruency 
advantage) might be attributed to task demands, in particular timing. In Kilner et al.’s study, 
participants performed and observed the actions at the same time; in the case of Brass et al. 
and Vogt et al., participants first observed, and then performed an action. However, in Drost 
et al.’s study, musicians heard and performed actions simultaneously, and yet participants 
showed a congruency advantage rather than an incongruency advantage. Inconsistency in 
effect direction is not restricted to the perception-action literature; it is also a notable feature 
of research into the interaction between action and language. Arriving at a satisfactory 
explanation of these inconsistencies, which will allow future research to predict the direction 
of effects, should be a high priority for theories of motor resonance in action perception and 
in language. 
Automatic imitation in speech 
Interestingly, an effect of perception on action has also been observed in speech. 
Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino and Rizzolatti (2002) used TMS to measure MEPs from Italian 
participants’ tongue muscles as they listened to speech. Recall from section 2.2.1 that the 
greater the activation present in the motor cortex, the greater the amplitude of the MEPs in 




to words that featured a sound involving a strong tongue movement (e,g., birra [ beer]) 
compared with words that did not (e.g., baffo [moustache]). In other words, participants 
showed evidence of increased activation in tongue motor areas when perceiving words that 
involved strong tongue movement, even though they did not execute any tongue actions 
themselves. Pulvermüller et al. (2006) found evidence for somatotopic activation of 
articulators (lips, tongue) as participants listened to speech while undergoing fMRI. And in a 
behavioural paradigm, Kerzel and Bekkering (2000) showed an effect of stimulus-response 
compatibility in speech. Participants observed a speaker pronouncing the syllables ba or da, 
while the printed word ba or da was superimposed on the speaker’s lips to indicate what the 
participant should produce. Participants were faster to produce syllables that were congruent 
with the observed speech, even though the observed speech was irrelevant to the task. 
Together, these results lend some support to a motor theory of speech perception, in which 
comprehenders understand speech by covertly producing the articulatory gestures necessary 
to produce the sounds they are hearing (Galantucci, Fowler, & Turvey, 2006; Liberman & 
Mattingly, 1985; Liberman et al., 1967). However, the necessity of such activation for 
speech perception remains unproven (see Willems & Hagoort, 2007 for a review of relevant 
neural evidence). 
The role of animacy 
The findings of Kilner et al. (2003), in which observation of human, but not robotic 
arm movements affected participants’ performance to perform movements themselves, 
suggest that the link between action execution and observation may be limited to observation 
of actions by biological entities. This possibility is supported by results from fMRI studies 
showing differential activation when observing actions performed by human hands versus 
3D virtual reality hands (Perani et al., 2001), or robotic hands (Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, 
Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004). However, the observed bias may involve more than just 




entity. Crescentini, Mengotti, Grecucci and Rumiati (2011) adapted a paradigm used in a 
behavioural study by Brass et al. (2001), for use in an fMRI study. Participants performed a 
finger movement (e.g., tapping) having watched a biological (e.g., hand) or non-biological 
(e.g., dot) perform a compatible (e.g., tapping/ downwards movement) or incompatible 
movement (e.g., lifting/ upwards motion). Activation was recorded during the action 
execution, and showed a main effect of biological versus non-biological stimuli, a main 
effect of compatibility (different regions activated for incompatible versus compatible 
actions), and an interaction between these two following an emotionally neutral or sad (but 
not angry) context. The authors concluded that the compatibility effect for biological stimuli 
only occurred in situations where people are more likely to empathise, or take another’s 
perspective. 
Behavioural studies have provided mixed evidence for an animacy bias (Bird, 
Leighton, Press, & Heyes, 2007). For example, Castiello, Lusher, Morena, Edwards and 
Humphreys (2002) found that the effect of automatic imitation was stronger following 
observation of a human hand compared with observation of a robotic hand (see also Jonas et 
al., 2007). However, Press, Bird, Flach and Heyes (2005) had participants perform a pre-
determined action (e.g., open their hand) in response to a congruent (e.g., open hand) or 
incongruent (e.g., closed hand) action by a human or a robotic hand. Although the effect of 
automatic imitation was stronger in the biological (human hand) condition than the non-
biological (robotic hand) condition, participants were still faster in the congruent versus 
incongruent conditions for the robotic hand. Thus, the robotic hand still appeared to result in 
some automatic imitation.  Similarly, Liepelt and Brass (2010) found that, although 
automatic imitation was stronger for observation of a human hand versus a wooden hand, 
automatic imitation still occurred in the wooden hand condition. However, in Liepelt and 
Brass’s study, the actual observed movements were the same in both conditions. The only 
difference between conditions was that prior to testing, participants were shown a human 




made by that hand. Therefore, in this study, it appears that the participants’ belief about the 
biological status of the hand, rather than any visual input from the hand itself, affected the 
degree of automatic imitation. 
The key to the biological/ non-biological difference may therefore lie not in the 
movement profile itself, but rather in a participant’s belief about the potential agency of the 
actor. Stanley, Gowen and Miall (2007) showed participants clips of biological (produced by 
the experimenter) or non-biological dot motion. Following presentation of the movement 
clip, participants moved their arm in the same plane (congruent) or a different plane 
(incongruent) to that of the dot motion clip. Participants who were told that all the 
movements they observed were produced by a human showed an interference effect in their 
own movement execution. Participants who were told that the movements they observed 
were computer generated showed no interference effect. These results suggest that belief 
about the other’s potential to act as an agent affects how people represent their action. When 
Press, Gillmeister and Heyes (2006) explicitly questioned participants in an automatic 
imitation task about the animacy of the stimuli, the reported belief of animacy had no effect 
on participants’ performance. However, an implicit assessment of participant’s animacy 
belief may provide a better test for the hypothesis that belief in animacy does not affect 
automatic priming (e.g., Press et al. note that participants may have been reluctant to use 
extreme scores on the animacy rating scale). 
2.2.3. Effects of action on perception 
 The link between action and perception does not appear to be one-way. Schütz-
Bosbach and Prinz (2007) review evidence for perceptual resonance: an effect of action on 
perception. Several studies appear to demonstrate that perceiving a stimulus while 
simultaneously planning and executing and action leads to a very generalised reduced 
perception of the visual stimulus. For example, De Jong (1993) found that participants are 




an auditory stimulus. However, it is unclear whether this effect is actually due to an effect of 
action on perception, rather than a more general effect where resources of a single processing 
channel are initially allocated to the first task, and thus unable to attend to the second, 
overlapping task (De Jong & Sweet, 1994; De Jong, 1995; Joliecœur, 1999; see Pashler, 
1994, for a review).  
Blindness to response-compatible stimuli 
In order to demonstrate a specific effect of action on perception, researchers must 
provide evidence of more specific cross-talk between these two domains: the difference in 
perception must be shown to vary according to the relationship between the action and the 
perceived stimuli (Müsseler, Wühr, & Prinz, 2000). Blindness to response-compatible 
stimuli is one such effect. Müsseler and Hommel (1997a) had participants perform a left or 
right key press, just as they were presented with a left or right pointing masked arrow. 
Participants were less able to correctly identify the direction of the arrow (left or right) when 
it was congruent with the direction of their button press (left or right). These findings suggest 
that people find it harder to perceive a stimulus when they are concurrently carrying out an 
action that shares certain features (e.g., direction) with that stimulus than otherwise.  
This particular effect is predicted by the Common Coding Approach (Prinz, 1990), 
in which stimuli and responses are represented in the same system. This system is one of 
external events, whereby stimuli represent perceived events, and responses represent planned 
events (see Theory of Event Coding, Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001, for a 
later development of this approach). The Common Coding Approach posits that since both 
stimuli and response are represented within the same system, they can be coded for the same 
features. So, both a stimulus (such as an arrow), and a response (such as a button press), can 
share the code LEFT. This means that perceiving a left-pointing arrow would trigger a left-
sided response. However, it also means that performing that left-sided response would, in 




does the actor break this potentially endless cycle of perception triggering action triggering 
perception? Mackay (1987) argues for a self-inhibition phase, whereby once a feature code 
has been activated, it results in lower than normal activation of that code. In this way, as the 
actor executes a left-sided response, the perceptual system is rendered less sensitive to the 
code LEFT, and is therefore not triggered by the LEFT-ness of the response. The perception-
action loop can thus be avoided. If such a self-inhibition phase exists, then blindness to 
response-compatible stimuli should occur when participants are asked to perceive a stimulus 
while already initiating a response that shares a feature code (e.g., LEFT) with that stimulus. 
In the case of Müsseler and Hommel (1997a), participants initiated a left button press, thus 
lowering the activation of the LEFT code, so that the left-pointing arrow was perceived less 
easily than an arrow that did not share the LEFT code (e.g., a right-pointing arrow). 
Further work has replicated this blindness effect in a task where participants were 
required to detect, rather than identify the direction of, masked arrows during a left or right 
key press (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997b), and during tasks where the cue telling participants 
which action to perform (in the original studies this was also a left or right pointing arrow) 
shared only partial or no feature overlap with the perceived stimulus or the executed action 
(e.g., black or white squares; Müsseler, Steininger, & Wühr, 2001; Müsseler et al., 2000). 
Kunde and Wühr (2004) found that the blindness effect persisted independently of the hand 
used to execute the action, and that a similar effect is observed when producing colour words 
(action) and perceiving patches of colour. These results, they suggest, imply that blindness to 
response-compatible stimuli is a general phenomenon whenever the action and perceptual 
stimuli overlap conceptually.  
Underlying the importance of the meaning attached to the perceptual stimulus, 
Stevanovski, Oriet and Jolicoeur (2002) found that the effects could be reversed if the 
participants interpreted the same visual stimulus as pointing in the opposite direction; for 
example, the direction of effects switched when participants interpreted the > symbol as a 




Hommel and Müsseler (2006) argued that semantic congruence is insufficient to elicit 
blindness to response compatible stimuli. They tested the generality of the blindness effect 
using combinations of left- or right-pointing arrows, and the words left or right as stimuli; 
and left- or right-button presses, and vocal responses left or right as responses. The arrows 
paired with the button presses produced the expected effect, as did the words paired with the 
vocal responses. But when the arrows were paired with the vocal responses, or the words 
with the button presses, the blindness effect did not occur. In other words, even though all 
the pairs overlapped conceptually, the effect only occurred in those pairs that also 
overlapped in the perceptually-derived features, in line with TEC accounts. 
Facilitation effects 
The effects outlined above constitute evidence of an incongruency advantage, or 
contrast effect of action on perception (Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). Similar effects have 
also been found for more complex actions, such as lifting boxes and estimating the weight of 
boxes lifted by others (Hamilton, Wolpert, & Frith, 2004); performing arm movements and 
determining the direction of moving stimuli (Zwickel et al., 2008; Zwickel, Grosjean, & 
Prinz, 2010); and drawing sinusoidial lines without visual feedback, while observing a dot 
moving in sinusoidial trajectories of various amplitudes (Schubö, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 
2001; Schubö, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2004). However, as in the case of automatic imitation, 
other studies have found effects occurring in the opposite direction.  
Facilitation, or assimilation effects occur when participants become more, rather 
than less sensitive to stimuli that match their action. For example, Wohlschläger (2000) had 
participants turn a knob clockwise or anticlockwise, and at the same time report the 
perceived motion direction of a circle of dots (pushing a right or left key to indicate 
clockwise or anticlockwise movement, respectively). The dots were in fact ambiguous as to 
which direction they were moving in, but participants were more likely to perceive the dots 




anticlockwise). Similarly, Repp and Knoblich (2007) found that the direction of movements 
required to create a pair of ambiguous tones on a piano keyboard (right key followed by left 
key; left key followed by right key) influenced perceived changes in pitch in an ambiguous 
tone sequence; participants were more likely to hear pitch as rising using a left to right key 
press order than a right to left key press order (but only for expert piano players). 
Other research suggests that the specific type of hand action being planned (e.g., 
grasping or pointing) can facilitate perception of congruent stimuli. Wykowska, Schubö and 
Hommel (2009) asked participants to prepare a grasping or a pointing action, and then 
perform a visual search task. They found that the type of action participants planned to make 
influenced detection of action-relevant features in the visual search task: participants were 
faster to detect different size targets when they prepared a grasping action, and faster to 
detect different luminescence targets when they prepared a pointing action (see also 
Bekkering & Neggers, 2002). Further studies have found effects of hand action on change-
detection – participants planning a grasping movement were more sensitive to change 
detection when a grasp-congruent object changed between two otherwise identical pictures 
(Symes, Tucker, Ellis, Vainio, & Ottoboni, 2008) – and detecting oddballs in a sequence of 
images (Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz,2007; Fagioli, Ferlazzo, & Hommel, 2007). 
Note that the Common Coding Approach specifically predicts an incongruency 
advantage, since the activation of a particular feature code should leave the agent less 
sensitive to that code (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a). To try and explain the differences in 
effect direction between studies, Zwickel, Grosjean and Prinz (2010b) note that  studies 
finding contrast effects typically use unambiguous stimuli such as left- or right-pointing 
arrows, whereas studies finding assimilation effects typically use ambiguous stimuli such as 
ambiguous piano tones or ambiguous movement (e.g., Repp & Knoblich, 2007; 
Wohlschläger, 2000). It is possible, therefore, that the nature of the experimental stimuli 
(ambiguous versus unambiguous) affects whether the results show a congruency or 




constitute ambiguous stimuli as such, these tasks do involve searching for a stimuli rather 
than observing it in an unambiguous context. The extent to which task demands might 
explain differences in effect direction is explored more fully in section 2.4.1.  
A more general difficulty that researchers may face when investigating the 
perception-action link, is distinguishing the effects of action on perception from those of 
perception on action. For example, Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti and Umiltà (1999) report a 
series of experiments showing that participants who prepared to grasp a bar in a particular 
orientation were faster to execute the grasping movement following presentation of 
congruent versus incongruent stimuli in a go/ no-go task (see also Craighero et al., 2002). 
Craighero et al. (1999) interpret these findings as showing that preparing to act leads to 
faster processing of visual stimuli – in other words, an effect of action on perception. 
However since the measured outcome variable is action, it is impossible to distinguish this 
explanation from one in which processing of congruent visual stimuli affects action 
execution – in other words, an effect of perception on action. Similarly, when discussing the 
link between language and action, the frequent use of motor actions as a response means that 
it is often unclear whether a given effect is due to activation in the motor system affecting 
language comprehension, or language comprehension affecting motor execution. This 
uncertainty is one reason why the functional role of the motor system in language 
comprehension is contested, and requires further investigation (see Chapter 7). 
2.2.4. The role of experience 
The Associative Hypothesis 
Heyes (2010) notes that many discussions of mirror neurons implicitly assume that 
such neurons evolved through adaption to the demands of natural selection, and that as a 
result, many of their properties are genetically inherited (e.g., Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; 




an Associative Hypothesis, where mirror neurons are formed through sensorimotor 
experience. For example, a sensory neuron might fire in response to perceiving a grasping 
action, and another motor neuron might fire in response to performing a grasping action. 
Perceiving and performing actions is often correlated (e.g., when a parent imitates a child’s 
action), meaning that the motor neuron will often fire when the grasping action is perceived, 
because it is also being performed. Eventually, through this association, the motor neuron 
will fire when observing that action, even when it is not performed (see Heyes, 2010 for 
details; Pulvermüller, 1999, offers a similar account of how words come to be associated 
with their meanings). The Associative Hypothesis can, Heyes argues, provide a better 
explanation of why mirror-matching in adults can be affected by learned sensorimotor 
associations based on short-term motor experience, compared with evolutionary accounts. 
Short-term sensorimotor couplings affects motor resonance 
In this thesis, I will explore the contributions of short-term and long-term motor 
experience on language processing. The idea that short-term motor experience might 
override the effect of long-term motor experience in language processing, is suggested by 
evidence that short-term sensorimotor experience can override the effect of long-term 
sensorimotor experience in automatic imitation. For example, we saw in section 2.2.1 that 
automatic imitation is typically elicited by human, but not robotic hands. However, 24 hours 
after a brief training period (216 trials) in which participants opened and closed their hands 
in response to open or closed robotic hand stimuli, respectively, the robotic hands elicited as 
much automatic imitation as the human hands (Press, Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2007). In 
another study, automatic imitation effects were removed by training participants to respond 
to open-hand stimuli by closing their hands, and to respond to close-hand stimuli by opening 
their hands  (Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; see Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, 




The suggestion that short-term sensorimotor experience modulates automatic 
imitation is supported by evidence from studies using TMS. Catmur, Walsh and Heyes 
(2007) measured MEPs in participants’ index and little finger abductors, before and after 
training sessions in which participants responded to little finger movements by moving their 
index finger, and vice versa. Prior to training, participants displayed the expected mirror-
matching effect: observing a little finger movement led to increased MEPs in little finger, but 
not index finger abductors; and observation of an index finger movement produced increased 
MEPs in index finger, but not little finger abductors. After training however, this effect was 
reversed. Observation of index finger movements led to increased MEPs in the little finger 
abductor, and observation of little finger movements led to increased MEPs in the index 
finger abductor. Together, these results suggest that short-term associations between 
perceptual input and performed actions can enhance, reduce, and even reverse more long-
term associations that trigger motor resonance. One of the aims of this thesis therefore, is to 
investigate whether short-term experience can override the effect of long-term experience on 
action language comprehension. 
The importance of motor cues 
Sensorimotor experience involves associating a particular action with a particular 
sensory input (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009). However, motor resonance might also be 
affected by sensory experience alone (e.g., how I observe most other people performing an 
action), or by motor experience alone (e.g., how I personally perform an action). Petroni, 
Baguear and Della-Maggiore (2010) found increased corticospinal activity when participants 
viewed abstract stimuli (coloured shapes) that had been associated with finger movements 
during a short (~12 minute) training session; importantly, this effect only occurred when 
stimuli had been motorically associated (participants performing action in response to the 
stimulus) rather than visually associated (participants viewing action after stimulus). These 




resonance, and are supported by fMRI research showing that expert dancers show greater 
bilateral activation when they view movements they have been trained to perform, compared 
with moves they view often but do not perform themselves (e.g., male and female ballet 
movements; Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006). Similarly, 
Casile and Giese (2006) found that acquiring novel motor behaviours facilitated participants’ 
perceptual discrimination of that action, even when they learnt the motor behaviour while 
blindfolded, thus eliminating visual feedback (see also Hecht, Vogt, & Prinz, 2001).  
These results provide a possible framework for explaining the finding, discussed in 
section 2.2.5 below, that people tend to be better at recognising their own movements than 
those of other people, even though they have greater visual experience of other people’s 
actions than of their own: motor cues have a stronger effect than visual cues in modulating 
motor resonance. The distinction between visual cues and motor cues will be important in 
discussing the possible perspectives that comprehenders might adopt on action language, as 
follows. If visual cues have a stronger role on motor resonance, then we might expect people 
to adopt the perspective of someone observing the described event. If motor cues have a 
stronger role on motor resonance, then we might expect people to adopt the perspective of 
someone performing the described event (see Chapter 3 for more details on the possible 
perspectives available to comprehenders). 
2.2.5. Representations of self and other 
Shared representations need not be identical 
One consequence of the link between perception and action is the implication that 
we represent other people’s (observed) actions in the same way as we represent our own 
(executed) actions. This is important because it suggests that comprehenders could interpret 
an action from someone else’s point of view, even when they are describing or hearing about 




people’s actions share representations leads to the problem of action attribution: how do we 
know whether a particular action was performed by ourselves or by somebody else? (de 
Vignemont & Haggard, 2008). The solution to this problem is that although self- and other-
generated actions may share some representations, the representations cannot overlap 
completely, else self-generated and other-generated actions would indeed be 
indistinguishable. These non-overlapping aspects of the representations would then act as a 
cue to how we achieve agency attribution (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Jeannerod, 2006).   
 Several studies suggest that self-generated actions may have a tighter link to the 
sensorimotor system than other-generated actions. For example, Grezes, Frith, Passingham 
(2004) had participants watch videos of themselves and others lifting a box. On 10% trials, 
the person in the video was told the incorrect weight of the box; participants judged whether 
or not they had been told the correct weight, while undergoing fMRI. Activity in the parietal 
premotor cortex began earlier when participants were making judgements about their own 
actions, than when they were judging other people’s actions. In another fMRI study, Jackson, 
Meltzoff and Decety (2006) showed participants clips of simple hand or foot actions. The 
clips were either presented from the perspective of the agent (INTERNAL orientation; that 
is, the effector extended upwards from the bottom of the screen, as though it could plausibly 
be interpreted as belonging to the participant); or from the perspective of an observer 
(EXTERNAL orientation; that is, the effector descended downwards from the top of the 
screen, and could most plausibly be interpreted as belonging to an agent facing the 
participant). The internally orientated clips thus represented a first-person visual perspective, 
and the externally orientated clips represented a third-person visual perspective. Participants 
either watched the clips passively, or imitated the actions that they saw. Internally orientated 
actions elicited greater activation in the left sensorimotor area than externally orientated 
actions, even in passive observation.  
 The difference between perception of first-person and third-person actions raises the 




language about first-person or third-person actions. In the case of typical dialogue, we are 
used to interpreting first- and second-person language (I am slicing the tomato, you are 
slicing the tomato) deictically, such that the person assumed to perform a described action 
(self or other) depends on who is uttering the description (myself or my interlocutor). It may 
therefore be the case that we are trained to ignore person in the comprehension of action 
sentences, and that there would be no difference in the degree of motor activation in 
response to first- versus third-person sentences. On the other hand, third-person sentences 
represent an unambiguous case in which the described action is being clearly attributed to a 
third party; whereas first-person language can refer to either self (if I am speaking) or other 
(if my conversation partner is speaking). In both cases, I typically refers to someone taking 
part in the conversation. In a laboratory setting, when no conversation partner is present, 
comprehenders might interpret first-person language as referring to themselves, as the only 
available source of linguistic utterances.  
If that is the case, then first-person action descriptions might result in increased motor 
activation relative to third-person action descriptions, mirroring the tighter connection 
between self-generated actions and the sensorimotor system. In support of this prediction, 
Papeo, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, and Rumiati (2009), using TMS, found increased MEPs in the 
hand muscles of participants reading first-person manual action verbs (e.g., I grasp) relative 
to first-person non-action verbs (e.g., I think), but no such difference between third-person 
action and non-action verbs. The authors argued that participants interpreted the agent of the 
first-person verbs to be themselves (in contrast to the third-person verbs, which they 
interpreted as referring to a third party), and that comprehenders simulate action language 
only when the self is interpreted as the agent of the action. I will test whether or not there 
appear to be behavioural differences in the interpretation of first- versus third-person action 
descriptions in in Chapters 5 and 6. For more details on overlapping and non-overlapping 




(2003), Decety et al., (1994), Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga and Rizzolatti (1996), Ruby and Decety 
(2001), Ruby and Decety (2004).  
Recognising self-generated actions 
Despite the link between executing an action, and observing another person 
executing an action, people appear to have remarkably little difficulty recognising their own 
actions. For example, Knoblich and Prinz (2001) found that participants were able to 
distinguish their own drawings from those of other people, regardless of the familiarity of the 
symbol in the drawing, and despite receiving no visual feedback while drawing. People are 
also able to identify tapping noises made by themselves rather than by a computer (Knoblich 
& Repp, 2009), and recordings of themselves playing the piano, even if they received no 
auditory feedback at the time of playing (Repp & Knoblich, 2004); and to identify their own 
clapping, even when the actual claps are replaced by uniform tones (i.e., temporal 
information alone sufficed; Flach, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2004). 
Not only can people recognise their own actions, but there is converging evidence 
that people are better at perceiving and predicting their own movements than those of other 
people. For example, Knoblich and Flach (2001) found that participants were more accurate 
at predicting the final location of a dart thrown at a dartboard when watching videos of 
themselves, rather than another person, throwing the dart. Note that even though such results 
stress the difference between self and other, they also support the link between action and 
perception, because such a link would predict that when the same system perceives and 
executes an action, it will make better predictions than when two different systems are 
involved (Knoblich & Flach, 2001). Similarly, Daprati, Wriessnegger and Lacquaniti 
(2007a) found that people were faster and more accurate at making same-different 
judgements in movements when pairs of movements were their own rather than those of 
another person, and Daprati, Wriessnegger and Lacquaniti (2007b) found that people were 




their own and other people’s actions. The ability to recognise their own movements persisted 
even when participants received no visual input about their movements during the recording 
phase, implying that the results could be attributed to kinematics rather than visual feedback.
 Loula, Prasad, Harber and Shiffrar (2005) found that participants were better at 
recognising their own dancing than that of other people in point light displays, despite the 
fact that we typically observe other people dancing more often than we observe ourselves. 
An advantage for self-generated actions has also been shown in gait (Beardsworth & 
Buckner, 1981; but see Cutting & Kozlowski, 1977), moving in time with music (Sevdalis & 
Keller, 2010), and lip reading (Tye-Murray, Spehar, Myerson, Hale, & Sommers, 2013). 
These results are important for two reasons. First, they support the hypothesis that self-
generated actions are more tightly connected to the sensorimotor system than other-
generated actions; and that, by extension, first-person descriptions of actions may be more 
connected to the sensorimotor system (more “embodied”) than third-person descriptions. 
Second, they suggest that motor experience (how I perform a particular action) may play a 
greater role in action perception than visual experience (how other people perform a 
particular action): in the studies outlined above, participants were better able to recognise 
actions they perform themselves (increased motor cues), compared with actions performed 
by, and therefore observed in, other people (increased visual cues). If motor cues, rather than 
visual cues, have a privileged role in action perception, then they may also have a privileged 
role in interpreting action descriptions. In other words, comprehenders might be more likely 
to interpret a sentence such as I am slicing the tomato in line with how they personally would 
slice a tomato, rather than how they observe other people slice a tomato.  In Chapter 5, I will 







2.3. Motor resonance in language 
In the previous section, I discussed the evidence for motor resonance during action 
perception. The evidence for some form of activation of the motor system during action 
perception is compelling, but the nature of the relationship between action execution and 
perception remains unclear.  If we consider language comprehension to be a type of 
perception (e.g., Jeannerod, 2006; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010), we might also expect 
evidence for motor resonance when people understand language about actions. In fact, there 
is strong evidence for cross-talk between the action and language systems, both at the neural 
and behavioural levels (see section 2.2.3 – 2.2.4). However, questions about necessity and 
direction of causality between the action and language systems remain unanswered. In the 
coming sections, I outline the current state of the field concerning embodied approaches to 
action language comprehension. First, in section 2.3.1, I explore to what extent language 
comprehension can be considered a form of action perception. In section 2.3.2, I sketch some 
current positions about the relation between language and action, and their predictions. In 
sections 2.3.3- 2.3.5, I assess to what extent these predictions are supported by current data.  
2.3.1. Language comprehension as action perception 
In recent years, the rise in research on action perception, in particular mirror 
neurons, has led to researchers viewing language as action – and, language comprehension as 
a form of action perception (Pickering & Garrod, 2013). This apparent parallel between 
action perception and language comprehension has prompted researchers to investigate the 
role of motor resonance in language. However, Fischer and Zwaan (2008) warn against 
straightforwardly viewing language comprehension as a form of action perception, for three 
reasons.  
First, they argue that whereas the speed of action observation is determined by the 




instead by the speech rate of the speaker or reading rate of the reader. However, some 
evidence suggests that in spoken language, speech rate appears to correlate with the speed of 
the described event (Shintel, Nusbaum, & Okrent, 2006); and in written language people 
tend to be faster to respond to sentences describing short distances, compared with long 
distances (Matlock, 2004). Similarly, in a recent study using eye-tracking, participants 
listened to sentences such as the student ran/ staggered along the trail to the picnic basket 
while observing a visual array featuring the actor, the path, and the actor’s target location 
(Lindsay, Scheepers, & Kamide, 2013). Participants looked more often and for longer 
periods at the path in sentences in which the verb implies slow movement along the path 
(e.g., stagger), compared with sentences in which the verb implies fast movement along the 
path (e.g., run). These results suggest that, contrary to Zwaan and Fischer’s claim, the speed 
at which language is processed is in fact affected by the implied speed or duration of the 
action being described. However, these results only describe a very general effect of 
processing speed, comparing a “fast” condition against a “slow” condition. When observing 
an action on the other hand, the rate at which that action is understood is necessarily 
proportionate to the speed at which the action is performed. Future research should therefore 
aim to establish whether there is evidence of a similar proportional relationship between 
language processing and the speed described in a sentence.  
Fischer and Zwaan’s second point is that in sentence processing, unlike action 
perception, understanding occurs only when a uniqueness point is reached, and it is clear 
what particular action is being described. For example, in the sentence John is opening the 
can, it is only once the comprehender hears the word can that she can activate a relevant 
motor representation: the verb opening could refer to many actions, all of which require 
entail differential involvement of the motor system (e.g., opening a door, opening a 
museum). Therefore, motor resonance should arise only once the uniqueness point is 
reached. This prediction has received empirical support from studies showing that motor 




described (e.g., clockwise or anticlockwise rotation; Taylor, Lev-Ari, & Zwaan, 2008). 
However, this uniqueness point also seems to be present in action perception. For example, 
when I observe John reaching towards a desk, I may not know until quite late into his 
reaching, whether he is planning to pick up his coffee cup (i.e., execute a power grip) or his 
pencil sharpener (i.e., execute a precision grip). Given that motor resonance is sensitive to 
the distinction between power and precision grip (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; see also 
section 2.2.3), this means that in action perception, as in action language, motor resonance – 
or at least, motor resonance specific to the action being performed – occurs at a critical point, 
once there is sufficient evidence to predict one action over another. Of course, in many 
cases, the context of the action will make it clear whether John is intending to pick up his 
coffee cup or his pencil sharpener; but outside of laboratory conditions, this is also the case 
for language. It would usually be quite clear from the context of the conversation whether 
the speaker is describing John opening the can, or the museum, before the disambiguating 
word (can/ museum) has been reached. In this situation, we would expect motor resonance to 
occur before the disambiguating word (see Kaschak & Borreggine, 2008 for relevant 
discussion).  
Fischer and Zwaan’s third point is that unlike action observation, in which an 
observer necessarily sees the action in all (or most of) its entirety, language is often 
underspecified. For example, in the sentence He turned the page, it is not clear who is doing 
the turning, and what sort of page is being turned (e.g., book page, calendar page). However, 
I argue that this is a feature of language use in experimental settings (i.e., isolated sentences 
presented without context). Research suggests that for longer stretches of language, 
comprehenders appear to build a situation model in which wider contextual information can 
be stored (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1980; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). In typical language use, 
therefore, in which context is accumulated, it would be clear who was turning what sort of 
page. In this thesis, I will investigate the role of motor context (previous actions versus 




available to participants, by providing them with simple action sentences without the 
situational knowledge that would usually be present in naturalistic language comprehension. 
In this way, I hope to isolate the effects of motor activation on perspective taking in sentence 
comprehension. Once this has been established, future work should, of course, look at how 
the role of motor activation develops in more naturalistic language settings where linguistic 
context is available for the comprehender (see section 8.3.4 for further discussion of the role 
of motor resonance in naturalistic language comprehension).   
In summary, Fischer and Zwaan (2008) provide three reasons for arguing that 
language comprehension involves a different set of constraints on motor resonance, 
compared with action perception. However, on closer inspection, it seems that the constraints 
described by Fischer and Zwaan are in fact more general constraints on action perception, 
and not specific to language comprehension. It is clear, however, that there is something 
different about language compared with action observation: namely, that language involves 
both communicative and referential motor resonance (see section 1.1). Throughout the 
thesis, therefore, I will consider language comprehension as a form of action perception, 
albeit a slightly special type of perception, which involves not one but two levels of motor 
resonance. In the next section, I outline various approaches to referential meaning in 
language, and the claims that these accounts make for the link between action and language. 
2.3.2. Types of embodiment theory 
In a recent review article, Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami and Vigliocco (2012) 
placed theories of semantics on a continuum from unembodied accounts at one end, to 
strongly embodied accounts at the other. Unembodied approaches propose that semantics is 
totally amodal, and completely independent from the sensorimotor system (e.g., Latent 
Semantic Analysis; Landauer & Dumais, 1997); such accounts are strongly challenged by 
evidence for cross-talk between the language and motor systems (sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5). 




embodied in the literature, because they propose that semantic systems are amodal in nature, 
and they reject the notion of dependence between the sensorimotor and language systems 
(e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). However, secondary embodiment accounts do allow for 
associated activation between the language and the action systems. For example, Mahon and 
Caramazza (2008) accept that spreading activation might occur between the two systems 
(i.e., activation of an abstract, amodal concept can trigger cascading activation in the motor 
system). What secondary embodied accounts deny is that this motor activation plays any 
functional role in semantic processing. In other words, secondary embodied accounts predict 
that there may be temporal or spatial overlap between activation of the language and motor 
systems, but there should not be any major disruption to one system when other system is 
impaired (Meteyard et al., 2012). 
In contrast, weak embodiment accounts propose that sensory and motor information 
contributes to (but does not wholly constitute) semantics (e.g., Pulvermüller, 1999; 
Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004). These theories also predict some temporal and 
spatial overlap between activation in the motor and language systems, and, in addition, claim 
that motor activation does play a representational role in meaning; it is more than an 
epiphenomenon (cf. Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). According to Meteyard and colleagues, 
weak embodiment accounts therefore predict that disruption in one system would result in 
disruption in the other system, but they do not claim that motor activation is sufficient for 
sentence comprehension to occur. For example, we might construe Taylor and Zwaan’s 
(2013, 2009) recent proposal of fault-tolerant comprehension as weakly embodied: in this 
view, language comprehension does not fail in the absence of motor simulation, but rather, 
degrades gracefully, perhaps resulting in a slightly less rich representation of the described 
action. The proposal is attractive because is explains how motor resonance might play a role 
in language comprehension, while still allowing for comprehension to occur in the absence 
of appropriate motor activation (i.e., it does not commit us to the view that participants fail to 




Weak embodiment accounts also allow for a degree of abstraction. For example, 
Simmons and Barsalou (2003) propose that information from different modalities is bound 
together to constitute semantics – as Shapiro (2010) points out, this binding process requires 
abstraction. This hypothesised binding process also has implications for the localisation of 
action language semantics, since the “bound” representations are no longer modality 
specific, and should therefore be located adjacent to modality specific areas (Meteyard et al., 
2012). Therefore, weak embodiment accounts predict activation in areas adjacent to the 
primary motor cortex, such as the pre-motor cortex.  
Finally, Meteyard et al. characterise strong embodiment approaches by a complete 
dependence between meaning and sensorimotor activity (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), 
in which simulation is both necessary and sufficient for language comprehension: the 
activation of the motor system during action language comprehension is comprehension. 
Unlike weak embodiment accounts, strong embodiment accounts therefore predict that 
activation will occur in the same regions during action execution and action language 
understanding (i.e., the primary motor cortex). Interestingly, Meteyard et al. note that 
theories of strong embodiment tend to be concerned with sentence and narrative processing, 
which intuitively lend themselves to the idea of simulation, through situation models. For 
example, the Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg & Robertson, 
2000) proposes that comprehenders understand language by combining object affordances 
(the potential for interaction that an object presents; Ellis & Tucker, 2000) into an action 
plan; by simulating performing these actions, comprehenders understand the meaning of the 
action described in the sentence. However, note that a series of fMRI studies have suggested 
that activation of the motor system is stronger following isolated verbs (e.g., grab) than 
following third-person sentences (e.g., The fruit cake was the last one so Claire grabbed it; 
Raposo, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009), contradicting the suggestion that simulation may 
be more likely to occur in sentences than in single words. In Chapter 3, I discuss in more 




One of the difficulties with placing accounts on a continuum such as that of 
Meteyard et al. (2012), is that accounts vary along several dimensions (see also Kiefer & 
Pulvermüller, 2012). Therefore, it is that it is not always clear where an account should sit. 
In particular, the distinction between strong and weak embodiment is not clear-cut. For 
example, Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbols Systems (1999) could be classified as either 
strongly or weakly embodied, depending on which dimension (abstraction, or dependence) is 
weighted most heavily: the claim that language comprehension does not involve complete 
reenactments of previous motor activity, but only some attention-driven subsets of that 
activation, implies a degree of abstraction in line with weak embodiment. On the other hand, 
the claim that simulation constitutes understanding is strongly embodied. Compounding this 
problem is the fact that embodiment has typically been framed as an alternative to 
unembodied accounts of language. Therefore, embodied theories have rarely specified 
whether they are arguing the case for weak or strong embodiment. Many studies accept 
activation in the motor and in the pre-motor cortex as equally supportive of embodiment 
(either weak or strong), when in fact, as Meteyard et al. have pointed out, different types of 
embodied theory predict different loci of activation. In the following section, we discuss 
evidence for shared neural resources between the language and motor systems. 
2.3.3. Neural evidence for shared resources 
The neural exploitation hypothesis states that brain mechanisms adapt to serve new 
functions in addition to their original roles; in the case of motor resonance and language, 
motor systems have adapted to perform a role in language comprehension as well as action 
execution and planning (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Gallese, 2009; see also Anderson, 2010). 
In the following sections, we outline evidence that language and action activate common 
neural substrates. The implication of such evidence is that one system exploits these shared 
resources in order to aid its own processing – for example, the language system might 




Language areas activated by motor tasks 
There is increasing evidence that areas of the brain typically recruited during 
language processing and production are also recruited when performing motor tasks. Broca’s 
area is usually defined as comprising the pars opercularis and pars triangualris in the left 
inferior frontal gyrus, or Brodmann’s areas 44 and 45 (e.g., Dronkers, Plaisant, Iba-Zizen, & 
Cabanis, 2007). This area has traditionally be ascribed an important role in sentence 
processing (e.g., Dapretto & Bookheimer, 1999; Friederici, 2002). However, recent work has 
also implicated this area in motor representations. For example, research using PET showed 
activation during observation and mental imagery of grasping movements (Grafton et al., 
1996), and studies using fMRI found activation while executing and imagining object 
manipulation (Binkofski et al., 1999; Gerardin et al., 2000). 
 Broca’s area is often considered a homologue of area F5 in monkeys, where the 
mirror system is thought to be located (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010). Like mirror neurons in monkeys, there is evidence that action-based 
activation in human Broca’s area only occurs following meaningful hand to object 
interactions, rather than hand movements in general (Decety & Grèzes, 1999; Johnson-Frey 
et al., 2003). These similarities between Broca’s area in humans and area F5 in monkeys 
have led some researchers to ascribe Broca’s area an important role in the evolution of 
speech, with a pre-linguistic grammar of gestures later evolving into oro-facial 
communication and vocalisation (Arbib, 2005; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; see Corballis, 
2013, for a recent review). 
On the other hand, we must be wary of using evidence that language areas are 
activated during action as support for the claim that motor resonance is involved in language 
processing. The results highlighted above may mean no more than that areas traditionally 
associated with one function are in fact multifunctional. For example, Broca’s area is also 
activated during musical processing (see Fadiga et al., 2009 for a review) but this is not 




Motor areas activated by language tasks 
Most arguments in favour of motor resonance in language processing are therefore 
based on evidence suggesting shared resources in the other direction (i.e., that language 
processing results in activation of motor areas). For example, in a PET study, Vigliocco et 
al., (2006) found that activation in the premotor and primary motor cortex increased when 
participants listened to motor words (both verbs and nouns) compared with sensory words 
(both nouns and verbs). Oliveri et al., (2004) also crossed meaning with grammatical class, 
using TMS to measure hand MEP responses while participants performed morphological 
transformations on action- or non-action-related words. Action words mostly (but not 
entirely) referred to hand actions; hand MEPs increased for action compared with non-action 
words, suggesting that participants had accessed some of the motor properties of the words.  
In further support of the hypothesis that language comprehension involves activating 
motor systems, fMRI research has shown increased activation in motor and premotor areas 
for action words compared with object words (Kable, Kan, Wilson, Thompson-Schill, & 
Chatterjee, 2005; Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, & Chatterjee, 2002), and action words compared 
with abstract words (Noppeney, Josephs, Kiebel, Friston, & Price, 2005). Further work 
suggests activity in action-related regions for tool words compared with non-tool words 
(Martin & Chao, 2001; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996), and for manipulable 
versus non-manipulable objects (Saccuman et al., 2006).  
Of course, if we argue that language activation during motor tasks need not imply 
any interaction between the two systems, only that certain areas of the brain are 
multifunctional; then we can – and perhaps, should – also deny that motor activation during 
language processing implies any interaction, for similar reasons. However, the suggestion 
that language comprehension involves simulations of the described actions is given 
additional credence by research suggesting that the motor activation occurring during 





A key feature of both weak and strong embodied approaches to language is that both 
types of account predict a degree of specificity in motor activation, corresponding to the 
action being described (e.g., Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005). The motor strip is 
divided into precise areas corresponding to particular body parts (e.g., Pennfield & 
Rasmussen, 1950; but see Schieber, 2001, for constraints on this somatotopic organisation). 
We saw in section 2.2 that observing an action leads to specific activation of the body parts 
involved in performing that action (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001). Following on from these 
observations, embodied approaches to language make the testable prediction that the 
sensorimotor systems will be recruited during language processing in a precise, somatotopic 
manner (Chatterjee, 2010).  
Using fMRI, Hauk, Johnsrude and Pulvermüller (2004) found that listening to leg-
related words (e.g., kick) produced activation in areas of the motor strip responsible for 
planning and executing leg movements; arm-related words (e.g., pick) produced activation in 
areas associated with arm movements, and mouth-related words (e.g., lick) produced 
activation in areas associated with mouth movements. Similar fMRI findings have been 
described for spoken sentences relating to hand, foot or mouth movements, compared with 
abstract sentences (Tettamanti et al., 2005), and for visually presented action sentences 
compared with metaphorical sentences (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006). 
In a study with TMS, Buccino et al., (2005) found that hand and foot MEPs decreased when 
participants listened to hand- or foot-related sentences, respectively. All of these results 
appear to support the suggestion that the motor system is recruited during language 
comprehension, and that this recruitment is specific to the effector (arm, leg, mouth) implied 
by the described action. 
However, these findings (and in particular, their use as evidence that action language 
comprehension is based on motor simulations) are not uncontroversial. As was the case with 




interest, rather than individual cells, means that we are unable to conclude whether the same 
cells (rather than different, action- or language-specific cells in the same region) are 
activated in action and in language processing. There is also evidence that the somatotopic 
organisation described above is in fact coarse grained, with overlap between effectors both 
within and between studies (Aziz-Zadeh & Damasio, 2008; Chatterjee, 2010; Fernandino & 
Iacoboni, 2010). Other researchers have failed to find evidence of somatotopy at all 
(Arévalo, Baldo, & Dronkers, 2012; Postle, McMahon, Ashton, Meredith, & de Zubicaray, 
2008).   
Another major limitation of neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI and PET is that 
they cannot tell us the time course of activation: does language processing precede motor 
activation, or does motor activation precede language processing? For example, in fMRI, the 
blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signal typically returns to baseline 20 seconds 
after stimulus presentation. This means that we do not know whether the observed activation 
reflects an early lexico-semantic stage of processing, or a later stage involving mental 
imagery (e.g., Tomasino, Werner, Weiss, & Fink, 2007). Fortunately, other techniques 
(MEG, TMS and EEG) operate at a high level of temporal resolution (see Hauk, Shtyrov, & 
Pulvermüller, 2008, for a review). For example, face- and leg- related words were presented 
while participants underwent MEG, showing evidence for somatotopic activation from 
around ~170 ms (i.e., an early processing stage typiocally associated with lexical processing; 
Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, et al., 2005). Similar evidence of early activation (below 250 ms) has 
also been found using EEG (Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 2001; Shtyrov, Hauk, & 
Pulvermuller, 2004).  
Localising motor activation: The need for precision 
It is sometimes argued that although functional neuroimaging can help us localise 
particular processes, competing theories do not often predict differences in localisation (e.g., 




the primary motor cortex itself, whereas weak embodiment predicts activation in areas that 
are related to, but not the same as, those involved in executing the corresponding actions 
(e.g., premotor cortex
1
). Can we use these differing predictions to distinguish between strong 
and weak embodiment accounts? In short, no. In addition to concerns over the specificity of 
somatotopic activation, there is also large variability in which parts of the motor system are 
activated in different studies. Researchers commonly report activation of the motor circuits 
(e.g., Tettamanti et al., 2005) or motor system (e.g., Marino, Gallese, Buccino, & Riggio, 
2012; Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005) during language processing, but the 
exact part of the motor system in which they find this activation varies considerably between 
studies. Some studies find activation in the primary motor cortex, as predicted by strong 
embodiment accounts (Hauk et al., 2004; Vigliocco et al., 2006), but others find activation in 
the premotor cortex (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; Boulenger, Hauk, & Pulvermüller, 2009), pre-
supplementary motor area (Lyons et al., 2010), or inferior parietal lobule (Péran et al., 2010), 
as predicted by weak embodiment accounts.  
In spite of this variable localisation, researchers have tended to assume that the same 
underlying processes are at work (i.e., motor simulation), when, in fact, this need not be the 
case (Chatterjee, 2010). For example, Willems, Toni, Hagoort and Casasanto (2010) found 
that a lexical decision task produced activation in premotor areas, while a mental imagery 
task on the same words produced activation in the primary motor cortex, and non-
overlapping parts of the premotor cortex. From these differences in localisation, Willems et 
al. concluded that different cognitive processes were taking place. This example is striking 
because much of the debate over the role of the motor system in action language 
comprehension centres on the question of whether the observed effects are simply the result 
of explicit motor imagery (e.g., Tomasino et al., 2007).  
In this section, I have outlined evidence for shared neural resources between the 
language and motor systems. I have also outlined some concerns regarding this evidence, 
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including a lack of temporal resolution, and considerable variable in spatial localisation. 
Despite such concerns, cognitive psychology papers incorporating neuroimaging results are 
typically seen as more convincing than those without (McCabe & Castel, 2008; Weisberg, 
Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008), and as a result, the studies outlined above have 
been hugely influential in garnering support for embodied approaches to language. However, 
embodied accounts do not only claim shared resources between the language and motor 
systems; they also argue for various degrees of dependency relation between the two 
systems. In other words, embodied approaches predict interaction between the two systems. 
To find evidence of an interaction, we must turn to behavioural research. 
2.3.4. Effects of language on action  
The neural evidence outlined above seems to discount what Meteyard et al. (2012) 
termed unembodied accounts, but it does not provide any evidence of interference or 
facilitation between the action and language systems that might help us distinguish between 
secondary, weak, and strong embodiment approaches. In fact, there is substantial evidence 
that language affects the speed, accuracy, or kinematics of action execution, in much the 
same way as action perception does.  For example, we saw in section 2.2.2 that performing 
an action increased perceptual accuracy for congruent actions (Bidet-Ildei, Chauvin, & 
Coello, 2010). Bidet-Ildei, Sparrow and Coello (2011) extended this work by displaying an 
action word for 500 ms prior to observing actions in a point light display. When the 
movement stimulus was preceded by a congruent action verb, participants were faster to 
detect the presence of a human rather than random motion in the stimulus.  
Similarly, recall from the action-perception literature that Hamilton et al. (2004) 
found that participants tended to judge a box lifted by someone else as heavier when they 
themselves were lifting a light box, and to judge a box lifted by someone else as lighter when 
they themselves were lifting a heavy box. Hamilton et al. explained these findings by 




Wolpert & Kawato, 1998) whereby a module for a specific task (e.g., lifting a heavy box) 
can be rendered temporarily unavailable to the perceptual system when it is being used to 
execute an action (see also discussion of blindness to response-compatible stimuli in section 
2.2.3). Scorolli, Borghi and Glenberg (2009) extended this box-lifting paradigm to study the 
effect of language on action. They had participants lift identical-looking heavy or light boxes 
after listening to sentences describing lifting a light object (e.g., pill) or a heavy object (e.g., 
chest). The logic of the experiment is that, if understanding action language involves 
activating the motor system responsible for executing that action, then understanding a 
sentence like move the pillow from the ground to the table should render the module for 
lifting light objects temporarily unavailable, resulting in a delay for participants lifting a light 
object, but not a heavy object, following this sentence. Indeed, Scorolli et al. found an 
interference effect in lift delay: participants were slower to lift the box having grasped it 
when the weight implied in the sentence was congruent with the actual weight of box. The 
fact that language shows similar effects as action observation suggests that language and 
action (or at least, action perception) share common mental representations.   
Action-sentence compatibility effects  
One of the most well-known phenomena in this area of research is the Action-
Sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). In this paradigm, 
participants read a sentence describing an action in a particular direction (e.g., towards or 
away from the body), and make a sensibility judgement on that sentence by performing an 
action that is congruent or incongruent with the direction of the sentence (e.g., press button 
nearer or further from their body). A facilitation effect is typically found when the sentence 
and response direction are congruent (e.g., pressing a button further from the body in 
response to the sentence Close the drawer). As well as imperatives such as Close the drawer, 
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) also found the ACE for concrete transfer sentences (e.g., you 




ACE has since been replicated in third-person sentences such as Lea delivers the pizza to 
Lea, (Gianelli, Farnè, Salemme, Jeannerod, & Roy, 2011), although only when spatial 
avatars are provided for the agent (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). The ACE has also 
been found using auditory sentences, in a go-no go paradigm (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006), 
and in American sign language (Secora & Emmorey, 2013). Aravena et al., (2010) recently 
provided evidence for a neural signature of the ACE using open and closed handshapes 
rather than direction of movement.  
Furthermore, Glenberg et al. (2008) extended work on the ACE by applying TMS to 
measure MEPs while participants responded to Italian sentences describing no transfer, 
concrete transfer, or abstract transfer. For technical reasons, MEPs could not be measured for 
towards and away movements, and so instead the authors measured grasping-related 
activation both during and after sentence processing. Findings showed increased activation 
when TMS was delivered at the end of the verb compared with the end of the sentence; and 
increased activation for transfer versus non-transfer sentences. There was no difference 
between concrete and abstract transfer sentences. These results suggest that the ACE occurs 
equally for concrete and abstract transfer sentences, and that motor resonance occurs during, 
rather than after sentence processing. Results from Zwaan and Taylor (2006) also suggest 
that motor resonance is a short-lived, localised phenomenon: participants turning a knob in a 
self-paced reading paradigm were faster to turn the knob when the verb matched the 
direction of turning (clockwise, anti-clockwise); but the effect was restricted to the verb in 
the sentence and did not spill over onto later words. 
Timing and effect direction 
In section 2.2.2, I discussed the fact that the direction of effects found in automatic 
imitation was inconsistent, and the temporal dynamics might play an important role in 
determining the direction: when participants observe an action and subsequently perform an 




an action simultaneously, interference effects have been found (e.g., Kilner et al., 2003). The 
results in action language comprehension seem even less consistent. For example, when 
Buccino et al. (2005) stimulated arm or leg areas using MEPs as participants listened to arm- 
or leg-related sentences, they found reduced MEPs in the congruent condition. In a follow up 
behavioural study using semantic categorisation, they found slower RTs when participants 
responded using an effector that was congruent with the action described in the sentence. On 
the other hand, Pulvermüller, Hauk, et al., (2005) found increased MEPs in the congruent 
condition when they applied TMS to leg- or arm-areas. Similarly, Kaschak et al. (2005) 
found that participants were slower to make sensibility judgements on sentences while 
watching motion in a congruent direction; but a study using the same linguistic materials 
found that when the implied motion was presented auditorily, instead of visually, 
participants were faster to make sensibility judgements in the congruent condition (Kaschak, 
Zwaan, Aveyard, & Yaxley, 2006; see section 2.4.1 for a review of effects in behavioural 
research).  
Could temporal dynamics help explain the inconsistency in action language research 
as well as in automatic imitation? The studies by Glenberg et al. (2008), and Zwaan and 
Taylor (2006) outlined above suggest that the ACE occurs at specific points in time rather 
than throughout the entire sentence. The direction of response might therefore depend on the 
point in time at which a response is made. For example, Boulenger et al. (2006) found 
evidence that action verbs affect movement kinematics, and that this effect reverses 
depending on the timing constraints. A stimulus was presented on screen just after 
participants began a grasping movement in a go/ no go task; if the stimulus presented was a 
word, participants had to complete the grasping action, and if it was not a word, participants 
had to interrupt the grasping action. Results showed that when action verbs (but not concrete 
nouns) were presented, participants’ hand acceleration decreased, implying an interference 
effect of language on action. The effect was stronger for hand than for non-hand related 




verbs, implying some degree of abstraction over the effector used). Boulenger et al. (2008) 
used subliminal display of words to rule out conscious imagery of the described action as the 
cause. However, when Boulenger et al. (2006) presented the word/ non-word stimulus before 
participants initiated their grasping action, hand acceleration increased rather than decreased, 
suggesting a facilitation effect. Willems and Hagoort (2007) note that Boulenger et al.’s 
results might help explain the discrepancy between the lowered MEPs in Buccino et al. 
(2005)’s TMS study, and the increased MEPs in other studies (e.g., Oliveri et al., 2004; 
Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005). In Buccino et al.’s study, TMS was 
applied during sentence presentation, so that language processing was not yet complete (as in 
Boulenger’s Expt. 1); in the studies by Pulvermüller et al. and Oliveri et al., TMS was 
applied once language processing was complete (as in Boulenger’s Expt. 2).  
Affordances 
The term affordances originally dates from Gibson (1977), where it refers to the 
action possibilities afforded to a particular organism by objects or the environment (e.g., a 
tree might afford climbing to a squirrel, but not to a whale). More recently, the term has been 
used to describe automatically elicited action possibilities, which are related to specific 
components of action, for example grasping with a power versus a precision grip (Symes et 
al., 2008; Tucker & Ellis, 2001, 2004). Over the past decade, researchers have become 
increasingly aware that language can affect how people carry out particular actions, by 
tapping into these action-relevant properties (affordances) such as orientation or size. For 
example, Creem and Proffitt (2001) found that participants asked to recall one word from a 
pair of semantically related words (e.g. celery – pear), were less likely to grasp a tool (e.g., a 
spatula) in a way that would afford normal tool use, compared with participants who 
completed a visuo-spatial or no concurrent task.  However, note that the word pairs used by 
Creem and Proffit were drawn from a range of categories (e.g., food, furniture, animals) and 




possible effect of language in general on action, but not the semantic specific interference 
that embodied theories (strong or weak) would predict. In fact, it may be the case that the 
semantic task was simply more challenging than the visuo-spatial task.  
Evidence for a more specific effect of language on action comes from a recent study 
in which participants performed a lexical decision task where the critical words denoted 
objects that are typically used by being brought towards the body (e.g., cup), or away from 
the body (e.g., key). Participants were faster to respond when the direction of response 
(towards or away from body) matched the direction in which the object was typically moved 
(Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, 2010). These results suggest 
that semantic information about an object can activate motor programmes connected with the 
typical affordances for that object (see also Lindemann, Stenneken, van Schie, & Bekkering, 
2006).      
Interactions between language and affordances also occur when semantic processing 
is irrelevant to the task. For example, participants were more likely to use a power grip to 
pick up a wooden block when they had just read a word referring to an object typically 
manipulated with power grip (e.g., apple); and more likely to use a precision grip to pick up 
an identical block when they had just read a word referring to an object typically 
manipulated using a precision grip (e.g., grape; Glover, Rosenbaum, Graham, & Dixon, 
2004). Similarly, Gentilucci and Gangitano (1998) had participants reach for and grasp a rod 
on which the Italian word for long or short was printed. The kinematics of participants’ 
reaching movements tended to approach the rod as near or far, according to whether it 
featured the word long or short, even though word reading was irrelevant to the task (see 
also Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, & Gangitano, 2000). Glover and Dixon (2002) 
found that this affect occurred early on but dissipated as participant’s hands approached the 
stimulus, implying that the effect was restricted to the early planning stages of movement.  
We saw in section 2.3.2 that affordances play an important role in Glenberg’s 




Glenberg, 2000), which claims that comprehenders combine affordances derived from 
language into potential action plans, which are used to simulate the actions described in the 
sentence. In support of the Indexical Hypothesis, Borghi (2004) had participants read a 
sentence (e.g., the woman shares the orange), followed by a noun (e.g., slice or pulp). The 
task was to decide whether or not the noun referred to part of the object mentioned in the 
sentence. When a noun was easier to derive an affordance from (e.g., it is easier to derive the 
act of sharing from slice than from pulp), the subsequent word was processed more quickly, 
even though both nouns were semantically related to the critical word in the sentence. These 
results support the Indexical Hypothesis by suggesting that we understand sentences through 
processing the affordances of the objects being referred to, rather than through associative 
relations between words. 
One relevant observation about affordances, made by Borghi and Riggio (2009), is 
that they can remain constant across different contexts (stable affordances; e.g., object size), 
or they can change according to the context (temporary affordances; e.g., object orientation). 
A canonical affordance is a special kind of affordance, which captures the way in which we 
typically use (rather than, for example, move or clean) a given object. For instance, a 
calculator might be passed to a friend the right way up or upside down (temporary 
affordance), but our use of a calculator is typically restricted to cases where it is right way up 
(canonical affordance). Crucially then, canonical affordances are based on our previous 
experience. Borghi argues that action perception recruits temporary affordances, as an object 
is presented to us at that point in time. However, in language processing, we construct a 
motor prototype, based on canonical affordances (Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Borghi, 2013). 
Thus, in the Indexical Hypothesis, comprehenders build potential action plans based on the 
way that they have typically interacted with objects in the past. Note that this recruitment of 
canonical affordances in language entails a degree of abstraction over accumulated 
sensorimotor experience, just as Barsalou’s perceptual symbols entail an abstraction over the 




2.3.5. Effects of action on language 
Evidence outlined in the previous section suggests that language does affect motor 
responses, in particular by affecting the way we process a describe object’s affordances. 
However, what embodied accounts of language processing (both weak and strong) would 
really like to show is that the relationship is two-directional – in other words, an effect of 
motor resonance on language processing – since this would support the claim that language 
is at least partly dependent on the sensorimotor system. There are main two sources of 
evidence for a functional role of the motor system in language processing. First, language 
processing in patients with motor impairments; and second, language processing in healthy 
participants whose motor system has been temporarily activated as part of an experimental 
design. In the following sections, I briefly review these two literatures. 
Patient studies 
A feature of patient studies through the years has been a reliable double dissociation 
between the language and action systems (e.g., paralysis with intact language function, 
versus aphasia with intact motor function; Pulvermüller, 2005). This double dissociation 
seems to rule out strong embodied accounts that posit a total reliance of meaning on the 
relevant sensorimotor systems.  
However, a range of studies examining specific action verb deficits in patients with 
reduced motor control, do suggest some language impairment, in support of weak 
embodiment theories. For example, Neininger and Pulvermüller (2003) found that in a 
lexical decision task, patients with lesions in the right temporo-occipital cortex (associated 
with visual processing) showed a relative disadvantage in accuracy for nouns with strong 
visual associations; and patients with hemiparalysis, and lesions in the right frontal cortex 
(associated with motor processing), showed a relative disadvantage for verbs with strong 
motor associations. An impairment for verbs relative to nouns has also been observed in 




Xuereb, Boniface, & Hodges, 2001), corticobasal degeneration and supranuclear palsy 
(Cotelli et al., 2006), Parkinson’s disease (Cotelli et al., 2007; Péran, Rascol, Celsis, 
Nespoulous, & Dubois, 2003), and Huntington’s disease (Péran, 2004). Importantly, 
Boulenger, Mechtouff, et al. (2008) found that the effect of masked priming on lexical 
decision for action verbs compared with concrete nouns was stronger in Parkinson’s patients 
who were on, compared with off, dopamine treatment (known to improve motor cortex 
function; see Boulenger, Mechtouff et al. for discussion). However, unlike studies on healthy 
controls (Oliveri et al., 2004; Vigliocco et al., 2006), none of the above studies crossed 
grammatical class (verb, noun) with meaning (action, non-action). Therefore, their results 
cannot differentiate between a selective deficit for verb processing (caused by damage or 
degradation to the language system), and a selective deficit for action-related words (caused 
by damage or degradation of the motor system).  
A more recent study (Péran et al., 2009) attempted to dissociate these two factors by 
using fMRI to measure activity as participants named images of objects, or produced verbs 
associated with the depicted object. The objects could be functionally manipulated (e.g., key) 
or could not be functionally manipulated (e.g., bee). Therefore, verbs produced in response 
to manipulable objects (e.g., key – turn), would be expected to have a higher actionable-
content than verbs produced in response to non-manipulable objects (e.g. bee – buzz). 
Behavioural results showed that reaction times for verb generation were slower for 
manipulable than for non-manipulable objects, suggesting an additional impairment in 
producing verbs with an actionable semantic content, over and above a general deficit for 
verbs. Importantly, the authors found a significant positive correlation between the severity 
of motor deficit (as revealed by pre-tests) and the amount of activation in motor and pre-
motor cortex during verb generation.  
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) suggest that patient studies such as those of 
Boulenger et al. (2008), and Neininger and Pulvermuller (2003), provide some of the 




lexical processing. However, note that both of these studies used lexical decision, a task 
which does not usually require deep semantic processing, and indeed for which other studies 
on healthy participants have failed to find embodied effects (Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio, 
Gallese, & Buccino, 2008). A further point to bear in mind when considering patient studies, 
is that right sided lesions resulting in impairment of action language processing or semantic 
knowledge are extremely rare (Kemmerer, Rudrauf, Manzel, & Tranel, 2012). In other 
words, even if damage to the motor system does result in action-language processing 
deficits, this only seems to occur when the damage occurs in the language-dominant left 
hemisphere, implying that degradation of language-related structures might also be involved 
in such deficits. Finally, note also that the majority of patient studies investigate deficits in 
verb generation or production, compared with embodiment research on healthy participants, 
which looks almost exclusively at language comprehension. Overall therefore, patient 
studies, while certainly suggestive of some amount of crosstalk between the language and 
motor systems, can provide only limited evidence for the routine involvement of motor 
resonance in typical language comprehension. 
Motor activation primes language representations 
Somewhat surprisingly, given that embodied approaches predict an effect of the 
motor system on language processing, research in this area is much sparser than research 
looking at the effect of language on action execution. Two notable studies have investigated 
the possibility of such an effect through the use of TMS. Willems, Labruna, D’Esposito, Ivry 
and Casasanto (2011) found that right-handed participants were faster to perform lexical 
decisions on manual action verbs than non-action verbs following stimulation of the left 
premotor hand area. Pulvermüller, Hauk, et al. (2005) used TMS to stimulate leg- and arm-
related areas of the primary motor cortex, prior to presentation of leg- or arm-related action 
words. Participants used lip movements to respond on a go-no go lexical decision task: they 




arm-areas, and faster to respond to leg-related words than arm-related words following 
stimulation of leg-areas. As with the results of Willems et al, these effects were only 
observed when TMS was applied to the language dominant left-hemisphere; no such effects 
were found applying TMS to arm- or leg-related areas in the right hemisphere, or during 
sham stimulation. The authors concluded that activation in the motor system facilitates 
lexical access to words that share a motor feature, such as effector, with this activation. In 
other words, motor activation primes visual word recognition, through shared representations 
between the motor and language systems.  
Turning to behavioural research, the most well-known evidence for an effect of 
action on language is a study in which participants spent ~20 minutes moving beans towards 
or away from their body. In a subsequent sensibility judgement, participants were faster to 
respond to sentences implying the same direction of movement (towards, away) as they had 
performed in the training session (Glenberg, Sato, & Cattaneo, 2008). Other behavioural 
evidence is limited. For example, Helbig, Graf and Kiefer (2006) used a semantic priming 
paradigm, and found that participants were faster to name target pictures of objects when a 
previously presented picture showed an object that was used in a similar way as the target 
object (e.g., nutcracker – pliers), compared with when the prime object was used in a 
different way (e.g., nutcracker – frying pan). Helbig et al. interpreted these findings in terms 
of the role of action representations in object recognition, but, since the task was object 
naming, the results could equally be interpreted in terms of action representations and lexical 
access (i.e., between the motor and language systems). However, objects that are used in 
similar ways tend to share visual features (Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, van Rooij, van Dam, 
& Bekkering, 2010). Therefore, it is difficult to rule out a priming effect between perceptual 
form and language (e.g., Huettig & Altmann, 2007; Huettig & McQueen, 2011), rather than 
an effect of action on language.  
Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) therefore had participants perform a lexical decision task 




calculator versus bookend), while rotating a disk in the right hand. The disc rotation allowed 
Rueschemeyer and colleagues to activate participants’ motor system while not activating 
perceptual features associated with the described objects. The distinction between 
functionally-manipulable, and non-functionally-manipulable words was motivated by a small 
body of literature suggesting that functional information about how an object is used, is 
activated more quickly and reliably than volumetric information about how an object is 
moved (Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008; Buxbaum, Kyle, Tang, & Detre, 2006; Masson, Bub, & 
Newton-Taylor, 2008). Functional words may therefore involve the motor system to a larger 
extent than do volumetric words (see Péran et al., 2009 earlier in this section). Rueschemeyer 
et al. found that participants were faster and more accurate to respond to the functional 
words, compared with the volumetric words, suggesting that activation of the motor system 
facilitated recognition of those words in which motor resources played a more important role 
(see also Witt, Kemmerer, Linkenauger, & Culham, 2010).  
Importantly, by using disc rotation to control for perceptual form similarities, 
Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) abstracted away from the particular type of action associated 
with their target action-words. Therefore, while their study suggests that generalised 
activation in the motor system may affect processing of action-related words, the results fail 
to demonstrate the level of specificity that would be required to support the proposal that 
comprehenders simulate the particular action being described. In a study preceding the recent 
upsurge in interest in the role of motor representations in language processing, Klatzky, 
Pellegrino, McCloskey and Doherty (1989) cued participants to make one of four different 
handshapes (poke/ pinch/ palm/ clench), before asking them to make a sensibility judgement 
on short phrases such as squeeze a tomato. Participants were faster to make these judgements 
when the handshape required to perform the action in sentence was congruent with the 
handshape prime, compared with when it was incongruent with the prime. This study 
suggests that activating the motor system for a particular action, may facilitate 




prime linguistic representations. In Chapter 7, I describe three studies that build on this work, 
to investigate a causal role of motor activation in language processing.  
Necessity and causation 
One advantage of conceiving the relationship between motor activation and 
language processing as a type of priming, is that it allows us to posit that the two systems 
involve shared representations, while relieving us of the burden of motor activation being 
either necessary, or sufficient, for action language comprehension. Therefore, cases in which 
there is no relevant action representation, but in which language is (presumably) understood 
regardless, no longer present a problem. Consider the case of structural priming: exposure to 
a particular syntactic form can prime the language user to repeat that form in production, or 
to interpret future sentences using the same structure (for a review, see Pickering & Ferreira, 
2009). However, nowhere in the structural priming literature is it claimed that such priming 
is either necessary or sufficient for language processing to occur – rather, the more modest 
claim is made that in those cases where priming is possible, it facilitates a particular 
interpretation of language. In this thesis, I therefore argue that where there is shown to be an 
effect of action on language, the relationship between the language and motor systems 
represents a type of priming. In other words, action representations do not cause action 
language comprehension, but they facilitate a particular type of interpretation, one that is in 
line with recent motor system activation 
It will be useful at this point to describe exactly what is mean by the terms 
simulation, embodiment, and understanding, under the above proposal. Simulation is used in 
this thesis to refer to the unconscious, automatic (in the sense of Heyes, 2010) activation of 
the same motor systems that would be used to perform a (linguistically described) action. In 
other words, it is used interchangeably with referential motor resonance. Embodiment is used 
to refer to the view that motor activation plays some role in the understanding of language. 




see section 2.3.2); however, my proposal is that motor activation is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for understanding. Understanding therefore retains the amodal symbols and 
abstract operations assumed in most traditional psycholinguistic theories of semantics; it is 
these symbols and operations that allow understanding to occur in the absence of relevant 
motor activation. When motor activation is present during, or perhaps prior to language 
processing, this activation primes the comprehender to produce a particular type of 
simulation (e.g., slicing a tomato with a left hand rather than with a right hand). The way in 
which a particular sentence is understood might therefore vary with the type of motor 
activation available, in the same way that an ambiguous high/ low attachment sentence might 
be understood to mean different things depending on whether it was preceded by a high or 
low attachment prime. In both cases however, understanding still occurs in situations where 
no prime is available. See section 8.3.6 for further an evaluation of this proposal based on the 
results from Experiments 1-9. 
2.4. Flexibility in embodied representations 
In sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5, I outlined some of the considerable evidence for cross-
talk between the language and action systems. Embodied approaches to language argue that 
this cross-talk reflects the fact that semantic representations of action language are at least 
partly constituted by action simulations in the motor system (e.g., Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; 
Taylor & Zwaan, 2009). Some researchers have argued that the link between language and 
action is immediate and automatic (Pulvermüller, 2005); this claim is supported by evidence 
that the link occurs early on in processing (Hauk & Pulvermüller, 2004; Pulvermüller, Härle, 
& Hummel, 2000), and remains even when processing the action words is irrelevant to the 
task (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005; Shtyrov, Hauk, & Pulvermuller, 2004; but 
see Hoedemaker & Gordon, 2013). However, we also saw in section 2.3.3 that there is 
potentially worrying inconsistency in the localisation of activation in neuroimaging research 




research in embodied approaches to action language yields similarly inconsistent results, 
with different studies finding results in different directions (facilitation versus interference), 
or no effects at all (see Table 2-1 for a summary of findings). In particular, effects seem to 
vary depending on the linguistic context of the stimuli (first-person versus third-person; 
present tense versus past tense), and the strategic context of the task (deep processing versus 
shallow processing; blocked trials versus randomised trials). This variability, and its 
implications for the automaticity of embodied semantic representations, is discussed in more 
detail below. 
2.4.1. Sensitivity to context 
Researchers have attempted to explain inconsistencies in the behavioural data in 
terms of temporal dynamics (e.g., Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Kaschak & Borreggine, 
2008), or the level of semantic processing required by the task (e.g., Sato, Mengarelli, 
Riggio, Gallese, & Buccino, 2008). A consultation of Table 2-1 suffices to show that the 
latter explanation cannot be the whole story – for example, whereas Sato et al. found no 
embodiment effects in a lexical decision task requiring relatively shallow semantic 
processing, other researchers did find behavioural effects in lexical decision (e.g., Boulenger 
et al., 2006; Rueschemeyer, Pfeiffer, & Bekkering, 2010; van Dam, Rueschemeyer, 
Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2010). An explanation in terms of timing of stimuli alone is 
similarly insufficient: Borreggine and Kaschak (2006) found a facilitative ACE when the 
response direction cue was presented at sentence onset; but Diefenbach, Rieger, Massen and 
Prinz (2013), using the same timings, observed an interference effect. Diefenbach and 
colleagues explain this discrepancy by pointing to the fact that although their response 
direction cue appeared on screen at the same time as that of Borreggine and Kaschak, it 
remained onscreen for longer, meaning that some participants may not have immediately 




Borreggine and Kaschak provides a particularly striking example of the fact that effect 
direction appears to depend on theoretically irrelevant differences between studies. 
The role of experimental power 
One possible explanation for the inconsistency in findings, in particular where there 
are no consistent differences in experimental parameters such as timing or task, is variation 
in the amount of experimental power between different studies. The majority of studies in 
Table 2-1 did not report their results in sufficient detail to allow power analyses to be 
conducted. I therefore calculated the number of observations per cell in the experimental 
design in order to gain some comparable measure of power across studies. We can see that 
some inconsistencies might indeed be explained by differences in power. For example, 
Borghi and Scorolli (2009) found a null effect when randomising hand- and foot-related 
stimuli, and a significant congruency advantage when these stimuli were blocked. The 
authors attribute the null result to the randomisation procedure, but closer analysis reveals 
that there were only half as many observations in the randomised version as in the blocked 
version of the experiment. Clearly then, we cannot rule out that the null result was due to 
lower experimental power.  
On the other hand, several other papers report two or more experiments showing 
differences in effect direction, but keep the number of observations per condition constant 
between studies (e.g., Bergen & Wheeler, 2010; Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Boulenger, 
2006). In addition, although experimental power might explain inconsistencies in whether or 
not a result is significant, it seems more difficult to invoke experimental power to explain 
significant effects in opposite directions, as are seen throughout the embodiment literature. 
Therefore, although differences in experimental power should be checked, doing so reveals 
no clear pattern that might explain the inconsistency in embodiment findings. I therefore 




experimental parameters. Identifying what these parameters are is an important next step in 
embodiment research. 
The role of strategy 
Recently, Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto and Tomasino (2012) demonstrated that the 
motor system’s response to words depends not only on the meaning of that word, but also on 
the type of strategy used in a previous, apparently unrelated, task. Participants underwent an 
fMRI scan while reading Italian verbs describing manual actions (e.g., stir) or psychological 
states (e.g., adore). Previous research has shown that manual action verbs elicit more 
activation in motor regions of the brain, compared with state or psychological verbs (e.g., 
Rueschemeyer, van Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, 2010). However, before 
reading the verbs in Papeo et al.’s study, participants completed a mental rotation task 
relying on either a motor or a visual strategy (Wraga, Thompson, Alpert, & Kosslyn, 2003). 
Results showed that the previous task context (motor-based or visual-based strategy) affected 
activation in response to the verbs. Notably, state verbs following the motor-based mental 
rotation task showed increased activation in motor areas compared with state verbs following 
the visual-based rotation task. The authors suggest that these results have important 
implications for fMRI studies in which blocked designs mean that participants are first asked 
to perform an action execution task in order to “localise” motor areas, and then to perform a 
language based task. 
It is important to note however, that such results, coupled with the inconsistency in 
findings outlined above, do not necessarily challenge the assertion that the link between 
language and action is automatic. Heyes (2011, p. 470) defines automaticity in relation to 
automatic imitation (i.e., visuomotor priming; see section 2.2.2) as meaning that the 
phenomenon occurs “independent of the actors’ intentions”. This definition of automaticity 
is compatible with the observed inconsistency in embodied cognition results, provided that 




control. What these results do mean, however, is that researchers in this field need to 
systematically explore in which contexts language appears to interact in particular ways with 
the motor system, and to incorporate these details into their theories.  
The role of linguistic context 
For example, linguistic context appears to affect how the language and motor 
systems interact with one another, although the exact manner in which this occurs in unclear. 
Some researchers have found significant interactions between language and action using 
third-person sentences such as Dave removed the screw from the wall (Taylor et al., 2008; 
Taylor & Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), but other researchers have found that third-
person language appears to elicit different representations compared with first- and second-
person sentences (Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & Taylor, 2009; Brunyé, Ditman, 
Mahoney, & Taylor, 2011). I discuss the issue of self-referential versus third-person 
language in some detail in Chapter 3, since this is an issue that will be investigated 
empirically in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Sentence tense also appears to influence results in a somewhat inconsistent manner. The 
majority of studies investigating the ACE use present tense stimuli, after Glenberg and 
Kaschak (2002). A direct comparison between present and past tense sentences found the 
ACE in present tense stimuli only (Bergen & Wheeler, 2010). However, Aravena et al. 
(2010), using handshapes rather than response direction, found an ACE-type effect in 
Spanish past tense sentences. A recent fMRI study showed sensorimotor activation in 
response to Hebrew sentences in the past and present tense, but not to future tense sentences 
(Gilead, Liberman, & Maril, 2013). The within-study contrasts in which researchers alter the 
linguistic context (e.g., person; tense) while maintaining the same task, with diverging 
results, demonstrate that linguistic context does play a role in the interaction between 





Author Date Journal Stimuli Task Observations 
per cell 
Direction of effect 
Ambrosini et al. 2012 Conscious Cogn Word pair Go/ no go sensibility judgement 210 Facilitation 
Aravena et al. 2010 PLOS ONE Sentence Sensibility judgement 676 Facilitation 
Bergen & Wheeler 2010 Brain Lang Sentence Sensibility judgement 1400/1400 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on gram. aspect 
       
Bidet Ildei et al. 2011 Acta Psychol Word Task irrelevant word 864 Facilitation 
Borghi 2004 Acta Psychol Sentence Part verification 228 Facilitation 
Borghi et al. 2004 Mem Cognition Sentence Part verification 760 Facilitation 
Borghi & Riggio 2009 Brain Res Sentence Sentence-picture matching 1440 Facilitation 
Borghi & Scorolli 2009 Hum Movement Sci Vb phrase Sensibility judgement 912/528 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on blocking 
       
Borreggine & Kaschak 2006 Cognitive Sci Sentence Go/ no go sensibility judgement 240/240 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on timing 
       
Boulenger et al. 2006 J Cognitive Neurosci Word Go/ no go lexical decision 378/378 Interference / facilitation  
depending on timing 
       
Boulenger et al. 2008 J Physiology Paris Word Task irrelevant word 1750 Facilitation 
Bub et al. 2008 Cognition Word Lexical decision 
Silent reading 
768 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on task 
       
Buccino et al. 2005 Cognitive Brain Res Sentence Go/ no go semantic categorisation 400 Interference 
Creem & Proffit 2001 J Exp Psychol 
Human 
Word Word recall 270 Interference 
De Vega et al. 2013 Psychol Res Sentence Silent reading 420 Interference 
Dalla Volta et al. 2009 Exp Brain Res Word Go/ no go semantic categorisation 160 Interference 
 




Diefenbach et al. 2013 Front Psychol Sentence Go/ no go sensibility judgement 160/80 Interference / facilitation  
depending on timing 
       
Gentilucci & 
Gangitano 
1998 Eur J Neurosci Word Task irrelevant word 84 Facilitation 
Gentilucci et al. 2000 Exp Brain Res Word Task irrelevant word 84 Facilitation 
Gianelli et al. 2011 PLOS ONE Sentence Sensibility judgement 680/680 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on subject  
       
Glenberg et al. 2002 Psychon B Rev Sentence Sensibility judgement 352 Facilitation 
Glenberg et al. 2008 Q J Exp Psychol Sentence Sensibility judgement 352 Facilitation 
Glover et al. 2002 Exp Brain Res Word Task irrelevant word 60 Facilitation 
Glover et al.  2004 Exp Brain Res Word Silent reading 120 Facilitation 
Helbig et al. 2006 Exp Brain Res Word Picture naming 288 Null effect 
Kaschak & Borreggine 2008 Q J Exp Psychol Sentence Action execution 540 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on timing 
       
Kaup et al. 2010 Brain Lang Sentence Sensibility judgement 160/160 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on gram. aspect 
       
Klatzky 1989 J Mem Lang Sentence Sensibility judgement 128 Facilitation 
Liepelt et al. 2012 Psychol Res Word Action verb naming 1280 Facilitation 
Lindemann et al. 2006 J Exp Psychol 
Human 
Word Go/ no go lexical decision/  
letter detection / 
semantic categorisation/  
 
576/300 Facilitation / null effect  
depending on task 
       
Masson et al. 2008 Q J Exp Psychol Sentence Reading aloud 270 Facilitation 
Mirabella et al. 2012 PLOS ONE Word Go/ no go semantic categorisation 180 Interference 








Nazir et al. 2008 Q J Exp Psychol Word Go/ no go lexical decision 378 Interference 
Postle et al. 2013 Front Human 
Neurosci 
Sentence Silent reading/  
reading aloud 
675 Interference 
       
Rueschemeyer et al. 2010 Neuropsychologia Word Go/ no go lexical decision 760 Facilitation 
Sato et al. 2008 Brain Lang Word Go/ no go lexical decision/  
Go/ no go semantic categorisation 
120/120 Interference/ null effect  
depending on task 
       
Scorolli et al. 2009 Exp Brain Res Sentence Passive listening 54 Interference 
Springer & Prinz 2010 Q J Exp Psychol Word Grammatical class judgement/ 
lexical decision 
918 Facilitation 
       
Taylor & Zwaan 2008 Q J Exp Psychol Sentence Silent reading 816 Facilitation 
Taylor et al. 2008 Brain Lang Sentence Silent reading 1248 Facilitation 
Tucker & Ellis 2004 Acta Psychol Word Task irrelevant word 2560 Facilitation 
Van Dam et al. 2010 Front Psychol Word Go/ no go lexical decision 1400 Facilitation 
Van Elk & Blanke 2011 Acta Psychol Word Iconicity judgement 504 Facilitation 
Van Elk et al. 2009 Cognition Word Go/ no go semantic categorisation 480 Facilitation 
Wang et al. 2012 Acta Psychol Word Spatial verification 490 Facilitation 
Witt et al. 2010 Psychol Sci Word Picture naming 1512 Interference 
Zwaan et al. 2010 Brain Lang Narrative Silent reading 480 Facilitation 






a null result for past tense sentences; other authors finding a significant ACE) mean that we 
cannot easily interpret the role of linguistic context. 
2.4.2. Flexibility in simulation: Prediction versus experience 
The increasing awareness of the importance of context in action-language cross-talk 
(see section 2.4.1. above) has led some researchers to view language-based motor resonance 
as a flexible process that, rather than simply replaying previous experiences, may in fact 
help us predict future events (Borghi, 2013; Rueschemeyer & Bekkering, 2013).  
Until recently, most embodied accounts of language have stressed the role of past 
experience in motor resonance. For example, Barsalou’s (1999) Perceptual Symbols account 
proposes that, during language comprehension, top-down simulators re-enact the state of 
activation that has previously been experienced when observing an object being referred to. 
Associationist theories argue that the relation between semantics and the motor system is 
based on Hebbian learning; during language acquisition, action verbs tend to be encountered 
in a motor context, leading to synaptic connections between the word and relevant motor 
area (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Hauk, 
2009). When an action word is later encountered, the motor area is therefore immediately 
and automatically activated, without top-down intervention. In both cases, simulation is 
conceived as an internal non-conscious representation of previous actions. We call this 
process retrospective simulation. However, action simulation might also occur from a 
prospective point of view. In other words, simulation might involve forming predictive 
motor plans about future actions.  
Prospective simulation and forward models 
In the motor control literature, anticipation of upcoming actions is framed in terms 
of forward models, which compare predicted feedback from a given motor command with 




necessary (Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Wolpert, 1997). The motor system is therefore conceived 
as being engineered to anticipate the future actions, through a process of simulation 
(Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001), and indeed, one of the major benefits of simulation is that it 
allows anticipation of upcoming actions and their consequences (Prinz, 2006). Pickering and 
Garrod (2013) recently appealed to forward models as a means of integrating language 
production and comprehension, with a focus on communicative motor resonance. However, 
forward models might also influence language comprehension through referential motor 
resonance. In fact, Glenberg’s Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak 
& Glenberg, 2000) is based on combining affordances in action plans, rather than simple 
reenactments, and therefore hints at the possibility of prospective simulation.  
Note that both retrospective and prospective simulation would draw on motor 
prototypes – that is, representations of how actions typically occur, based on previous 
experience and canonical affordances (Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Borghi, 2013). However, 
whereas retrospective simulation would simply involve running a simulation of a motor 
prototype, prospective simulation would involve using this prototype to predict future 
actions (see also Pezzulo & Castelfranchi, 2009). A key aim of this thesis is to investigate 
the relative roles of retrospective and prospective simulation on action language 
comprehension. Do language comprehenders merely simulate their previous long-term 
motor experience, or do they adapt to the current motor context in order to better predict 
future actions? One means of investigating this question is to look at body specificity in 
action language comprehension. 
2.4.3. Body-Specificity 
We saw in section 2.2.3 that motor cues seem to player a stronger role in action 
recognition than visual cues –people are better at recognising their own dancing movements 
than those of other people’s, despite having more experience of observing other people 




the next section we discuss evidence that action representations code for the specific effector 
(left or right hand) that an individual typically uses to perform particular actions. 
The Body-Specificity Hypothesis 
Left- and right-handed actors typically perform unimanual actions with their left or 
right hands, respectively. However, both groups have the experience of viewing other people 
perform more right-handed actions than left-handed actions, due to the larger number of 
right-handed actors in the world. The results of Loula et al.’s (2005) study suggest that the 
motor cue (dominant hand) should override the visual cue (right hand), and converging 
evidence suggests that this is indeed the case. For example, Sartori, Begliomini and Castiello 
(2013) recently used TMS to measure MEPs from the dominant and non-dominant hands of 
right- and left-handed participants as they observed a left- or right-handed grasping action. 
Participants showed increased MEPs in their dominant hand when observing both right- and 
left-handed actions, indicating that motor resonance reflects an individual’s own motor 
experience in the world. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that participants 
initially activated a left-handed neural response to the left-handed stimuli, but then 
transferred this activation in order to prepare a right-handed response. Perhaps more 
compelling evidence comes from Willems, Toni, Hagoort and Casasanto (2009), who tested 
both left- and right-handed participants. In their study, participants imagined performing 
manual actions while undergoing fMRI; results showed differential activation between the 
two groups of participants, with right-handers showing left-lateralised activation, and left-
handers showing right-lateralised activation. These results lend support to the Body-
Specificity Hypothesis (Casasanto, 2011; Casasanto, 2009), which states that  
 
“If concepts and word meanings are constituted in part by simulations of people’s 
own perceptions and actions, then people with different bodily characteristics, who interact 
with their physical environments in systematically different ways, should form 





The Body-Specificity Hypothesis originated from a series of studies looking at 
emotional valence, in which participants were asked, for example, to indicate whether a 
positively or negatively valenced animal should be placed in a box on the right side of the 
page, or in a box the left side of the page (Casasanto, 2009). Previous research on right-
handers had suggested that positive valence is associated with the right side of the body, and 
negative valence with the left side of the body (Davidson, 1992). However, when Casasanto 
tested both right- and left-handed participants, he found that right-handed participants 
displayed the expected right-is-good valence mapping, but that left-handed participants 
displayed the opposite left-is-good valence mapping. Further work has replicated this effect 
in children as young as 5 years old (Casasanto & Henetz, 2012). Brunyé and colleagues 
recently showed that the effects of body-specificity appear to extend to memory tasks as 
well as emotional valence: right-handed participants mis-remembered positively valenced 
locations as being further right, and negatively valenced locations as being further left, than 
was actually the case; left-handed participants showed the opposite pattern of results 
(Brunyé, Gardony, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2012). 
Body-specificity and language 
Given the posited link between action and action language semantics, and given 
evidence suggesting that representations of manual actions are body-specific, it is possible 
that semantic representations of action language might also be body-specific. In other words, 
right- and left-handed individuals may interpret action language differently from one 
another, based on their different motor experiences. To our knowledge, there have only been 
two studies looking at this question, and both studies used fMRI rather than behavioural 
paradigms. Willems, Hagoort and Casasanto (2010) tested for body-specificity in action 
language by having right- and left-handed participants perform a lexical decision task on 
manual action verbs (e.g. throw), with no response required on critical trials. When 




activation in the right pre-motor hand area, and right-handed participants showed 
significantly more activation in the left pre-motor hand area. Therefore, it appears that a 
comprehender’s experience of performing actions modulates their comprehension of isolated 
action verbs.  
However, some caution is needed in interpreting these results, in light of a failure to 
replicate by Hauk and Pulvermüller (2011). Hauk and Pulvermüller were investigating 
language lateralisation for action verbs describing bimanual and unimanual actions. They 
recruited left- and right-handed participants to passively read the verbs. Although unimanual 
verb processing led to stronger activation in the left motor region for right-handers than for 
left-handers, activation in the corresponding right motor area was not significantly stronger 
for left-handed participants than for right-handed participants. Moreover, a later study by 
Willems and colleagues used TMS on the left and right premotor hand areas of right-handed 
participants, as they performed a lexical decision task on manual action verbs using left- and 
right-handed responses (Willems et al., 2011). Contrary to the authors’ expectations, and the 
predictions of the Body-Specificity Hypothesis, there was no effect of which hand 
participants used to respond. It is clear therefore that more evidence is needed to establish to 
what extent right- and left-handed individuals interpret action language based on their 
different motor experiences: I will investigate this question in Chapter 5. 
 Plasticity in body-specificity 
We have seen that the direction of effects in embodied approaches to language can 
vary depending on the context of the task (see section 2.4.1). But there is also some evidence 
that the preceding motor context can affect action-language comprehension. In one 
experiment, Borghi and Scorolli (2009) had right-handed participants perform a sensibility 
judgement on phrases describing actions typically performed either with the dominant hand 
(e.g., to peel the apple) or with the mouth (e.g. to bite the apple); participants responded 




hand verbs using their right hand, reflecting the fact that the mouth actions typically also 
involved holding or lifting an object with the dominant hand. However, in a second 
experiment, participants performed sensibility judgements on phrases describing actions 
typically performed either with the dominant hand (e.g., to throw the ball) or with the foot 
(e.g., to kick the ball), participants were slower to respond to both types of verbs using their 
dominant right hand. Note that the foot trials included actions that could be performed with 
either (or both) foot (e.g., to step on the grass). The authors argue that the evocation of foot 
actions on half of the trials (at random), forced participants to adopt a general response 
strategy; in a later experiment, when hand and foot sentences were blocked, participants 
were faster to respond with their right hand on hand sentences only, as predicted by 
embodiment accounts. Therefore, it appears that the general motor context of a task can 
influence the interaction between motor resonance and action-language comprehension. 
The fact that body-specificity appears at such a young age (Casasanto & Henetz, 
2012) could be due to one of two possibilities: first, that the valance mapping is related to 
“built in” cognitive differences between left- and right-handers; or second, that the valence 
mapping may be acquired in a reasonably short time. In support of the second hypothesis, 
Casasanto and Chrysikou (2011) tested the left-right valence mapping of originally right-
handed participants who, having suffered a stroke, had effectively switched their dominant 
hand in later life. Participants performed tasks from Casasanto’s original study (2009), and 
showed the same pattern of results (left-is-good) as the left-handed participants in that study. 
A further study showed just how quickly the valence mapping could be reversed: right-
handed participants were randomly assigned to wear a bulky ski glove (in order to inhibit 
motor fluency) on their left or right hand while lining up dominoes (requiring a high level of 
manual dexterity). After only twenty minutes’ training, participants who wore the glove on 
their right hand showed the opposite pattern of valence mapping to those who wore the 
glove on their left hand. That is, those who had worn the glove on their right hand (and had 




valenced items to the left side of space. This flexibility in left- and right-handed participants’ 
valence mapping suggests that their interpretations of action language may also display 
some plasticity, depending on the motor context of the task. 
2.5. Summary and research questions 
In this chapter, I provided an overview into the posited links between action and 
perception, and between action and language. I discussed evidence that self actions were 
more tightly connected to the sensorimotor system than other actions, and raised the 
possibility that first-person language might also be more tightly connected to the 
sensorimotor system than third-person language. In Chapter 3 of the thesis, I will explore 
issues of perspective taking, and first- versus third-person language in more detail. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I investigate whether the posited differences between first- and third-
person language are evident in comprehension. I also discussed body-specificity, and 
suggested that simulation might involve prediction and action planning, as well as motor 
experience. In Chapters 5 and 6 I test whether language comprehension interacts with long-
term motor experience, short-term motor experience, or current motor plan. Finally, I 
discussed that fact that there are very few studies that investigate the effect of action on 
language, rather than the other way round. I explored some of the debate surrounding the 
possible functional role for motor resonance in language comprehension. In Chapter 7, I 
adapt a paradigm used by Klatzky et al. (1989) in order to test for a causal effect of action 
planning on language comprehension. Overall, the thesis attempts to specify some of the 
constraints that govern what happens when people understand sentences describing simple 





3. PERSPECTIVE TAKING IN LANGUAGE: 
INTEGRATING THE SPATIAL AND ACTION DOMAINS 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, research into language comprehension has increasingly been 
framed in terms of a link between perceptual and motor systems, and higher level cognitive 
tasks. A central assumption of such Embodied Cognition frameworks is that people’s 
understanding of language is grounded in their physical interactions with the world (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Glenberg, Sato, 
& Cattaneo, 2008; Pulvermüller, 2005). In strong versions of Embodied Cognition, language 
comprehension is achieved through mental representations that correspond, in perceptual or 
motor qualities, to the object or action being described. Such accounts draw on evidence that 
comprehenders are faster to correctly match sentences to images that correspond to the 
perceptual characteristics implied by the sentence context, such as orientation (Stanfield & 
Zwaan, 2001), shape (Pecher, van Dantzig, Zwaan, & Zeelenberg, 2009; Zwaan, Stanfield, 
& Yaxley, 2002), and implied movement (Kaschak et al., 2005, 2006). 
In addition, Action-Sentence Compatibility effects (ACE; Glenberg & Kaschak, 
2002) demonstrate that language comprehension is linked to action execution. Participants 
are faster to respond to sentences that imply moving the hand away from or towards one’s 
body (e.g., “Close/ Open the drawer”), when the direction of response required (away from 
or towards their body) matches the direction of movement implied in the sentence. Aravena 
et al. (2010) recently provided evidence of a neural signature for ACE effects by recording 
event-related (brain) potentials. In this study, participants listened to sentences implying an 
open or closed hand shape, and indicated their understanding by responding with either an 




did not match the hand-shape required by the response, resulted in an N400 effect 
(associated with difficulty integrating stimuli into a given semantic context; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2000).  Such evidence is consistent with the viewpoint that action language 
comprehension involves representing an action as though you were performing it yourself – 
that is, from an agent’s perspective.  
In this chapter, I explore research into action-perspective taking (from whose 
perspective do language users simulate a described action?), and spatial-perspective taking 
(from whose perspective do language users conceive spatial relations?). I propose that these 
two forms of perspective taking are fundamentally linked: in order for language users to 
perform an action simulation, they must first establish a spatial context for that action, by 
locating it within a situation model. In dialogue, spatial-perspective taking can be used by 
interlocutors to negotiate or align on situation models that specify similar spatial relations 
between entities, to ensure a mutually understood spatial context for actions. Actions are 
performed in space, and, therefore, we might expect considerable cross-over between the 
literatures on action- and spatial-perspective taking, but this does not appear to be the case. I 
argue that one reason for this situation is the use of inconsistent and conflicting terminology 
across the two fields.  
One of the goals of this chapter is to unite action- and spatial-perspective taking in 
an account of action language comprehension. First, I propose a vocabulary for discussing 
action-perspective taking that will allow action- and spatial-perspective taking to be 
integrated. Next, I explore evidence from the Embodied Cognition literature, investigating 
which action-perspective comprehenders typically adopt. I argue that, contrary to some 
Embodied Cognition accounts where action-perspective taking is typically assumed to be 
fixed on the agent, several other perspectives are in fact available. I then review research 
into which spatial-perspective people tend to adopt in language use, and how such 
perspective taking is negotiated in dialogue. Finally, I propose the Spatial Grounding 




evidence in favour of this hypothesis, and explore the role of situation models in providing 
this context.  
3.2. Representing other people’s actions 
At the same time as theories of action language processing have stressed the 
primacy of motor representations, theories of action understanding have argued that the 
same mental representations are involved in both performing and perceiving actions (e.g.  
Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Prinz & Hommel, 2002). For example, Common Coding theory 
(Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997) proposes that codes for planned actions and perceived 
actions share a common representational domain. In support of this account, behavioural 
research suggests first, that participants are less able to perceive a static stimulus (left or 
right pointing arrow) when performing a congruent action (left or right button press; 
Müsseler & Hommel, 1997), and second, that perceiving an action while planning an 
incompatible action affects action execution (Brass et al., 2000; Kilner et al., 2003). In other 
words, the link between perception and action affects our ability both to perceive stimuli, 
and to perform actions. Such findings are echoed by recent neurological research showing 
evidence of “mirror matching”, where regions of the motor system that are activated when 
performing an action are also activated when passively perceiving an action (e.g., Buccino et 
al., 2001; Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; for a review see Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). 
Much research has argued that the perceiver of an action mentally simulates 
executing that action herself (Decety, 2002). This simulation theory has counterparts in 
simulation theories of mind that propose that understanding another person involves 
simulating their mental activity (e.g. Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Indeed, it could be argued 
that a successful theory of mind is one that allows us to predict and understand our own and 
other peoples’ actions, and that this is achieved through simulation (Ruby & Decety, 2001). 




own actions or mental activities from those of other people? The ability to distinguish 
ourselves from other people is critical to successful social interaction, but in a system in 
which our own actions share representations with the actions of other people, action 
attribution becomes a key computational problem (de Vignemont & Haggard, 2008; Decety 
& Sommerville, 2003). 
The mechanism by which the separation of self and other is maintained is beyond 
the scope of this paper (see, for example, Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Ruby & Decety, 
2001; Ruby & Decety, 2004). But however it is achieved, the self-other distinction is tightly 
connected with perspective taking. First, self must be successfully distinguished from other 
in order for there to be the possibility of different perspectives (Jeannerod, 2006). Second, 
the ability to represent other people’s actions in a similar way to their own allows people to 
take an agent’s perspective on an action, even when they are describing or hearing about an 
action performed by somebody else. 
3.3. A taxonomy of perspective 
As highlighted above, a large body of research now suggests a link between 
language processing and sensorimotor activation (see Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; 
Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012 for recent reviews). This link can best be 
captured by Embodied Cognition accounts of language processing. Embodied Cognition 
seeks to distinguish itself from “traditional” psycholinguistic accounts by insisting that 
language representations are modal rather than amodal (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Zwaan & 
Taylor, 2006). What is often not made explicit in Embodied Cognition accounts is that 
modal representations are inherently perspective-based. For a representation to be modal, it 
must assume a given perspective. In other words, the perspective is necessary to ground the 
representation. However, discussion of perspective taking in action language is often 
opaque, and this is particularly problematic if we wish to relate action-perspective taking 




In visual cognition, researchers distinguish between two types of spatial-perspective 
taking. Level 1 perspective involves understanding what falls within another individual’s 
line of sight – for example, is a particular object occluded by another object as that person 
looks at it? Level 2 perspective involves understanding how the world appears from another 
person’s perspective – for example, is a particular object to the left or the right of another 
object as that person looks at it? (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Michelon & 
Zacks, 2006). In the present paper, I limit the review of spatial-perspective to this second 
level, focusing on spatial relations, rather than visibility. Kessler and Rutherford (2010) 
argued that Level 2, but not Level 1 spatial-perspective taking, appears to involve some form 
of covert mental rotation or simulation. As such, Level 2 spatial-perspective entails a level 
of embodiment that Level 1 does not, and is therefore closer to the perspective-bound 
simulations proposed by Embodied Cognition accounts of action language understanding. 
With respect to Level 2 spatial-perspective taking, we can contrast intrinsic, 
absolute, and relative reference frames (see Levinson, 1996, 2003). In an intrinsic reference 
frame, the position of an object is described relative to a reference object (e.g., “The window 
is above the door”). In an absolute reference frame, the position of an object is described in 
terms of stable environmental features, such as points of the compass, as in “The ship is 
south of the island”. Neither of these reference frames locates an object relative to an 
observer. A relative reference frame, on the other hand, does just that: for example, “The car 
is to my left”. Within a relative reference frame, one can adopt an egocentric or allocentric 
perspective. An egocentric perspective entails representing objects in a scene from your own 
viewpoint, and an allocentric perspective entails representing objects from the viewpoint of 
someone other than yourself (see Levinson, 2003 for a fuller treatment of spatial reference 
frames). The terms egocentric and allocentric therefore have specific and well-established 
meanings in the spatial literature: egocentric means conceptualising space from your own 
point of view, and allocentric means conceptualising space from another’s point of view. In 




putting oneself in someone else’s shoes (for example, interpreting a sentence such as “John 
kicked Mary” as though the comprehender herself were performing the act of kicking; e.g., 
Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010). This use of the term is opposite that in spatial-
perspective taking and is therefore confusing. In addition, using the term egocentric 
perspective in action language, or allocentric perspective in spatial language, does not 
specify whose shoes the comprehender is putting herself into. In spatial language, this 
underspecification is typically not problematic, since the perspective adopted in a sentence 
such as “John is looking at the picture on the left” can be explicitly clarified. The 
comprehender can legitimately ask “on whose left?”, and the speaker can reply “on my left”, 
“on your left”, “on his left”, etc.  
However, in action language, perspective-taking is implicit, rather than explicit, and 
no such clarification is possible. For example, a comprehender who responded to the 
sentence “John is looking at the picture on the left”, with the query “who is looking?” would 
receive the reply “John”, and remain no clearer about whose perspective the speaker was 
adopting. Therefore, unlike spatial language, when discussing action language it is necessary 
for embodied accounts to specify whose perspective is being adopted for a particular action: 
the term egocentric perspective tells us that comprehenders are putting themselves in 
somebody else’s shoes, but crucially not whose shoes. Similarly, researchers often speak of 
“situated simulations” (Marino et al., 2012), or “sensorimotor experience” (Pecher et al., 
2009) without specifying from whose perspective this simulation or resonance occurs. I 
suggest that this lack of specification derives from a widely held assumption in embodied 
cognition accounts that the agent’s perspective is adopted. However, I also suggest that this 
assumption is unwarranted.  
There are in fact different Embodied Cognition accounts of language processing, 
and researchers in this field place varying importance on the role of sensorimotor processing 
in semantics (see Meteyard et al., 2012 for a recent review of positions advocating different 




an internal simulation of the described action, as if the comprehender were performing that 
action herself (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, Bergen & Wheeler, 2010; Borghi & Scorolli, 2009; 
Zwaan & Taylor, 2006).  If it is true that action-perspective taking is fixed on the agent’s 
perspective, then the underspecification of egocentric, outlined above, is not a problem; the 
perspective adopted would always coincide with the agent of the described action. However, 
as we shall see, it is not clear that an agent’s perspective is always adopted. Researchers in 
action language therefore need to make clear exactly whose perspective they assume is being 
adopted. 
For example, in understanding “John kicked Mary”, there are at least two embodied 
perspectives that could be adopted for the action of kicking: that of John (the embodied 
agent); and that of Mary (the embodied patient). If the comprehender has reason to believe 
that other people are witnesses to the event (i.e., if she has reason to include bystanders in 
her situation model), then she can also adopt the perspective of a bystander watching the 
kicking event unfold (the embodied observer). For example, if a previous sentence implied 
the existence of a crowd gathering around Mary and John, the comprehender can adopt the 
perspective of a member of this crowd, observing John kicking Mary.  In each case, the 
comprehender represents the action from the perspective of a person present in the 
comprehender’s model of that event. In taking the embodied agent’s perspective, the 
comprehender represents the action of kicking as though she herself were the agent of that 
action, by activating the same systems involved in executing a kicking action. In taking the 
embodied patient’s perspective, the comprehender represents the action of kicking as though 
she herself were the patient of that action (presumably activating some form of empathic 
response to the pain, such as wincing). In taking the embodied observer’s perspective, the 
comprehender represents that action as though she were watching it unfold, by activating the 
same systems that would be recruited when observing such an action. 
In addition to these embodied perspectives, there is another perspective that the 




participant or observer, the non-embodied observer represents the action from the 
perspective of someone who is not included in the comprehender’s model of that event. This 
can be made clear by contrasting the sentence “John kicked Mary” with the sentence “John 
kicked Mary when they were alone”: only in the first sentence is it possible to adopt an 
embodied observer’s perspective.  I suggest that comprehenders may adopt the perspective 
of a non-embodied observer when the spatial context is insufficient to allow an embodied 
action simulation. 
The sentence “John kicked Mary” refers to a transitive event with two participants.  
There are of course, more complex sentences in which further embodied perspectives exist. 
This is the case for sentences describing ditransitive events (e.g., “John passed the child to 
his wife”), or sentences where a thematic role is occupied by more than one entity (e.g., 
“John kicked Mary and Sam”). The number of potential embodied perspectives available for 
a given sentence is therefore the number of participants in that event plus that of any 
embodied observers licensed by the comprehender’s situation model. I propose that these 
perspectives (e.g., embodied agent, embodied patient, embodied recipient…, plus embodied 
observer and non-embodied observer) provide a transparent basis for discussing action 
perspective taking. Using these terms, researchers can not only distinguish between 
embodied and non-embodied representations, but within the embodied representations, it is 
possible to distinguish whose perspective is adopted. 
3.4. Do language users consistently adopt the agent’s 
perspective? 
I noted above that many embodied accounts of language assume that if a perspective 
is adopted for action language, it is the agent’s perspective (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; 
Wu & Barsalou, 2009; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Such an assumption is consistent with 




for specific body parts. Research using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has 
found that passive listening to an arm-word (“pick”) leads to increased activation in areas of 
the premotor and primary motor cortex associated with arm movements; passive listening to 
a face-word (“lick”) leads to increased activation in areas associated with the face; and 
passive listening to a foot-word (“kick”) lead to increased activation in areas associated with 
the feet (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004; see also Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & 
Iacoboni, 2006). In other words, the activation appears to be associated with particular acts 
from the perspective of the agent of the act (e.g., the kicker) rather than (for example) the 
patient (e.g., the person or thing that is kicked). Further work using 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) has demonstrated that such somatoptopic activation occurs 
extremely quickly, within 200 ms of word presentation, and even when participants are 
concentrating on an unrelated, non-language based task (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, et al., 2005). 
These findings suggest that adopting an embodied agent’s perspective may occur 
automatically in the early stages of semantic processing, at least in isolated words.  
More evidence that people adopt the embodied agent’s perspective (as though the 
comprehender herself were carrying out an action) comes from evidence for “body-specific” 
representations of manual action verbs (e.g. throw) in a Dutch lexical decision task 
(Willems, Hagoort, &  Casasanto, 2010). Left-handed participants showed activation in the 
right pre-motor hand area, but right-handed participants showed activation in the left pre-
motor hand area, despite there being no manual responses on critical trials. These results 
echo findings of “body-specific” activation for motor imagery, where left- and right-handed 
participants imagined performing actions described by manual action verbs (Willems et al., 
2009). It therefore appears that people tend to adopt the embodied agent’s perspective for 
isolated verbs, representing the verb according to how they personally would perform those 
actions with their particular bodies (i.e., right-handed for right-handed participants; left-




However, verbs are usually processed not in isolation, but in the context of 
sentences featuring noun phrases that refer to particular entities. Do language users also 
adopt an embodied agent’s perspective in action sentences, as well as isolated verbs? The 
evidence that they do is mixed. Participants undergoing fMRI were presented with Italian 
versions of mouth-, leg-, or hand-related action sentences featuring the first-person in the 
agent’s role (e.g., “I bite the apple”; “I grasp the knife”; “I kick the ball”; Tettamanti et al., 
2005). The results showed evidence of somatotopic activation similar to that observed in 
isolated verb processing (e.g., Hauk et al., 2004), implying that participants were simulating 
the described actions from the agent’s perspective. However, in this study, the agent’s 
perspective coincided with the perspective of the potentially self-referential pronoun “I”: 
participants may have adopted a perspective in line with the thematic role assigned to the 
pronoun “I”, rather than the perspective of the agent per se. A better indication of whether 
participants routinely adopt the embodied agent’s perspective comes from studies 
investigating ACE effects (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg, Sato, Cattaneo, et al., 
2008). When sentences were given in the form of an imperative (e.g., “Close the drawer”), 
participants were faster to respond when the direction of the response was congruent with 
the movement implied by the agent in the sentence than when it was incongruent. In other 
words, they appeared to adopt the perspective of an agent closing a drawer. However, in 
sentences featuring two arguments, one of whom could refer to the participant, participants 
were faster to respond when the direction of the response was congruent with the movement 
relative to the pronoun “you”. For example, participants were faster to respond with away 
movements to sentences such as “You delivered the pizza to Andy”, but faster to respond 
with towards movements to sentences such as “Andy delivered the pizza to you”.  Therefore, 
this suggests that when a sentence involves a potentially self-referential pronoun (“you”, 
“I”), comprehenders tend to adopt the perspective of the thematic role assigned to that 
pronoun, whether or not this coincides with the thematic agent of the action. In a dialogue 




understood by each participant in turn, the situation is more complex. Participants appear to 
prioritise adopting opposing perspectives for “you” and “I”, over maintaining a consistent 
perspective (e.g. embodied agent, embodied observer) for either of the pronouns (Pickering, 
McLean, & Gambi, 2012). 
Several studies have addressed whether people adopt the agent’s perspective when 
the agent of a described action is not self-referential, in the absence of a second self-
referential argument. In Embodied Cognition accounts that conceive action language as an 
extension of mirror-matching, where representations of other people’s actions are inherently 
similar to representations of one’s own actions (e.g., Pulvermüller, 2005; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 
1998), descriptions of actions performed by third-person agents should elicit similar effects 
to descriptions of actions performed by first- or second-person agents. In line with this 
prediction, Buccino et al. (2005) used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to stimulate 
the left-hemispheric hand or foot motor areas, as participants listened to Italian third person 
hand- or foot-related action sentences (e.g. “He sewed the shirt”; “He marched on the spot”), 
compared with control abstract sentences (e.g. “He loved his wife”). Motor evoked 
potentials (MEPs) from the hand and foot muscles were recorded. Hand MEPs were 
modulated specifically when listening to hand-related action sentences, and foot MEPs were 
modulated specifically when listening to foot-related sentences. These results suggest at 
least some tendency to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective for third-person sentences.  
However, without a direct comparison between first- and third-person sentences, we 
cannot know whether action perspective-taking in third-person sentences matches action 
perspective-taking in first-person sentences. Behavioural evidence suggests that 
comprehenders reading self-referential and non-self-referential sentences adopt different 
action-perspectives. Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, and Taylor (2009) used a 
sentence-picture matching task with first-, second-, and third-person action sentences, and 
“internal” or “external” action images. In the “internal” images, the position of the hands 




images, the position of the hands meant they could not plausibly be interpreted as those of 
the participant. Instead, they could most plausibly be interpreted as those of an agent who 
the participant was observing perform the action. Selecting an internal image would imply 
adopting the embodied agent’s perspective. Selecting an external image would imply 
adopting the perspective of an embodied observer. Brunyé et al. found that participants were 
faster to correctly match first- and second-person sentences to internal rather than external 
images, and to correctly match third-person sentences to external rather than internal images. 
In other words, participants adopted the embodied agent’s perspective when the agent of the 
sentence could be attributed to the comprehender, but not otherwise (see also Ditman, 
Brunyé, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2010; Sato & Bergen, 2013).  
In an fMRI study, Tomasino, Werner, Weiss and Fink (2007) found no difference in 
primary motor cortex activation between silent reading of German action phrases presented 
in the first-person (e.g., “I hammer”) versus third-person (e.g., “he hammers”). However, 
Papeo, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, and Rumiati (2011) had participants silently read action or non-
action Italian verbs conjugated in the first- or third-person (e.g., “I write”; “he writes”; “I 
wonder”; “he wonders”). They found that TMS-induced MEPs in the relevant motor area 
(e.g., hand) increased for the first-person action verbs, but that the third-person action verbs 
behaved like the non-action verbs, and showed no increase in MEPs. Embodied Cognition 
accounts need not predict total parity between first- and third-person action representations. 
However, the posited involvement of the motor system in action language comprehension 
(e.g., Fischer & Zwaan, 2008) should imply at least some difference between third-person 
action and non-action verbs. The fact that a difference between action and non-action verbs 
was found only in first-person sentences, led Papeo et al. (2011) to conclude that motor 
simulation of an action sentence occurs only when the self is identified as the agent of the 
action.  
What could be behind the conflicting results of Tomasino et al. (2007), and Papeo et 




study were asked to decide whether a described event took place inside or outside a building, 
and thus could complete the task without paying attention to whether the verb was presented 
in the first- or third-person. On the other hand, Papeo et al. instructed participants to 
determine the syntactic subject of a phrase, thus focussing attention on the contrast between 
first- and third-person agents. Researchers are becoming increasingly aware of the role of 
task demands and context in studies of Embodied Cognition. The conflicting results here add 
to evidence suggesting that motor representations of action language may not be activated 
automatically, but depend on aspects of the task, including depth of processing (Sato, 
Mengarelli, Riggio, Gallese, & Buccino, 2008), sentence tense (Bergen & Wheeler, 2010), 
and relevance to task goals (Hoedemaker & Gordon, 2013). Indeed, it is possible to view the 
emphasis, outlined above, on the agent’s perspective as a result of task demands. The link 
between action and language has typically been investigated by studying congruency effects 
when participants execute actions during sentence processing (Taylor & Zwaan, 2008; 
Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), after sentence processing (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg, 
Sato, Cattaneo, et al., 2008), or before sentence processing (Glenberg, Sato, & Cattaneo, 
2008). When the emphasis of the task is to execute an action, it is perhaps not surprising that 
results seem to indicate that participants adopt the agent perspective. Other paradigms in 
embodied approaches to language follow sentence processing with image presentation rather 
than action execution. For example, participants are typically faster and more accurate to 
recognise an image of an object when it is presented in the same orientation (vertical/ 
horizontal) as implied by the preceding sentence (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; see also Pecher 
et al., 2009; Zwaan et al., 2002). The authors interpret these findings as evidence that 
comprehenders run visual simulations of an event (i.e., they adopt an embodied observer’s 
perspective). The perspective adopted by comprehender may therefore depend on the task 
used to investigate it. It may even be possible to use the task to prime participants to adopt a 




In summary, some Embodied Cognition accounts of action language assume that 
people adopt an embodied agent’s perspective when comprehending action language, based 
on an internal simulation of performing that action (Barsalou, 2009; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). 
Moreover, strong Embodied Cognition accounts assume that the agent’s perspective is 
automatically activated, regardless of contextual factors such as the reference of the 
sentence, as determined, for example, by the subject pronoun (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, et al., 
2005; Pulvermüller, 2005). The evidence outlined above suggests that people do adopt the 
embodied agent’s perspective for isolated verbs, and for sentences in which a potentially 
self-referential pronoun (“you”, “I”) is specified as the agent (Hauk et al., 2004; 
Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, et al., 2005; Willems, Hagoort, et al., 2010). However, when a self-
referential pronoun occupies a thematic role other than agent, comprehenders appear to 
adopt the perspective of the thematic role assigned to that pronoun, and not the perspective 
of the agent (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). When a third party is specified as the agent of an 
action, and no self-referential pronoun is present, some evidence suggests that 
comprehenders adopt the embodied agent’s perspective (Buccino et al., 2005; Tomasino et 
al., 2007), whereas other evidence suggests that people adopt an embodied observer’s 
perspective (Brunyé et al., 2009; Papeo et al., 2011). Although more data are clearly needed 
in order to draw firm conclusions about which perspective comprehenders adopt under 
which circumstances, current data demonstrate that adopting an agent’s perspective is not 
the only possibility during action language comprehension. As a consequence, the 
underspecified terms egocentric or internal perspective should be avoided when discussing 
action-perspective taking. Instead, researchers in Embodied Cognition should seek to 
employ more transparent terms that specify in whose shoes the comprehender is placing 






3.5. Spatial perspective-taking 
So far, I have reviewed evidence examining whose action-perspective language 
users tend to adopt when processing action language sentences. However, language users 
can also adopt a range of spatial-perspectives during language production or comprehension. 
Of particular interest is whether people adopt an egocentric spatial-perspective (conceiving 
spatial relations from their own point of view), or an allocentric spatial-perspective 
(conceiving spatial relations from another’s point of view). 
Schober (1993) asked participants to describe the location of objects, either alone, to 
an imaginary addressee, or when in the same room as a conversational partner. Participants 
were more likely to describe the location from the addressee’s point of view, using terms 
such “on your left”, than from their own point of view. Schober (1995) also found that 
speakers tended to adopt the addressee’s perspective in task requiring the speaker to identify 
particular objects to an addressee. Interestingly, participants in Schober (1993) who 
described objects to an imaginary addressee were more likely to use the addressee’s 
perspective than participants whose conversation partners were present. With an addressee 
absent and unable to provide feedback, it may be safer for the speaker to assume the 
addressee’s perspective as often as possible. Duran, Dale, and Kreuz (2011), using a virtual 
reality paradigm, also found that participants were more likely to adopt an allocentric spatial 
perspective when told that they were interacting with a virtual, rather than real partner. It 
appears that believing that their partner was real allowed participants to shift more of the 
burden of mutual comprehension to their partner. The tendency to shift responsibility for 
effective communication to a conversation partner may be stronger when, as in Duran et 
al.’s study, that partner is making a request rather than providing information. Yoon, Koh, 
and Brown-Schmidt (2012) found that speakers in a modified referential communication 
task were more likely to use allocentric perspective when requesting something from their 




ensure that their requests are successfully understood, it is sensible for listeners to assume 
that speakers will adopt an allocentric perspective when making that request. 
The above results show that spatial-perspective taking, like action-perspective 
taking, is a flexible process. By changing the perspective they adopt, speakers or listeners 
can shift more or less of the burden of mutual comprehension on to their partner. Further 
research suggests that during dialogue, people may attempt to minimize not only their own 
effort, but the collective effort of both conversation partners, by obeying what Clark and 
Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) term the principle of least collaborative effort. Speakers and listeners 
often appear to adopt spatial perspectives in a way that maximises the resources available. 
The principle of least collaborative effort appears to be adopted especially in cases where 
one partner is judged less able to complete the communication task (Schober & Brennan, 
2003). For example, Mainwaring, Tversky, Ohgishi, and Schiano (2009) found that speakers 
were more likely to use an (allocentric) addressee’s perspective when the addressee was 
under increased cognitive load. Schober (2009) studied what happens when, unbeknownst to 
the participants, one partner in a conversation has better spatial ability than another, as 
determined by mental rotation test results. Participants were paired into a director and a 
matcher, with no knowledge of their own or their partner’s results on the mental rotation 
tests. The matcher selected a target circle from an array, based on the director’s spatial 
descriptions. Low-ability directors were more likely to take their own (egocentric) 
perspective, while high-ability directors were more likely to take their partner’s (allocentric) 
perspective. Over the course of the experiment, high-ability directors who were paired with 
low-ability matchers increased their use of allocentric perspective, whereas low-ability 
directors who were paired with high-ability matchers decreased their use of allocentric 
perspective. Note that these opposite patterns of behaviour between high- and low-ability 
directors is in itself reason to be cautious of basing our understanding of spatial perspective-




I suggest that this online adaptation to a partner’s ability to engage in the 
communicative task is compatible with conversation as conceived as a joint action (Clark, 
1996; Gambi & Pickering, 2011; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). In the case of 
spatial perspective-taking, the perspective that people adopt appears to depend at least partly 
on the ability of their partner to engage in the task. In the next section, I argue that 
maximising the collective resources in this way allows conversation partners to establish 
coherent situation models in both partners. Once these situation models have been 
established, language users are in a position to adopt a particular action-perspective when 
performing mental simulations of actions. However, interlocutors do not adapt only their use 
of spatial-perspective within a relative reference frame; they also appear to adapt their 
choice of reference frame itself. Evidence that conversation partners align on their use of 
reference frame comes from studies using a confederate-priming paradigm. Watson, 
Pickering, and Branigan (2004) studied participants’ use of an intrinsic versus a relative 
reference frame. Participants were more likely to use an intrinsic reference frame after the 
confederate had used an intrinsic frame than after the confederate had used a relative 
reference frame. Importantly, Watson et al. found participants regularly switched between 
reference frames. Spatial-perspective taking in dialogue is therefore highly flexible in order 
to allow for maximal alignment and hence maximal similarity in situation models. Whether 
such alignment on situation models occurs as a result of automatic priming (e.g., Pickering 
& Garrod, 2004, 2006), or of negotiating common ground (e.g., Clark, 1996) is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but I assume both possibilities remain open. 
3.6. Situation models: Linking spatial- and action- 
perspectives 
Much research on Embodied Cognition can be traced back to studies of situation 




According to recent accounts, situation models are representations of specific situations 
described in language, where events are connected along five dimensions; space, time, 
protagonist, causality, and intentionality (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; for a review 
of situation models in language see Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Evidence suggests it is the 
content of these models, rather than linguistic form of the language itself, which is typically 
retained in memory and integrated into updated models as comprehension continues 
(Johnson-Laird & Stevenson, 1970; Sachs, 1967). For example, Bransford, Barclay, and 
Franks (1972) demonstrated that participants who read the sentence “Three turtles rested on 
a floating log, and a fish swan beneath them” frequently selected the linguistically different 
but situationally equivalent sentence “Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam 
beneath it” in a recognition test (see also Barclay, 1973; Honeck, 1973; but see Jahn, 2004 
for potential limits on such effects). Many modern studies in the Embodied Cognition 
literature have found similar effects when the focus is shifted to online rather than memory 
processes. For example, Borghi, Glenberg, and Kaschak (2004) found that participants were 
faster to verify items typically found inside a given object (e.g., “steering wheel”) following 
a preamble placing them inside that same object (e.g., “You are driving a car”) versus 
outside it (e.g., “You are refuelling a car”). They proposed that participants used a mental 
simulation grounded in modal representations (e.g., of being inside or outside a car), which 
then guides property verification (see also Kosslyn, Ball, & Reiser, 1978).  
Such mental simulations are a defining feature of embodied theories of language, 
and differ from the situation models discussed in text or discourse processing in that they 
appear to capture online processing during language comprehension. Whereas situation 
models represent the integration of knowledge about events and situations into a coherent, 
existing framework, mental simulations are concerned with the online action-perspective 
taking about a particular act (see also Zwaan, 2008 for discussion of the differences). I 
propose that this “nesting” of action simulations within situation models is what links 




embodied perspective on an action, that action must be grounded in a spatial context. This 
spatial context is provided by the comprehender’s situation model. Situation models are 
conceived from a particular spatial perspective; in dialogue, conversation partners maximise 
their resources and align on spatial-perspective and reference frames, in order to ensure 
suitably similar situation models, for example by making use of the principle of least 
collaborative effort (Clark, 1996). Recall that situation models can specify events across a 
number of dimensions (space, time, causality, etc.; Zwaan et al., 1995). For our purposes, 
“suitably similar” situation models means that the situation models of both interlocutors 
specify the same protagonists in roughly the same spatial relations to one another.    
The spatial relations between objects and people are a fundamental part of situation 
models (Tversky, 1991), and might be specified at various levels of granularity, from coarse 
grained, specifying only overall direction, to fine grained, specifying exact distances. I 
propose that the minimum information required in a situation model in order to run an action 
simulation is the participants in that action and some (coarse-grained) information about the 
spatial relations in which they stand. This allows comprehenders to establish the direction 
and perhaps rough distance in which an action occurs, and thus to simulate it, adopting a 
particular action-perspective. When a sentence is interpreted self-referentially (because it 
involves pronouns such as “you” or “I” – and perhaps also, although we know of no study 
demonstrating this – when it refers to the comprehender by name), the comprehender creates 
a situation model grounded in his or her own body; other participants in the action are by 
default conceived as located in front of the comprehender. For example, in Glenberg and 
Kaschak (2002), sentences such as “You delivered the pizza to Andy” elicited ACE effects 
because the direction of an action could be established (away from the comprehender’s 
body), and an action-perspective could be adopted in line with the thematic role assigned to 
the self-referential pronoun (embodied agent). I refer to the idea that spatial context grounds 




The Spatial Grounding Hypothesis can explain the diverging results we discussed 
earlier regarding first-person and third-person language. Recall that Papeo et al. (2011) 
found that comprehenders appeared to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective for first-
person language, but no embodied perspective for third-person language; whereas the results 
of Tomasino et al. (2007) suggested that first- and third-person language elicited similar 
action perspectives. The Spatial Grounding Hypothesis explains these results as follows. In 
Papeo’s study, the first-person sentences ground the situation model in the comprehender’s 
own body, allowing an action simulation to occur; in the third-person sentences, the situation 
model contains insufficient spatial information for action simulation. In Tomasino et al.'s 
(2007) study, the task was to decide whether the described action took place inside or 
outside, thus encouraging the construction of situation models in which to situate first- and 
third-person actions. Task demands may therefore play an important role in action language 
understanding, in the extent to which they provide, or encourage participants to create, 
spatial context for the described actions.  
For example, third-person sentences in which the direction of the described action 
(e.g., turning a knob clockwise or anti-clockwise) is apparent from the sentence context 
(e.g., raising or lowering the volume) also elicit ACE-type effects where the comprehender 
adopts an embodied agent’s perspective (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Further work suggests that 
these effects only occur once the direction of movement (clockwise or anti-clockwise) has 
been specified (Taylor et al., 2008). On the other hand, some evidence suggests that where a 
described action lacks suitable spatial grounding – for example, when it is described in the 
third-person, and the spatial relations between participants are not specified – action-
perspective taking does not occur. Gianelli, Farnè, Salemme, Jeannerod, and Roy (2011) 
replicated the ACE effects in sentences featuring second-person agents (e.g. “You gave a 
pizza to Louis”), but not third-person agents (e.g. “Lea gave a pizza to Louis”). When 




other words, participants only adopted an embodied agent’s action-perspective when their 
situation model afforded adequate spatial context.  
I have suggested that spatial context grounds action-perspective taking, such that a 
comprehender can only simulate an action from a particular perspective if her situation 
model specifies the participants in that action, and their spatial relations (thus giving her 
access to the direction in which an action would occur). I have argued that this proposal, the 
Spatial Grounding Hypothesis, can incorporate apparently conflicting results about action-
perspective taking into a coherent framework. But there are other factors that support the 
Spatial-Grounding Hypothesis. First, it predicts that conversation partners will align on 
spatial-perspective and choice of reference frame, in order to establish similar situation 
models in both partners. We saw in the previous section that this is indeed the case. Second, 
it can explain why the presence of a potential agent other than the speaker affects how likely 
the speaker is to shift her spatial perspective. Tversky and Hard (2009) investigated the 
influence of a potential agent on how likely people were to adopt an allocentric perspective. 
Participants viewed photographs of scenes in which an actor was reaching for objects (and 
thus, in a position to act on that object), scenes with no actor, and scenes with an actor who 
was not reaching. Participants were more likely to adopt an allocentric spatial perspective 
(that of the actor in the photograph) when the actor was reaching versus not reaching for an 
object. Similarly, Zwickel (2009) investigated what spatial-perspective participants adopted 
when watching clips of animated triangles they perceived as more or less agentive (Abell, 
Happé, & Frith, 2000). Zwickel provided some evidence that participants only adopt an 
allocentric perspective when they view the other entity as an agent with specific states of 
mind, rather than a non-agentive entity moving at random. Mazzarella, Hamilton, Trojano, 
Mastromauro, and Conson (2012) recently extended Tversky and Hard’s study by 
manipulating the extent to which the actor was in a position to act on the object (grasping 
versus gazing). Images in which the actor was in a better position to act on the object 




images in which the actor was in a less good position to act on the object (gazing). All of 
this suggests that participants are more likely to adopt an allocentric spatial-perspective in 
the presence of someone they perceive as a potential agent. 
On the other hand, research suggests that the ability to extract information useful for 
object interaction (e.g., size) is diminished when participants adopt an allocentric, rather 
than egocentric spatial perspective (Campanella, Sandini, & Morrone, 2011). In addition, 
participants are faster to execute a reach-to-grasp movement when the object also falls 
within the peripersonal, rather than extrapersonal, space of a second person, implying that 
people tend to be faster to interact with objects in the presence of another potential agent 
(Gianelli, Scorolli, & Borghi, 2013). Given that participants want to interact with objects 
more quickly in the presence of another potential agent, and given that adopting an 
allocentric perspective may impede their ability to do so, why, then, would participants be 
more likely to adopt an allocentric perspective in the presence of another potential agent? 
Tversky and Hard suggested that their participants, in order to make sense of the scene, tried 
to understand the possibility that the other person can interact with the objects. We propose 
that people find it easier to understand another person’s potential actions when they 
understand the spatial relations in the other person’s situation model; that is, when they 
conceive space from that person’s perspective. Spatial-perspective taking can therefore 
augment a situation model by increasing awareness of an agent’s potential actions, even 
when no action is described.  
One argument against the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis is that that situation models 
are often underspecified, and do not provide comprehenders with the necessary spatial 
context in which to situation action simulations. In particular, isolated verbs provide no 
explicit spatial context, and yet evidence suggests that comprehenders do adopt an embodied 
agent’s perspective on the actions that the verbs describe (e.g., Hauk et al., 2004; Willems et 
al., 2010). I suggest that participants typically interpret these isolated verbs as self-referential 




language, the comprehender’s own body grounds her situation model in this case. In other 
cases, where the comprehender’s situation model does not allow her to establish at least the 
coarsely-coded spatial relations involved in an action, she cannot adopt an embodied action-
perspective, because the action simulation cannot be run. However, this does not mean that 
the sentence describing an action cannot be understood. Rather, the comprehender can adopt 
the perspective of a non-embodied observer. This perspective is not an embodied 
perspective, in the sense that it does not involve a simulation of the action from the 
perspective of any of the participants. However, it is sufficient to allow the comprehender to 
understand the sentence, even if that understanding is somewhat less fully specified than the 
situation in which an embodied action perspective can be adopted. Researchers have found 
that non-ice hockey players respond more slowly and show less pre-motor activation than 
expert ice hockey players do when reading sentences about ice hockey (Beilock, Lyons, 
Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum, & Small, 2008), but this does not mean that fail to understand 
the sentences. Their understanding may be impoverished relative to that of the expert 
players, but comprehension is not an all or nothing process (Taylor & Zwaan, 2013). Just as 
non-expert players may supplement their understanding of ice hockey using information and 
inferences about similar experiences (e.g., playing field hockey), comprehenders with 
inadequate situation models may supplement their models by adopting a non-embodied 
observer’s perspective based on memories or inferences about similar situations.  
Allowing for the possibility of a non-embodied perspective is important, since it 
means that embodied accounts are not bound to the claim that motor resonance is necessary 
for language comprehension. The necessity claim is problematic for embodied accounts of 
language processing for two reasons. First, because it implies that all language must be 
understood through motor activation, even when there is no obvious source of activation, 
such as in abstract and metaphorical language. Some proponents of embodiment argue that 
non-literal language can be understood through the transfer of motor activation in concrete 




& Lakoff, 2005). However, the evidence for motor activation during comprehension of 
metaphorical language is mixed at best (see section 8.3.4). Second, and more importantly, 
the claim that simulations are necessary for comprehension implies that participants who do 
not run a simulation (e.g., in cases where no ACE is observed – see for example Bergen & 
Wheeler, 2010; Gianelli et al.,2011) do not understand the sentences being presented, even 
though they are able to answer questions about those sentences to the same degree of 
accuracy as participants who do show evidence of simulation. The necessity claim therefore 
requires that comprehension involves something quite different from our intuitive grasp of 
what it is to understand a sentence (see Hickok, 2010, and section 2.2.1 for a similar 
argument in action perception). Thus, an account of sentence comprehension which argues 
for a necessary link between language and action leaves itself open to the accusation that it 
is in fact a theory of something other than sentence comprehension. I therefore argue that in 
order to remain plausible, embodied accounts of language must still be able to accommodate 
a non-embodied perspective. The Spatial Grounding Hypothesis provided a starting point for 
exploring under what circumstances comprehenders adopt this non-embodied perspective 
rather than running an action simulation (see also section 8.3.6). 
3.7. Summary 
In this chapter, I have attempted to reconcile two largely distinct literatures 
concerned with spatial-perspective taking and action-perspective taking. I have proposed a 
transparent vocabulary for action-perspective taking, which I hope will facilitate research 
between these two domains. At the heart of the proposal is the suggestion that researchers 
working in Embodied Cognition must specify from whose perspective a given action is being 
simulated. Although an agent’s perspective seems in many cases the most natural candidate, 
other perspectives are possible, and are often adopted when self-referential pronouns are 




I have argued that comprehenders can only adopt an action-perspective if they have 
a spatial context for that action (the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis). In the case of isolated 
verbs and self-referential pronouns, people typically take their spatial grounding from their 
own bodies. But in the absence of self-referential language, action-perspective taking can 
only occur when the spatial relations between participants in the action have been 
established within the comprehender’s situation model. In dialogue, interlocutors use spatial-



























4. STATISTICAL ANALYSES USED IN THIS THESIS 
The experiments in this thesis analysed the relationship between a variety of 
independent variables (e.g., dominant hand, response hand, planned action), and a set of 
dependent variables – both dichotomous (e.g., accuracy, image choice) – and continuous 
(e.g., button release RT, button press RT, voice onset time), using mixed-effects modelling. 
In modelling terms, these independent variables are fixed effects. Mixed-effects modelling 
allows us to combine fixed effects with random effects terms sampled from a larger 
population, such as participant or item (Baayen, 2008).  
4.1. Mixed-effects modelling 
The inclusion of participants and items as random effects allows linear mixed-
effects (henceforth, LME) models to estimate the parameters by which different participants 
or items vary: some participants may respond slower overall than other participants, and 
some items may be more easily processed overall than others. Inclusion of random intercepts 
for participants and items allows us the model to capture this variance. Moreover including 
by-participant or by-item random slopes allows us to additionally account for the fact that 
some participants or items might perform differently in different experimental manipulations 
(Baayen, 2008). In addition, logit link LME models have been demonstrated to handle 
categorical data (e.g., image choice) better than ANOVA (Jaeger, 2008).  
4.2. Maximal random effect structure 
Recent years have seen increasing use of LME modelling in psycholinguistics 
research, and as such, recognised best-practice in model construction and reporting has 
changed as this thesis progressed. In particular, Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily (2013) 
argued that for hypothesis testing, maximal random effect structure (i.e., random intercepts 




should be used wherever possible. One potential problem with this approach is that models 
with complicated random effects structure may not converge. I explain how this was dealt 
with in section 4.3 below. It should be noted that earlier analysis using forward model 
selection revealed the same pattern as results as reported here. 
4.3. Model construction 
In all analyses, I built a full model with all fixed effects, and maximal random effect 
structure (i.e., random intercepts, including interactions, for between-subjects factors; and 
random intercepts and random slopes, including interactions, for within-subjects factors; 
Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Where the resulting model failed to converge, I 
simplified the random effects structure as specified in the text through backwards selection. 
Where simplification of random effect structure was necessary, I report the best-fitting of the 
converged models. Model fit was assessed by comparing model fit with and without the 
relevant random effect using the log-likelihood ratio   2 test. In all analyses, the pattern of 
results reported did not vary with different converged models. All models retained all fixed 
effects.  
All models were built using LME models implemented in the lme4 package (Bates 
& Maechler, 2009) in R statistical software (R Development Core Team, 2011). For each 
model, I report the coefficients and standard errors for the fixed effects, and the likelihood 
that each coefficient differs from zero. P-values for continuous dependent variables were 
calculated by setting an upper limit for the degrees of freedom based on the number of 
observations minus the number of fixed effects parameters (Baayen, 2008). 
All predictors were centred prior to analysis, and coded using effects coding. This 
procedure helps to minimise collinearity (Baayen, 2008) and means that significance tests in 
the mixed-effects model correspond to tests for main effects and interactions in an ANOVA 





4.4. Power analysis 
The probability of detecting an effect, if the effect is indeed present, is known as 
statistical power; the higher the statistical power, the more likely the test is to detect an 
effect that actually exists. Power analysis can be used to test whether a given experimental 
design, with a specified number of conditions and sample size, is sufficiently high-powered 
to detect an effect that exists in the data; lack of power may lead to the researcher 
committing a Type II error (Cohen, 1988). When data are analysed using classical inferential 
statistics such as t-test or ANOVA, the power of a given design can be calculated based on 
the sample size, the effect size, and the desired significance level (see, e.g., Cohen, 1988, for 
examples of such analysis). However, this type of classical power analysis is not 
recommended for use in linear mixed effects models. Instead, researchers are advised to 
calculate the power using simulation of fake data (Gelman & Hill, 2007).  
In the simulation approach, researchers generate numerous (e.g., 1000) sets of simulated 
data in which they specify the hypothesised fixed effects. The size of these fixed effects is 
estimated based on previous research. Each simulated dataset is then analysed using the 
same LME model. Power is calculated as the proportion of simulations for which the model 
correctly reports the specified effect as being statistically significant. For example, in order 
to test the power of a particular design to detect a difference of 100 ms between conditions, 
researchers would simulate 1000 datasets in which they have specified that the 100 ms 
difference exists, and then analyse these datasets. This process allows researchers to see how 
well their design can detect an effect which they know exists in those datasets: we would 
expect that, in a well-powered design, the model should be able to detect the effect on ~80% 
of simulations (Gelman & Hill, 2007). In this thesis, post-hoc simulation-based power 
analysis was conducted for Experiments 3 and 4, to check whether the experimental design 








5. BODY-SPECIFICITY IN ACTION SENTENCES 
5.1. Overview of the chapter 
Embodied approaches to language propose a tight link between the motor and 
language systems, in which language comprehenders perform a covert motor simulation of 
the actions being described, in order to achieve understanding (Barsalou, 2008, 2009; 
Pulvermüller, 2001). In Chapter 2, I discussed the evidence that action language 
comprehension involves covert simulation of the described actions (see also Fischer & 
Zwaan, 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Meteyard et al., 2012, for reviews). However, it 
is unclear from which perspective comprehenders might run such simulations. For example, 
comprehenders might run a simulation as though they themselves were performing the 
described action (embodied agent), or they might run a simulation as though they were 
observing somebody else perform the described action (embodied observer). 
In this chapter, I report four experiments that distinguish between these two 
possibilities, and also test whether this perspective taking is grounded in long-term motor 
experience, or current motor context. I do so by testing whether people who interact with the 
world in a particular way (e.g., performing actions with a particular hand) show evidence of 
interpreting action language in line with their long-term motor experience. In Experiment 1, 
I provide reaction time evidence that right- and left-handed participants interpret first-person 
sentences describing manual actions as though they were performing the described action 
with their dominant hand. In Experiment 2a, I provide further evidence of body-specific 
interpretations of action language, and also show that this tendency is stronger in first-person 
than in third-person sentences. In Experiment 2b, I provide evidence suggesting that these 
apparent effects of body-specificity in language comprehension, may in fact be driven by 




experience). In Experiment 3, I test for, but do not find, evidence for body-specific 
representations of manual action sentences in the absence of overt manual responses. 
5.2. Introduction 
Embodied accounts of language comprehension often assume that comprehenders 
represent described actions from the perspective of the person performing the action – i.e., 
the embodied agent’s perspective (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). However, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, the embodied agent’s perspective is not the only perspective 
available. In understanding a sentence such as I am slicing the tomato, the comprehender 
could equally adopt the perspective of an embodied observer (i.e., simulate watching 
someone else slice a tomato). One means of distinguishing which of these possible 
perspectives (embodied agent versus embodied observer) is adopted, is to look at the way 
right- and left-handed participants interpret language about actions typically performed with 
the dominant hand. People typically perform unimanual actions and experience greater 
motor fluency with their dominant hand; however, the fact that the great majority of people 
in the world are right-handed, means that everyone – regardless of hand dominance – 
observes a majority of right-handed actions in other people. In other words, right- and left-
handed participants have different motor experiences, but similar visual experiences (at least 
of other people’s actions). Therefore, if language comprehenders tend to adopt an embodied 
agent’s perspective, then right- and left-handed participants should show evidence of 
interpreting manual action language differently from one another. But if language 
comprehenders tend to adopt an embodied observer’s perspective, then right- and left-
handed participants should interpret manual action language in a similar way to one another.  
Initial findings from a lexical decision task during fMRI suggest that right- and left-
handed comprehenders interpret isolated manual actions verbs (e.g., throw) as though they 
were performing the action with their corresponding dominant hand – in other words, by 




is, as yet, no behavioural evidence that language comprehenders adopt a body-specific, 
embodied agent’s perspective; and no evidence about whether this preference for the 
embodied agent’s perspective is present in sentences as well as in isolated verbs. Indeed, the 
fact that motor resonance appears to be a rather localised, short-lived phenomenon 
(Glenberg, Sato, Cattaneo, et al., 2008; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), coupled with evidence that 
action words presented in isolation may elicit higher motor activation than action sentences 
(Raposo et al., 2009), raises the possibility that comprehenders may not adopt an embodied 
agent’s perspective in entire sentences – or at least, that we would not find any evidence of 
this at the behavioural level. In Experiment 1 therefore, I test whether left- and right-handed 
participants engaged in a sentence-picture matching task, show different interpretations of 
manual action sentences such as I am slicing the tomato. 
5.2.1. Self and other in action language 
Motor resonance in action observation is evidenced by the fact that observed and 
executed actions appear to share common action representations (e.g., Buccino et al., 2001; 
Fadiga et al., 1995; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). On the other hand, there must be some 
distinguishing feature between our own and other people’s actions, else action attribution 
would be impossible (Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Jeannerod, 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001). 
One such feature may be the visual orientation in which an action is presented. For example, 
a hand performing an action could be presented with the arms extending upwards from the 
bottom of the image, congruent with the location of the comprehender’s arms (internal 
orientation); or with the arms extending downwards from the top of the image, congruent 
with the location of an observed other’s arms (external orientation).  
In recent years, several findings have emerged that suggest that motor resonance in 
action observation may be more pronounced when observed hand is presented in an internal, 
rather than external orientation. For example, Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman and Pascual-Leone 




that had either an internal or an external orientation. MEPs were significantly increased 
when participants watched the internally orientated actions, compared with the externally 
orientated actions (see also Alaerts, Heremans, Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009). Increased 
motor resonance in response to internally versus externally orientated hands has also been 
demonstrated behaviourally in visuomotor priming (Miall et al., 2006; Vogt et al., 2003), 
and imitation (Jackson et al., 2006).  
Generalising from action perception to language comprehension, we might therefore 
expect that the degree of motor resonance exhibited in action language understanding to be 
influenced by the orientation (internal, external) of a depicted action. Brunyé and colleagues 
used a sentence-picture matching task with internally or externally orientation pictures 
(Brunyé et al., 2009). Participants judged whether sentences describing manual actions in the 
first-, second-, or third-person, matched internal or externally orientated images of that 
action. Participants were faster to match first- and second-person sentences to internally 
orientated images, and third-person sentences to externally orientated images. These results 
have been interpreted as demonstrating that comprehenders simulate the described action 
from the actor’s perspective (adopting an embodied agent’s perspective) in first- and second-
person sentences, and simulate the described action from the perspective of someone 
observing that action (adopting an embodied observer’s perspective) on third-person 
sentences (see also Ditman, Brunyé, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2010).  
The fact that comprehenders appear to adopt a first-person perspective on sentences 
such as I am slicing the tomato may appear counterintuitive, given that participants hearing 
this sentence in normal dialogue would need to interpret I as referring not to themselves, but 
to their interlocutor. In fact, in a second experiment by Brunyé et al., in which the action 
sentences were preceded by a short narrative context (e.g., I am a 30-year old deli 
employee),  participants were now faster to match the first-person sentences to externally 
orientated images, as though adopting an embodied observer’s perspective. Why might this 




first- and third-person sentences because the third-person sentences are unambiguously 
about another person. Adding a preceeding context which contradicts the comprehender’s 
circumstances may therefore perform a disambiguating function, making it clear that the I in 
the sentence should not be interpreted as referring to the comprehender. Without any such 
disambiguating context, and in the absence of an interlocuter, comprehenders may simply 
attribute the pronoun to the only potential speaker in that situation – themselves. The posited 
link between comprehension and production systems may make this more likely (see 
Pickering & Garrod, 2013). In the present study, sentences will be presented with no 
preceeding context, thus encouraging comprehenders to adopt different perspectives on the 
first- versus third-person sentences. Note that there is already evidence suggesting that self-
referential processing may enjoy a privileged status in memory (Kelley et al., 2002; Klein & 
Kihlstrom, 1986; Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). The suggestion that self-referential 
language may be more tightly connected to the sensorimotor system than third-person 
language might be viewed as an extension of this privileged processing status.  
 Recall from section 2.2.4, research suggests that motor experience may play a 
greater role in action recognition than visual experience (e.g., Loula et al., 2005). Marzoli, 
Mitaritonna, Moretto, Carluccio and Tommasi (2011) investigated how action orientation 
(internal, external) affects the relative roles of motor and visual experience on action 
recognition. Left- and right-handed participants were asked to imagine a third party 
performing a manual action (e.g., using a toothbrush), from either a front view (consistent 
with an external orientation) or a back view (consistent with an internal orientation). 
Participants then indicated with which hand (left, right) they imagined the action being 
performed. Participants’ motor experience should encourage right-handed participants to 
imagine right-handed actions, and left-handed participants to imagine left-handed actions. 
On the other hand, participants’ visual experience should encourage all participants to 
imagine right-handed actions. Interestingly, the results showed that when the participants 




motor experience: left-handed participants tended to imagine left-handed actions; and right-
handed participants tended to imagine right-handed actions. However, when participants 
imagined the action from the front view (external orientation), they showed a greater effect 
of visual experience: both left- and right-handed participants tended to imagine right-handed 
actions. Thus, the relative contributions of motor and visual experience were mediated by 
orientation. This finding supports the possibility that orientation could be a cue to agency 
attribution, with internally orientated actions being attributed to self (hence right- and left-
handed participants imaging right- and left-handed actions, respectively), and externally 
orientated actions being attributed to other (hence both groups of participants imaging right-
handed actions). In Experiment 2a, I will introduce an orientation manipulation (internal, 
external) that will be crossed with a linguistic cue to agency attribution, namely pronoun 
(first-versus third-person sentences). 
5.3. The sentence-picture matching paradigm 
Matching a sentence to a drawing or photograph is a widely used paradigm in the 
psycholinguistics literature. Use of similar tasks in empirical research can be traced back to 
at least the late 1960s, when participants were typically asked to match schematic diagrams 
to descriptions such as a yellow square with a red vertical stripe (Cohen, 1969). In these 
early studies, researchers tended to be interested in the mechanisms involved in matching 
one stimulus to another (e.g., Posner, Boies, Eichelman, & Taylor, 1969), or in people’s 
judgments about spatial location (Chase & Clark, 1971; Seymour, 1969) rather than in 
linguistic representations. However, Chase and Clark soon realised the importance of the 
paradigm for psycholinguistics (Chase & Clark, 1972; Clark & Chase, 1972), based on the 
observation that “for a sentence and picture to be compared they must be represented, 
ultimately, in the same mental format” (Clark & Chase, 1972, p. 473).  
Since the early 1970s, various versions of sentence-picture matching tasks have been 




Basilico, 1999), children (e.g., van der Lely, 1996), and patients with various forms of 
language impairment (e.g., Caplan & Waters, 1997; Papagno, Curti, Rizzo, Crippa, & 
Colombo, 2006; Small, Kemper, & Lyons, 1997). In verification versions of these tasks, 
participants read a sentence and then decide whether or not a subsequently presented image 
matches the sentence. This type of task has been successfully used to investigate embodied 
cognition more widely (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan et al., 2002), the link between the 
language and motor systems (Borghi & Riggio, 2009), and perspective taking in action 
language comprehension (Brunyé et al., 2009; Sato & Bergen, 2013). In forced choice 
versions of these tasks, participants are shown a sentence, followed by a choice of pictures, 
and asked to select the image that best matches the sentence. This type of task has been 
successfully used to investigate structural priming (Branigan, Pickering, & McLean, 2005; 
Raffray, Pickering, & Branigan, 2007) and perspective taking in action language 
comprehension (Pickering et al., 2012). In both verification and forced choice versions, 
accuracy and reaction time data can be recorded.  
During a sentence-picture matching task, participants form a representation of the 
sentence, maintain this representation while forming a representation of the image, and then 
compare the two representations (e.g., Black, Nickels, & Byng, 1991). The key premise that 
makes these tasks of interest to psycholinguistics is, as Clark and Chase pointed out, the idea 
that the sentence and image are represented in essentially the same form: the image-based 
representation is assumed to reflect the sentence-based representation. Thus, data from 
sentence-picture matching offer an insight into language comprehension because, by 
analysing which image participants choose to match the sentence, or how quickly they verify 
an image, can inform us about the nature of participants’ linguistic representations.  
For example, whether right- or left-handed participants have similar (right-handed) 
representations of manual action sentences is unclear from looking at their language use 
alone. But by having both groups verify whether a right- or left-handed image matches a 




pattern of response latencies (implying that the groups have similar linguistic 
representations); or if the groups show different response latencies to the different types of 
image (implying that the groups have contrasting linguistic representations). Similarly, by 
asking people to read a manual action sentence and then select a right- or left-handed image 
(Experiments 2a, 2b, 4, 5, 6), we can assess if the two groups show a similar preference for 
one type of image (implying that the groups have similar linguistic representations), or if the 
groups show preferences for different types of image (implying that the groups have 
contrasting linguistic representations).   
5.4. Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, I tested whether first-person action sentences such as I am 
slicing the tomato are interpreted from an embodied agent’s perspective. I did this by 
testing whether right- and left-handed participants adopted body-specific representations 
of sentences describing manual actions typically performed with the dominant hand (e.g., 
slicing, throwing, writing…). In a sentence-picture matching task, participants read a 
sentence and then saw an image depicting that action performed with a left or a right 
hand. I predicted that participants would show evidence of body-specific representations, 
in line with previous research on isolated verbs (Willems et al., 2010) and motor imagery 
(Willems, Toni, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2009). In other words, right-handed participants 
would interpret the action sentences as though they were performing the action with their 
right hand, and left-handed participants would interpret the sentences as though they were 
performing the action with their left hand. This pattern of results would add to evidence 
that in self-referential language, such as first-person sentences, comprehenders adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective (see Chapter 3). On the other hand, if both left- and right-
handed participants interpreted the sentences as though they were performing the action 
with the right hand, this would undermine the Body-Specificity Hypothesis, and suggest 




visual experience of observing more right-handed actions in the world. 
5.4.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two native English speakers took part in the experiment in return for course 
credit or payment. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, and no history 
of reading difficulties. Handedness was assessed using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(EHI; Oldfield, 1971) once testing was complete. The EHI asks participants to select their 
hand preference for a list of ten manual actions (see Appendix A), and then calculates a 
laterality quotient. Scores of over 40 indicate that the participant is right handed. Scores of 
lower than -40 indicate that the participant is left-handed. Scores of between -40 and 40 
inclusive, indicate that the participant is ambi-dexterous. Test re-test reliability on the EHI is 
high (Ransil & Schachter, 1994), and scores on the test correlates well with other 
handedness measures (Bryden, 1977) as well as self-reported handedness (Ransil & 
Schachter, 1994). Across all experiments in the thesis, the handedness assigned by the EHI 
matched the handedness self-reported by all participants. 
Sixteen participants in Experiment 1 were left-handed (11 females; mean age = 23 
years; mean EHI score = -69, EHI score range = -41 to -100). The remaining sixteen 
participants were right-handed (13 females; mean age = 21 years; mean EHI score = 80, EHI 
score range = 55 to 100). In all experiments, all participants remained naïve to the fact that 
they were being recruited on the basis of handedness. The majority of left-handed 
participants in Experiments 1 and 2a were recruited through the construction of a research 
participant database: during debriefing of unrelated psychology experiments, other 
researchers obtained various details about the participant (e.g., age, handedness, languages 
spoken), along with their consent to be contacted about future experiments. The remaining 




their left-handed acquaintances. All right-handed participants in Experiments 1 - 6 were 
recruited from the research participant database. This recruitment process, although lengthy, 
allowed us to be sure than none of our participants were aware that they had been recruited 
on the basis of handedness. 
Materials and design 
We prepared 32 photographs showing a right hand performing a manual action such 
as slicing a tomato, and used photo editing software to produce 32 mirror image photographs 
of the same action, performed by the left hand (see Figure 5-1 for examples, and Appendix 
B for the full stimuli). For each pair of left- and right-handed photographs, we constructed 
one experimental sentence, which described the event shown in the photograph. To create an 
equal number of filler trials, each sentence was also paired with a photograph describing a 
difference event. All sentences consisted of first-person pronoun + present tense verb + 
direct object (e.g., I am slicing the tomato). Half of the filler trials formed object-mismatch 
trials, where the photograph and sentence depicted the same verb but a different object (e.g. 
slicing the bread versus slicing the tomato). The other half of the filler trials formed verb-
mismatch trials, where the photograph and sentence depicted the same object but a different 
verb (e.g. slicing the bread versus buttering the bread). Handedness of photographs was 
balanced across experimental and filler trials, and within the filler trials, across verb-
mismatch and object-mismatch trials. All photographs were taken from an internal 
orientation, so that the hands appeared at the bottom of the photograph and might plausibly 
be interpreted at those of participant. 
Each participant saw the left-handed version of each image twice (once on a critical 
trial, and once on a filler trial), and the right-handed version of each twice (once on a critical 
trial, and once on a filler trial). The experiment was split into 4 blocks, and each participant 
only saw one version of each image once per block. Each block contained 16 critical and 16 




presentation was counterbalanced across participant handedness. Trials were pseudo-
randomised such that critical and filler trials featuring left- and right-handed versions of the 
same photograph were not presented consecutively within, or across blocks. 
 
 















 I used a sentence-picture matching task, similar to that employed by Brunyé et al., 
(2009). Participants sat at a computer terminal with a viewing distance of 60 cm. A button 
box was placed on the desk, rotated 90 degrees so that the line of buttons was perpendicular 
to the participant’s body. Participants therefore responded by making towards and away 
movements rather than left and right movements, thus minimising the chances that their 





I am opening the bottle. 




















responses, the button box was rotated to suit the handedness of the participant, which was 
noted by the experimenter as the participant filled out a consent form prior to testing.  
A short practice session (6 critical trials and 6 filler trials, randomly presented) preceded 
the main experiment. Participants did not receive any feedback during this practice session. 
At the start of each trial, a central fixation cross appeared on screen. The cross remained on 
screen until the participant pressed the middle button on the button box with their index 
finger. A sentence appeared in the centre of the screen. Participants were instructed to hold 
down the middle button while silently reading the sentence. All text was presented in 24 
point black courier new font, on a white background. After 1000 ms, the sentence was 
replaced by a left- or right-handed photograph depicting an action that either matched 
(critical trial) or did not match (filler trial) the action described in the sentence. The 
participant released the central button, and indicated whether the sentence and photograph 
matched by pressing either a nearer or a further button with the same index finger. If there 
was no response within 3000 ms, the trial timed out and the next trial began.  
Whether participants pressed the nearer or further button to indicate “match” or 
“mismatch” was counterbalanced across left- and right-handed participants, and across block 
presentation order. I recorded RTs for (a) releasing the central button, and (b) pressing the 
appropriate response button. There was an enforced 90 second pause between each block. 
There was no mention of handedness prior to testing. All participants performed the task 
using their dominant hand without being prompted by the experimenter.  Participants 
completed the EHI once testing was complete. During debriefing, participants answered the 
following questions: (a) What do you think was the purpose of the study? (b) On a scale of 
1-10, how difficult did you find this study? (c) Did you adopt any strategy that made it easier 
to complete the study? (d) Looking back, can you think of any strategy that might have made 
the study easier? No participant mentioned dominant hand or referred to the left- and right-
handedness of the images. The experiment took approximately 20 minutes, with a further 5 - 






 I analysed button release RTs and button press RTs from correct critical (match) 
trials, and error rates for critical trials. Predictors of interest were participant’s dominant 
hand (left-handed participant, right-handed participant), and the hand performing the action 
in the image (left-handed image, right-handed image). An interaction between dominant 
hand and image hand would constitute evidence of body-specificity in manual action 
sentences, in accordance with the Body-Specificity Hypothesis ( Casasanto, 2009), and 
suggest that participants were adopting an embodied agent’s perspective on the sentences. I 
also checked for an effect of which direction participants were required to move to signal a 
match response, by including response direction (MATCH = near button, MATCH = far 
button) as a predictor. Unless otherwise specified, all analyses reported below use the 
following model with maximal random effect structure: 
 
Model 5-1: Dominant hand * Image handedness + Response direction + (1 + Image 
handedness| Subject) + (1 + Participant handedness * Image handedness + Response 
direction| Item) 
Error rates 
Overall accuracy on critical trials was 85%. There were no significant differences in 
accuracy for left-handed participants (86%) and right-handed participants (84%), or between 
left-handed image choice (86%) and right-handed image choice (84%), and the interaction 
between these two variables was not significant (all ps > .05).  
Button release RTs  
I removed all button release RTs below 100 ms (0.5% of correct critical trials), and 




response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that participant 
(0.1% trials replaced with lower cutoff; 2.1% trials replaced with upper cutoff). Table 5-1 
shows the mean button release and button press times by condition. Table 5-2 shows the 
model coefficients for button release RTs using Model 5-1. As can be seen from Table 5-2, 
there was no main effect of dominant hand, image hand, or response direction. However, the 
interaction between dominant hand and image hand was significant: participants were slower 
to match sentences to pictures that were congruent with their own dominant hand (congruent 
trials = 443 (169) ms), and faster to match sentences to pictures that were incongruent with 
their own dominant hand (incongruent trials = 433 (162) ms). These results support the 
Body-Specificity Hypothesis, and suggest that comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s 
perspective on action language. However, if we correct for the fact that both button release 
and button press RTs were tested, the interaction would no longer be significant (p > .025). 
 
 
Table 5-1. Mean winsorised button release and button press RTs (ms) by condition in 
Experiment 1 (sds in parentheses). 
 
 
 Left-handed image Right-handed image 
BUTTON RELEASE   
Left-handed participant 446 (184) 435 (175) 
Right-handed participant 431 (149) 440 (154) 
   
BUTTON PRESS   
Left-handed participant 726 (245) 739 (261) 





Button press RTs 
 I removed all responses below 200 ms (0% of correct critical trials), and winsorised 
the remaining data so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s mean response 
latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that participant (0% trials 
replaced with lower cutoff; 2.0% trials replaced with upper cutoff). Table 5-1 shows the 
mean button release and button press times by condition. Table 5-2 shows the model 
coefficients button press RTs using Model 5-1. As can be seen from Table 5-2, there was no 
main effect of dominant hand, image hand, or response direction. The interaction between 
dominant hand and image hand was not significant (all ps > .05). The effect of body-
specificity therefore appears to be limited to button release RTs. 
Table 5-2. Predictors of button release and button press RTs in Experiment 1: 
Coefficients from Model 5-1 (significant effects shown in bold) 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
BUTTON RELEASE    
(Intercept) 497.2 27.0 <.001 *** 
Dominant hand 16.2 29.9 0.9 
Image hand -0.4 7.1 0.9 
Response direction 21.2 29.5 0.7 
Dominant hand x image hand 24.3 12.1 0.03 * 
    
BUTTON PRESS    
(Intercept) 739.8 28.3 <.001 *** 
Dominant hand -0.3 54.2 0.9 
Image hand -19.1 13.4 0.2 
Response direction 18.8 54.2 0.7 





Responses to filler trials were significantly slower than critical trials for both button release 
RTs (critical trials = 439 (167) ms; filler trials = 479 (175) ms; B = 36.03, SE = 9.01, p < 
.001) and button press RTs (critical trials = 738 (249) ms; filler trials = 820 (251) ms; B = 
85.40, SE = 16.58, p < .001). Within filler trials, there was no interaction between 
participant handedness and image handedness (B = 9.25, SE = 15.82, p = 0.56). 
5.4.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 1, I observed a significant interaction between dominant hand and 
image handedness in button release RTs in a sentence-picture matching task: participants 
were slower to verify sentence-matching for pictures involving a hand action that was 
congruent with their own dominant hand than for pictures that were incongruent with their 
own dominant hand. This interaction is in line with fMRI research suggesting that left- and 
right-handed participants might interpret action language according to their experience of 
performing actions in the world (Willems, Hagoort, et al., 2010). More generally, these 
results imply that comprehenders adopt the perspective of an embodied agent when 
understanding first-person action language, in line with the predictions from Chapter 3. 
However, these findings should be treated with caution, for two reasons. First, the 
interaction between dominant hand and image handedness occurs for button release RTs, 
and not for button press RTs. The findings from button release RTs are in line with work on 
the ACE reporting significant effects based on button release RTs (Glenberg & Kaschak, 
2002; Glenberg, Sato, Cattaneo, et al., 2008), although these studies do not report if button 
press RTs were also significant. Other work investigating the temporal dynamics of the ACE 
does report significant findings based on button press RTs (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; 
Kaschak & Borreggine, 2008), but does not report if button release RTs are also significant. 
When correcting for multiple comparisons (the fact that both button release and button press 




release RTs because the literature reports roughly equal number of studies finding effects 
using these two dependent variables, making predicting the point at which an effect will 
occur (release or press), extremely difficult. It is to be hoped that future studies will report 
findings for both button release and button press RTs, with adjusted p-values, so that the true 
prevalence of effects in button releases and button presses, and the different circumstances 
under which these occur, can be determined. Such action might then allow researchers to 
better predict at what point in the response they are most likely to find an effect, and to 
design their studies accordingly.     
Second, although I found an incongruency advantage (participants were slower to 
validate pictures that were congruent with their dominant hand), I did not predict an 
interaction in this direction, rather than a congruency advantage, given the inconsistency of 
effect direction in the literature. We saw in Chapter 2 that some studies investigating the link 
between action and language reported faster responses in congruent conditions (e.g., Borghi 
& Riggio, 2009; Boulenger et al., 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Rueschemeyer, van 
Rooij, Lindemann, Willems, & Bekkering, 2010; van Elk & Blanke, 2011; Zwaan & Taylor, 
2006), and that other studies reported faster responses in incongruent conditions (Buccino et 
al., 2005; Dalla Volta, Gianelli, Campione, & Gentilucci, 2009; de Vega, Moreno, & 
Castillo, 2013; Mirabella, Iaconelli, Spadacenta, Federico, & Gallese, 2012; Nazir et al., 
2008; Scorolli et al., 2009), and furthermore that the field is still without an adequate 
explanation for these differences in effect direction. Part of the reason for this lack of 
explanation is that, until recently, many studies aimed simply to show some evidence of 
some form of embodiment, and to discredit approaches that allowed no role for embodiment 
(see section 2.3.2). In other words, researchers tended to lapse into a dichotomy between 
embodiment and non-embodiment and, since an interaction of any kind was taken as 
evidence for the former, there was no systematic effort by the community as a whole to 




A hallmark of scientific theories is that, as they develop, they allow scientists to 
begin predicting not only the presence of an effect, but the type of effect that would occur. It 
appears that no such robust predictions are presently available to accounts of embodied 
cognition; working to develop them should be an urgent priority over the coming years. 
Until then, the reason for an incongruency advantage (rather than congruency advantage) on 
button release RTs (rather than button press RTs) in Experiment 1 remains unclear.   
5.5. Experiment 2a 
In Experiment 2a, I extended Experiment 1 by testing whether body-specificity in 
action language was affected by sentence pronoun (I am / He is), and image orientation 
(internal / external). The Spatial Grounding Hypothesis (see Chapter 3) predicts that action-
perspective taking will be reduced in non-self-referential language (e.g., third-person 
sentences), compared with self-referential language (e.g., first-person sentences). If this is 
correct, then participants should be less likely to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective for 
third-person sentences – in other words, body-specificity should be stronger for first-person 
sentences than for third-person sentences. Research suggests that participants may show 
stronger sensorimotor activation in response to internally orientated hands (Marzoli et al., 
2011; Vogt et al., 2003). Therefore, participants might also be less likely to adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective on externally orientated images than on internally orientated 
images (see Figure 5 – 2 for examples of internally and externally orientated stimuli). 
5.5.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two native English speakers took part in the experiment in return for course credit or 
payment. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, and no history of 




(EHI; Oldfield, 1971) once testing was complete. Sixteen participants were left-handed (10 
females; mean age= 25 years; mean EHI score = -80.10, EHI score range = -60 to -100). 
Sixteen participants were right-handed (13 females; mean age = 20 years; mean EHI score = 
92, EHI score range = 66 to 100).  
Materials and design 
 Materials were the same as for Experiment 1, with the addition of third-person 
versions (he is…) of each critical and filler sentence; and externally orientated versions of 
each right- and left-handed photograph (see Appendix B). Because Experiment 2 used a 
two-alternative forced choice matching task, each sentence was now paired with 2 images 
(one right-handed, one left-handed). On critical trials, both images depicted the action 
described in the sentence. On filler trials, one image depicted the action described in the 
sentence, and one image depicted a different action that did not match the sentence. In all 
trials, both images in a pair were the same orientation (either both internal or both external). 
In filler items, the image handedness was counterbalanced across matching and mismatching 
images.  
 The design of Experiment 2 was as follows. Subject pronoun (I am / He is), and 
image orientation (internal / external) were fully crossed, giving four within-participants and 
within-items conditions:  
 First-person + Internal   Third-person + Internal 
 First-person + External   Third-person + External  
 The experiment consisted of four blocks, each with 32 critical and 32 filler items (16 
object-mismatch trials and 16 verb-mismatch trials), so that each participant saw four items 
per condition in each block, and each item appeared once per condition (in a different 
condition per block) for each participant. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across 
participants in a Latin square design. In order to control for an effect of spatial congruency 




across participants and items, which image appeared on the left or right side of the screen. 
Therefore, for each participant, half the trials in each condition were spatially congruent, and 
half were spatially incongruent. Each item appeared in a spatially congruent trial for half the 
participants, and a spatially incongruent trial for the remaining participants. The order of 
trials was randomised within block.  
Procedure 
 I used a forced-choice sentence-picture matching task, similar to that employed by 
Pickering et al. (2012). Apparatus and computer set up were the same as Experiment 1, with 
the exception that, due to the setup of the dual button box apparatus, the button boxes were 
placed horizontally facing the participant rather than at a 90 degree angle. A short practice 
session (4 critical trials, 12 filler trials) took place before the main experiment. Participants 
did not receive any feedback during this practice session. At the start of each trial, a central 
fixation cross appeared. The cross remained on screen until the participant pressed the 
middle button on a button response box with their index finger. A sentence appeared in the 
centre of the screen. Participants were instructed to hold down the middle button while 
silently reading the sentence. After 1000 ms, the sentence was replaced by a pair of images, 
one left-handed and one-right handed. One of the images appeared on the left of the screen, 
and the other image appeared on the right of the screen. The participant selected one of the 
two photographs to match the preceding sentence, by releasing the middle button on the 
button box and pressing either the left or right button with the same index finger, to select 
the picture on the left side or right side of the screen, respectively. On critical trials, both 
photographs showed the action described in the sentence, but with a different hand (left or 
right) performing the action in each image. If no response was made within 3000 ms, the 
trial timed out. In addition to image choice, I recorded RTs for (a) releasing the central 




There was an enforced 90 second pause between each of the 4 blocks. On 25% of 
trials (4 randomly selected critical trials and 12 randomly selected filler trials per block) the 
word REPEAT appeared on screen following image selection, to cue participants to repeat 
the sentence out loud. This repetition task was introduced in order to disguise the purpose of 
the experiment, and to ensure that participants attended to the pronoun as well as the action. 
Participants’ oral responses were recorded and coded according to whether participants 
recalled the sentence correctly or not. 
There was no mention of handedness or “left” and “right” prior to the experiment. 
The experimenter explained how the participant was to respond using the terms “this side of 
the screen” and “this button”, rather than “left side of the screen” or “right button”. 
Participants’ handedness was assessed by observing the participant fill out a consent form 
prior to the experiment, and by completion of the EHI during debriefing following the 
experiment. All participants performed the task using their dominant hand without being 
prompted by the experimenter.  
5.5.2. Results 
Analysis 
 I analysed the likelihood of selecting a right-handed image on critical trials, 
and error rates for response choice on filler trials, and for sentence repetition on all trials. 
In addition, I analysed the button release and button press RTs from correct critical trials. 
Predictors of interest were dominant hand (left-handed participant, right-handed participant), 
pronoun (first-person, third-person), and image orientation (internal, external). A main effect 
of dominant hand would add to the evidence from Experiment 1 for body-specificity in 
manual action sentences, and suggest that participants were adopting an embodied agent’s 
perspective on the sentences. An interaction between dominant hand and pronoun would 


































I am opening the bottle. 







He is opening the bottle. 







I am opening the bottle. 







He is opening the bottle. 









modulated by the linguistic context. An effect of image orientation would suggest that 
participants used orientation as a cue to agency attribution, and that their interpretation of 
action language differed according to this cue. I also expected a spatial-compatibility effect 
where participants would be more likely to select a right-handed image when it was 
positioned on the right side of the screen (cf. Hommel, 2011; Rubichi & Nicoletti, 2006), 
and therefore included image-screen congruency (CONGRUENT = right-handed image on 
right side of screen, INCONGRUENT = right-handed image on left side of screen) as a 
predictor. 
 Unless otherwise specified, all analyses reported below use the following model 
with simplified random effect structure (the correlation parameter, and the random intercepts 
and slopes for image-screen congruency, were removed in order to allow the model to 
converge): 
 
Model 5-2: Dominant hand * Pronoun * Image orientation + Image-screen congruency + (1 
|Subject) + (1| Item) + (0+ Pronoun * Image orientation | Subject) + (0+ Dominant hand * 
Pronoun * Image orientation | Item) 
Error rates 
Sentence-picture matching 
Overall accuracy on selecting the correct image to match the sentence on filler trials 
was 94%. There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences (94%) 
versus third-person sentences (93%); for internally (93%) versus externally (94%) orientated 
images; or for image-screen congruent (94%) versus incongruent (95%) trials (all ps > .05). 
Right-handed participants were significantly more accurate (96%) than left-handed 






Overall accuracy for sentence repetition was 94% (97% on critical trials; 92% on 
filler trials, ns.). There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences 
(94%) versus third-person sentences (94%); for internally (95%) versus externally (93%) 
orientated images; for image-screen congruent (95%) versus incongruent (93%) trials; or for 
right-handed (95%) versus left-handed (93%) participants (all ps > .05). 
Image choice  
In total, 6.8% of critical trials timed-out without a response. I removed the 0.02% 
trials where participants selected an image within 200 ms of image onset. Tables 5-3 and 5-4 
show the frequency of image choice by condition. Table 5-5 shows the model coefficients 
for the likelihood of selecting a right-handed image. There was a main effect of dominant 
hand: right-handed participants were more likely than left-handed participants to select a 
right-handed image. In addition, this preference interacted with pronoun: participants were 
more likely to select an image that was congruent with their own hand dominance following 
a first-person sentence, compared with a third-person sentence. There was also a significant 
effect of image-screen congruency (see Table 5-3). There were no effects of image 
orientation, as a main effect, or as an interaction (all ps > .05). 
Table 5-3. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choice by image-screen 
















Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
764 (76%) 236 (24%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
525 (56%) 412 (44%) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
399 (40%) 576 (60%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 




Table 5-4. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choice by handedness, 
pronoun, and image orientation in Experiment 2a (percentage responses in 
parentheses)  
 
Button Release RTs 
I removed trials with button release RTs of under 100 ms (3.3% critical trials), and 
winsorised remaining critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s mean 
response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that participant 
(0.01% trials replaced with lower cutoff; 2.3% trials replaced with upper cutoff). Tables 5-6 
and 5-7 show the mean button release RTs, by condition. I tested for effects of dominant 
hand, pronoun, image orientation, and image-screen congruency using Model 5-2 (all ps > 
.05). 
 






Left-handed participants I am Internal 333 148 
 I am External 333 158 
                                          Total I am (all orientations) 666 (69%) 306 (31%) 
 He is Internal 308 178 
 He is External 315 164 
                                          Total He is (all orientations) 623 (65%) 342 (35%) 
   
Right-handed participants I am Internal 197 280 
 I am External 183 283 
                                          Total I am (all orientations) 380 (40%) 563 (60%) 
 He is Internal 220 250 
 He is External 214 254 




Table 5-5. Predictors of image choice in Experiment 2a: Coefficients from Model 5-2 
(significant fixed effects in bold) 
 
 
Button press RTs 
 I removed trials with button press RTs of under 200 ms (0.02% critical trials), and 
winsorised remaining critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s mean 
response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that participant 
(0.04% trials replaced with lower cutoff; 2.14% trials replaced with upper cutoff). Tables 5-
6 and 5-7 show the mean button press RTs, by condition. I tested for effects of pronoun, 





Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image  
(Intercept) -0.29 0.14 <.05 * 
Dominant hand 1.17 0.28 <.001 *** 
Pronoun 0.02 0.08 0.84 
Image orientation 0.05 0.16 0.76 
Image-screen congruency 0.28 0.09 <.01 ** 
Dominant hand x pronoun 0.50 0.15 <.001 *** 
Dominant hand x image 
orientation 
 
0.09 0.35 0.79 
Pronoun x image orientation 0.08 0.15 0.58 
Dominant hand x pronoun x 
image orientation 








Table 5-6. Mean winsorised button release and button press RTs (ms) by image-

















BUTTON RELEASE   
Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
624 (304) 564 (294) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
701 (336) 543 (311) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
576 (319) 580 (348) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
577 (312) 597 (359) 
BUTTON PRESS   
Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1023 (403) 975 (385) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1112 (398) 882 (373) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1123 (570) 1172 (555) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 





Table 5-7. Mean winsorised button release and button press RTs (ms) by response hand, pronoun, and image orientation in Experiment 2a 
(sd in parentheses) 
 
 
Left-handed image choice Right-handed image choice 
Pronoun I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  






639 (283) 660 (285) 661 (336) 661 (365) 541 (255) 540 (286) 545 (331) 576 (328) 
Right-handed 
participants 
569 (272) 583 (331) 598 (346) 558  (308) 591 (331) 554 (304) 585 (377) 618 (389) 
     




 1017 (391) 1057 (387) 1095 (420) 1056 (434)   996 (359)   1022 (432) 1060 (365) 1003 (474) 
Right-handed 
participants 






In Experiment 2a, I replicated an effect of body-specificity on how comprehenders 
interpret action language sentences: in a two-alternative forced-choice sentence-picture 
matching task, right-handed participants were more likely to select a right-handed image, 
and left-handed participants were more likely to select a left-handed image. These results 
reinforce the findings from Experiment 1, which appear to show that people adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective, rather than an embodied observer’s perspective in action 
language comprehension.  
Importantly, the effect of dominant hand interacted with pronoun such that right-
handed participants were more likely to select a right-handed image following a first-person 
sentence compared with a third-person sentence, and left-handed participants were more 
likely to select a left-handed image following a first-person sentence compared with a third-
person sentence. This interaction demonstrates that the effect cannot solely be due to 
differences between right- and left-handers’ processing of right- and left-handed images. 
Work on affordances has shown that participants are faster to respond to objects that are 
displayed as optimally “graspable” for the hand making the response (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). 
Our results from Experiment 1 might therefore have been interpreted in terms of the left- and 
right-handed images being optimally graspable by left- and right- handed participants, 
respectively. However, the interaction with sentence pronoun in Experiment 2a indicates that 
there cannot only be an effect of image-based affordances. At the very least, these image-
based affordances are interacting with language processing.  
Interestingly, there was no effect of image orientation. This was slightly unexpected, 
given work suggesting that motor resonance is stronger in response to internal rather than 
external images (Vogt et al., 2003), that the role of handedness interacts with image 
orientation (Marzoli et al., 2011), and that image orientation and subject pronoun interact 





5.6. Experiment 2b 
  In Experiment 1a, all participants responded using their dominant hand (without 
any prompting from the experimenter), and appeared to adopt an embodied agent’s 
perspective on sentences describing manual actions. One explanation of these results is an 
interaction between language and long-term motor experience, consistent with the Body-
Specificity Hypothesis (Casasanto, 2011), whereby a comprehender’s understanding of 
action language is grounded in their long-term motor experience of the world (i.e., the 
experience of having used their dominant hand to perform the actions described in the 
sentences). However, the results are also compatible with an interaction between language 
and current motor context (i.e., the hand being used to respond in this particular task). 
Experiment 2b was therefore designed to dissociate response hand from dominant hand.  
In Experiment 2b, I replicated Experiment 2a with a group of right-handed 
participants, but this time participants were instructed to respond using their non-dominant 
(i.e., left) hand. In this way, we aimed to test whether the results from Experiments 1 and 2a 
were due to long-term motor experience (i.e., the dominant hand), or the immediate motor 
context of the task (i.e., the hand-in-use). I also wished to determine whether the effect of 
pronoun, and null effect of image orientation replicated. If the apparent effects of body-
specificity in Experiments 1 and 2a are due to long-term motor experience, then right-
handed participants responding with their left hand should behave like the right-handed 
participants in Experiment 2a. If the apparent effects of body-specificity in Experiments 1 
and 2a are in fact due to current motor context, then right-handed participants responding 











 Sixteen native English speakers (9 females, mean age = 22.4 years, age range = 18 - 
29) took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or corrected 
to normal vision, and no history of reading difficulties. All participants were right-handed 
according to the EHI (mean EHI score = 85, EHI score range = 60 to 100). 
Materials and design 
 Materials and design were the same as Experiment 2a.                                                                   
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 2a, except that participants responded to 
all trials using their non-dominant left hand.  Participants were informed they were taking 
part in a study on working memory, and would be using their left hand to make the task 
more difficult. No other mention of handedness was made prior to testing, and no participant 
noticed a connection between dominant or response hand and handedness of the images. 
5.6.2. Results 
Analysis 
Analysis was the same as Experiment 2a, with the following exception. Trial 
number within the experiment (i.e., the point in the experiment at which a particular 
response was made) was now included as a fixed effect in all models, and as a random effect 
when the resulting model converged. This inclusion aimed to account for the fact that 
participants may become more fluent with their left hand as the task progressed. Unless 
otherwise specified in the text, all analyses reported below used the following model with 





slopes for image-screen congruency, were removed in order to allow the model to 
converge): 
Model 5-3: Pronoun * Image orientation + Image-screen congruency + Trial + (1 |Subject) + 
(1| Item) +(0+ Pronoun * Image orientation + Trial | Subject) + (0+ Pronoun * Image 
orientation | Item)  
Error rates 
Sentence-picture matching 
Overall accuracy on selecting the correct image to match the sentence on filler trials 
was 95%. There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences (95%) 
versus third-person sentences (95%); for internally (95%) versus externally (95%) orientated 
images; or for image-screen congruent (96%) versus incongruent (94%) trials (all ps > .05).  
Sentence repetition 
Overall accuracy for sentence repetition was 96% (97% on critical trials; 95% on 
filler trials, ns.). There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences 
(94%) versus third-person sentences (96%); for internally (97%) versus externally (95%) 
orientated images; or for image-screen congruent (96%) versus incongruent (96%) trials (all 
ps > .05). 
Image choice  
 In total, 7% of critical trials timed-out without a response and could not be analysed. 
I removed any further trials where participants selected an image within 200 ms of image 
onset (1.37% remaining critical trials). Tables 5-8 and 5-9 show the frequency with which 
participants selected a right-handed image, by condition. Table 5-10 shows the model 
coefficients for the likelihood of selecting a right-handed image using Model 5-3. We can 
see from Table 5-9 that right-handed participants using their left hands chose left-handed 





pronoun: right-handed participants using their left hand were more likely to select a left 
handed image following first-person sentences compared with third-person sentences. There 
was also a main effect of image-screen congruency, with participants more likely to choose a 
left-handed image when it appeared on the left side of the screen (68%) compared with the 
right of the screen (46%). There was no effect of image orientation, and no effect of trial: 
participants were equally likely to select a right-handed image throughout the experiment. 
Button release RTs 
 I removed trials with button release RTs of under 100 ms (0.02% critical trials), and 
winsorised remaining critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s mean 
response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that participant (0% 
trials replaced with lower cutoff; 2.69% trials replaced with upper cutoff). Tables 5-11 and 
5-12 show the mean button release RTs, by condition. I analysed the button release RTs 
using Model 5-3. There were no significant effects of pronoun, image orientation, or image-
screen congruency, and no significant interactions between these variables. There was no 
effect of trial on button release RTs (all ps > .05).  
Button press RTs 
I removed trials with button press RTs of under 200 ms (1.37% critical trials), and 
winsorised remaining critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s mean 
response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that participant 
(0.05% trials replaced with lower cutoff; 2.17% trials replaced with upper cutoff). Tables 5-
11 and 5-12 show the mean button press RTs, by condition. I analysed the button press RTs 
using Model 5-3. There were no significant effects of pronoun, image orientation, or image-
screen congruency, and no significant interactions between these variables (all ps > .05). 






Table 5-8. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choice by image-screen 







Table 5-9. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choice by pronoun and 










Table 5-10. Predictors of image choice in Experiment 2b: Coefficients from Model 5-3 










Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
676 (68%) 319 (32%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
413 (46%) 494 (54%) 






 I am Internal 302 182 
 I am External 278 193 
     Total I am (all orientations) 580 (61%) 375 (39%) 
 He is Internal 255 214 
 He is External 254 224 
     Total He is (all orientations) 479 (52%) 438 (48%) 
   
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image  
(Intercept) -0.37 0.16 0.02* 
Pronoun 0.31 0.13 0.02* 
Image orientation 0.08 0.12 0.50 
Image-screen congruency 0.98 0.11 <.001*** 







Table 5-11. Mean winsorised button release and button press RTs (ms) by image-












Between experiment comparisons 
In order to confirm whether right-handed participants using their left hand performed 
significantly differently from left-handed participants using their left hand, I conducted a 
planned between experiment comparison in which I compared the choice data of right-
handed participants in Experiment 2b with that of left-handed participants in Experiment 2a, 
using the following model with simplified random effect structure (the random intercepts 
and slopes for image-screen congruency and the dominant hand by trial interaction term 
were removed in order to allow the model to converge): 
Model 5-4: Dominant hand * Pronoun * Image orientation + Image-screen congruency + 
Dominant hand x Trial + (1+ Pronoun * Image orientation | Subject) + (1+ Dominant hand * 










BUTTON RELEASE   
Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
618 (306) 660 (326) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
594 (330) 591 (335) 
BUTTON PRESS   
Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1045 (443) 1104 (427) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 







Table 5-12. Mean winsorised button release and button press RTs (ms) by condition in Experiment 2b (sd in parentheses) 
 Left-handed image choice Right-handed image choice 
Pronoun I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  
Image orientation Internal Internal External External Internal Internal External External 
BUTTON RELEASE   634 (329) 640 (355) 645 (395) 663 (420) 576 (329) 557 (308) 577 (332) 573 (319) 
BUTTON PRESS 1041 (423) 1058 (455) 1095 (482) 1086 (487) 1027 (457) 1029 (467) 1042 (509) 1057 (536) 




Table 5-13 shows the model coefficients for this between-experiments comparison. 
Left-handed participants were more likely to select a left-handed image than were right-
handed participants using their left hand, but importantly, this trend did not reach 
significance. In addition, there was a main effect of pronoun:  participants were significantly 
more likely to choose a left-handed image following a first-person sentence than following a 
third-person sentence. There was also a significant effect of image-screen congruency, with 
participants more likely to choose a left-handed image when it appeared on the left of the 
screen than on the right of the screen. There was no effect of image orientation, nor any 
further interaction between image orientation, pronoun and dominant hand (all ps> .05). The 
interaction between trial and dominant hand was not significant. 
In order to confirm whether there were any significant differences between right-
handers using their left hand, and right-handers using their right hand, I conducted a second 
planned between-experiment comparison. Here, I compared the image choices of right-
handed participants in Experiment 2b (responding with left hand) with those of right-handed 
participants in Experiment 2a (responding with right hand). Results showed a main effect of 
response hand: participants tended to select an image that was congruent with their response 
hand. There was no main effect of pronoun, but there was a significant interaction between 
response hand and pronoun: people were more likely to select an image congruent with their 
response hand following first-person sentences, compared with third person sentences. There 
was a significant effect of image-screen congruency: participants were more likely to select 
a right-handed image when it appeared on the right of the screen. There was no effect of 
image orientation, trial, nor any other interaction between image orientation, pronoun and 







Table 5-13. Predictors of image choice in Experiments 2a and 2b: Coefficients from 
Model 5-4 (significant fixed effects in bold) 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard 
Error 
p (coefficient = 0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image  
Left-handers Expt. 2a / Right-handers Expt. 2b  
(Intercept) -0.62 0.15 <.001*** 
Dominant hand 0.44 0.32 0.17 
Pronoun 0.32 0.10 0.001*** 
Image orientation 0.13 0.12 0.30 
Image-screen congruency 1.03 0.10 <.001*** 
Dominant hand x Pronoun 0.01 0.19 0.95 
Dominant hand x Image orientation -0.08 0.19 0.69 
Pronoun x Image orientation -0.06 0.17 0.74 
Dominant hand x Trial 0.0005 0.0007 0.42 
Dominant hand x Pronoun x Image 
orientation 
-0.09 0.21 0.77 
    
Right-handers Expt. 2a / Right-handers Expt. 2b  
(Intercept) -0.03 0.10 <.80 
Response hand 0.62 0.16 <.001*** 
Pronoun 0.01 0.19 .87 
Image orientation 0.09 0.13 .47 
Image-screen congruency 0.42 0.08 <.001*** 
Response hand x Pronoun -0.56 0.15 <.001*** 
Response hand x Image orientation -0.006 0.24 0.98 
Pronoun x Image orientation -0.07 0.14 .61 
Response hand x Trial -0.02 0.03 .53 
Response hand x Pronoun x Image 
orientation 





Right-handed participants who responded using their left hand in Experiment 2b 
showed a preference for left-handed images on critical trials. This pattern of results parallels 
that of the left-handed participants using their left-hand in Experiment 2a, and contrasts with 
that of the right-handed participants using their right hand in Experiment 2a. The absence of 
any effect of trial number in Experiment 2b implies that participants do not simply 
“become” more left-handed as the experiment progresses. These data suggest that 
comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s perspective on manual action sentences, and that 
this perspective is based on the hand being used to respond to the task, rather than the hand 
that would typically be used to perform the described actions.  
In Experiment 2b, I found a main effect of pronoun: for right-handed participants 
using their left hand, the preference for left-handed images was stronger following first-
person sentences, compared with third-person sentences. This effect of pronoun is in line 
with the interaction observed between pronoun and dominant hand in Experiment 2a, 
suggesting that the extent to which participants adopt an embodied agent’s perspective can 
be modulated by linguistic context, and the degree to which the language used to describe 
the actions can be interpreted as referring to the comprehender herself. Once again, we 
observed no effect of image orientation, either as a main itself or in interaction with other 
predictor variables. 
These data suggest that when participants respond with their non-dominant hand, 
this overrides the long-term motor experience of their dominant hand. However, it may be 
the case that in the absence of any manual response, the effect of long-term motor 
experience becomes apparent. For example, Willems et al., (2010) found evidence 
suggesting that dominant hand affects action language representations when neither hand is 
required to make a response. Comparing Experiments 2a and 2b, we can see that although 




preference was weaker than that of the left-handers in Experiment 2a, although this trend 
was not significant. Experiment 3 was designed to test for an effect of dominant hand in the 
absence of manual responses. 
5.7. Experiment 3 
   In Experiment 2b, right-handed participants using their left hand were more likely 
to select left-handed images than right-handed images, and this preference was stronger 
following first-person than in third-person sentences. These results suggest that 
comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s perspective based on hand-in-use (current motor 
context), rather than dominant hand (long-term motor experience). In other words, we have 
found an effect of current motor context. However, an underlying effect of long-term motor 
experience remains a possibility. In other words, the results of Experiment 2b might 
represent a case where the comprehender’s default source of motor activation (long-term 
motor experience) is overridden by a conflicting motor context. To investigate this 
possibility, I conducted a further experiment in which there was no conflicting current motor 
context that might override such an effect. Experiment 3 was designed to test for an effect of 
body-specificity in a vocalized response task in which no overt hand actions were required.  
In Experiment 3, I used a verification sentence-picture matching task as in 
Experiment 1. I used both first- and third-person sentences to check for an effect of pronoun, 
as had been observed in Experiments 2a and 2b. If comprehenders typically adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective driven by long-term motor experience, until this is overridden 
by conflicting motor context, then right-handed participants responding without moving or 
planning to move their hands should show different latencies in response to left- and right-
handed images, in line with their long-term motor experience. In particular, given that 
Experiment 1 showed an incongruency advantage, we would expect right-handed 






 Twenty four native English speakers (10 females, mean age = 22.8 years, age range 
= 19 - 32) took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision, and no history of reading difficulties. All participants were right-
handed according to the EHI (mean EHI score = 77, EHI score range = 41 to 100). 
Materials and design 
 Materials and design were the same as Experiment 1, with the exception that we 
produced third-person versions of each critical and filler sentence, thus doubling the length 
of the experiment. An item consisted of a sentence (first or third person) paired with an 
internally orientated image (right- or left-handed). As with Experiment 1, in critical trials, 
the sentence and image depicted the same event; in filler trials, the sentence and image 
depicted different events. The experiment was divided into 4 blocks, with a different version 
of each item (I am + right-handed image; I am + left-handed image; He is + right-handed 
image; He is + left-handed image) appearing once per block.  
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as Experiment 1, except that participants responded to 
all trials vocally, instead of using their hand. Participants responded “good” if the sentence 
and picture matched, and “bad” if the sentence and picture did not match. If no response was 
made within 3000 ms of the image appearing on screen, the trial timed out and the 
participant moved onto the next trial. Voice Onset Times (VOTs) were recorded using the 
sound key on an SR response box. The experimenter recorded the participants’ response on a 
computer in the same room, but separated from the participant by a screen. Auditory 
responses were also recorded using a USB microphone to allow the experimenter to cross-




preceded by a short practice block of 24 trials. No mention of handedness was made prior to 
testing, and no participant noticed a connection between dominant hand and the handedness 
of the images. 
5.7.2. Results 
Analysis 
 I analysed VOTs from correct critical (match) trials, and error rates between critical 
and filler trials, and within critical trials. Predictors of interest were pronoun (first-person, 
third-person), and image handedness (left-handed image, right-handed image). A main effect 
of image handedness of VOTs (participants being slower to respond to right-handed images) 
would suggest that, in the absence of conflicting immediate motor context, comprehenders 
interpret manual action sentences according to how they would normally perform that 
actions being described (in this case, with their right hand). An interaction between image 
handedness and pronoun would support the finding from Experiments 2a and 2b, that the 
embodied agent’s perspective is modulated by linguistic context. Unless otherwise specified 
in the text, all analyses in this section are based on the following model with maximal 
random effect structure: 
 
Model 5-5: Image handedness * Pronoun + (1 + Image handedness* Pronoun| Subject) + (1 
+ Image handedness* Pronoun | Item) 
Error rates 
 Overall accuracy on the task was 89%. On critical trials, participants were 
significantly more likely to correctly match sentences to right-handed images (94% 
accuracy) than to left-handed images (92% accuracy; B = 0.46, SE = 0.16, p = .004). There 




third-person accuracy (94% accuracy), and no significant interaction between image 
handedness and pronoun (all ps > .05). 
Voice Onset Times 
 Of the critical trials, I removed trials where participants corrected their response 
(0.8%), where the participants’ response was preceded by a disfluency (1%), and where the 
participant repeated her response (0.04%; total trials excluded = 1.84% of critical trials). In 
addition, 1.60 % of all critical trials timed out without any VOT response, and were 
excluded from analyses. I then checked for responses made faster than 350 ms, and then 
winsorised the data so that VOTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s mean VOT 
latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that participant (0% trials 
replaced with lower cutoff; 2.56% trials replaced with upper cutoff). Table 5-14 shows the 
mean VOTs by condition. Table 5-15 shows the model coefficients for VOTs using Model 
5-5. There was no main effect of image handedness or pronoun, and the interaction between 
the two was not significant (all ps > .05). 
 
 









Pronoun Left-handed image Right-handed image 
I am 698 (212) 693 (198) 








In Experiment 3, right-handed participants who responded without using their hands 
showed no sign of body-specificity in action sentences. There was no effect of participants 
being slower to respond to right-handed images, as in Experiment 1, and no effect of 
pronoun as had been observed in Experiment 2a and 2b. Therefore, these data do not provide 
any evidence that, in the absence of overt manual responses, comprehenders adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective based on their long-term motor experience.  
Given that Experiment 1 only revealed a difference of ~15 ms, a post-hoc power 
analysis was conducted to check that the design in Experiment 3 had given sufficient power 
to detect a small effect size. This power analysis was conducted using the simulation-based 
approach outlined in section 4.4. I generated 1000 datasets, based on the design of 
Experiment 3. The fixed effect of image handedness was estimated based on the results from 
Experiment 1, namely, participants (all right-handed) should be 15ms slower to respond to 
right-handed images than to left-handed images (b = 15). The fixed effects for pronoun and 
the interaction between image handedness and pronoun were set at b = 0, since the estimated 
coefficient of these effects does not impact on the likelihood that a simulation can detect an 
effect in the fixed effect of interest (image handedness). The variances associated with the 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Voice Onset Time    
(Intercept) 696.00 35.86 <.001*** 
Pronoun -0.06 10.17 0.97 
Image hand -10.46 26.67 0.18 




random effects were estimated based on the variances in the actual data from Experiment 3, 
namely 16108 for subjects, 1182 for items, and 39971 for residuals. I then tested how 
effectively Model 5-5 (the maximal model, used in analysis of our actual data), could 
correctly detect the 15 ms effect of image handedness that had been specified in the 
simulated data. A significant difference was detected in only 21% of simulations, indicating 
that the experimental design was insufficiently powered to reliably detect an existing effect 
in image handedness. The null result in Experiment 3 may thus have been the result of a 
Type II error. I therefore conducted a second power analysis, using the following model 
which collapsed across pronoun: 
Model 5-6: Image handedness + (1 + Image handedness| Subject) + (1 + Image 
handedness| Item) 
 
Again, the fixed effect for image handedness was set at b = 15, but fixed effects of 
pronoun and the interaction were not specified, as the analysis collapsed over pronoun. 
Using this simplified model, the 15 ms difference between left- and right-handed images 
was correctly detected on 78% simulations, indicating reasonable power to detect an effect 
of image handedness. The actual data obtained from Experiment 3 were then reanalysed 
using Model 5-6 to check for any effect of image handedness when collapsing across 
pronoun. Results of this additional analysis showed no effect of image handedness on VOT 
(b = -1.33, SE = 13.10, p = 0.90), despite the increase in power.   
5.8. General discussion 
In four experiments, I explored evidence that comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s 
perspective when understanding action sentences – that is, they understand the sentences as 
though they were performing the action themselves. In Experiments 1 and 2a, I found 




matching tasks: participants were slower to correctly match sentences to images that were 
congruent with their dominant hand, and were more likely to select an image that was 
congruent with their dominant hand in a two-alternative forced choice task. These results are 
in line with the suggestion that when understanding language about actions, people adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective based on the way they have previously performed those 
actions. In Experiment 2b however, I found evidence that the apparent body-specificity in 
Experiments 1 and 2a may have been due to the current motor context rather than long-term 
motor experience. Right-handed participants who responded using their left hand were more 
likely to select a left-handed image to match a sentence in a two-alternative forced-choice 
task. In Experiment 3, I failed to find any evidence that in the absence of overt manual 
response, comprehenders interpret action language in light of their long-term motor 
experience: right-handed participants showed no difference in Voice Onset Times to right-
handed and left-handed images in a sentence-picture matching task. 
Taken together, these results suggest firstly, that comprehenders tend to adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective, especially for first-person language, and secondly, that this 
perspective is grounded in the current motor context rather than long-term motor experience. 
The absence of any effects of trial when right-handed participants used their left hand to 
respond suggests that our results cannot easily be attributed to a purely practice effect. 
5.8.1. Sentence pronoun 
In Experiments 2a and 2b, the hand-in-use preference was stronger following first-
person compared with third-person sentences. The Spatial Grounding Hypothesis (see 
Chapter 3) predicts differences between self-referential (e.g., first-person) and non-self-
referential (e.g., third-person) language. According to the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis, in 
order to run an action simulation (and thus, adopt an embodied perspective), comprehenders 
must be able to ground that simulation in a sufficiently detailed representation of the space 




to some coarse-coded information about the spatial properties of the action. For example, in 
order to simulate the action of closing a drawer, the comprehender must first be able to 
conceive the direction of such an action. In the case of self-referential language, 
comprehenders can ground themselves in their own body: a sentence such as I am closing 
the drawer can be understood in terms of moving the hand towards the comprehender’s own 
body. But in the case of third-person language, external cues might also be required to 
enable to comprehender to know in which direction they should simulate a movement (e.g., 
spatial avatars; see Gianelli et al. , 2011). In the absence of such external cues, running an 
action simulation of third-person language should be more difficult compared with first-
person language. 
The effects of pronoun of Experiments 2a and 2b support the claims of the Spatial 
Grounding Hypothesis to some extent, since participants appear more likely to adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective for first-person, compared with third-person sentences. 
However, note that left-handed participants, in particular, still displayed a strong preference 
(~65%) for left-handed images following third-person sentences. One possible explanation 
of this finding is that, just as Taylor and Zwaan argue that comprehension is not an all or 
nothing process (Taylor & Zwaan, 2009, 2013), running a simulation during language 
comprehension is not all or nothing either. Action simulations may degrade gracefully in 
clarity or specificity as the spatial context becomes less than optimal (e.g., in third-person 
language). For example, motor representations of one’s own actions are thought to be more 
detailed than representations of other people’s actions (Jeannerod, 2006), a mechanism 
which may allow us to distinguish between our own and other’s actions. Therefore, third-
person language may simply trigger less detailed simulations, and therefore result in weaker 
embodiment effects than first-person language. 
A second possibility is that third-person language does not result in less detailed 
simulations, but is simply less likely to result in a simulation happening at all. The idea of 




favour the first possibility, that third-person representations are less embodied, rather than 
the second possibility, that third-person representations are less likely to be embodied at all. 
However, the present data are insufficient to distinguish between these two possibilities 
empirically. Note that the results of our right-handed participants in Experiment 2a do 
however suggest that third-person language is not more likely to trigger an embodied 
observer’s perspective (contra Brunyé et al., 2009): for right-handed participants responding 
using their right hand, adopting an embodied observer’s perspective should also manifest 
itself in a preference for right-handed images.  
5.8.2. Image orientation  
Perhaps surprisingly, we found no effect of image orientation in any of the three 
groups of participants in Experiments 2a and 2b, either as a main effect or in interaction with 
other predictors. These null effects contrast with findings from action observation (Vogt et 
al., 2003), motor imagery (Marzoli et al., 2011), and action language comprehension 
(Brunyé et al., 2009; Pickering et al., 2012), all of which find effects of orientation (internal, 
external) on processes through to involve motor resonance. Why, then, do we find no effect 
of orientation?  
 Gardner and Potts (2010) asked participants to make speeded laterality judgements 
about whether a ball was in the left or right hand of a schematic human figure. The human 
figure was shown from either a front view (external orientation) or a back view (internal 
orientation). Left-handed participants were faster to respond when the ball was in the 
figure’s left hand, and right-handed participants were faster to respond when the ball was in 
the figure’s right-hand, regardless of internal or external orientation. Gardner and Potts 
hypothesise that attentional biases towards an individual’s dominant hand (e.g., Amazeen, 
Amazeen, Treffner, & Turvey, 1997; Amazeen, Ringenbach, & Amazeen, 2005; Rubichi & 
Nicoletti, 2006) generalise from an individual’s own body to other, observed bodies (or in 




representations, both behaviourally (e.g., Summers, Semjen, Carson, & Thomas, 1995) and 
cortically (Triggs, Subramanium, & Rossi, 1999). Therefore, although it can account for the 
findings of Experiment 2a, it cannot easily account for the reversal of behaviour in 
Experiment 2b, where right-handed participants showed a preference for left-handed images. 
Instead, it seems that hand orientation only inconsistently acts as a cue to agency 
attribution. For example, Anquetil and Jeannerod (2007) found that participants were equally 
as fast to imagine a manual action from an external orientation as from an internal 
orientation. The conditions in which orientation does and does not act as a cue are unclear, 
and should be a topic for further research. However, a clue may lie in a recent TMS study, 
where participants observed manual actions in which either the muscle performing the 
movement, or the direction that movement, could be congruent with the participant (Alaerts, 
Swinnen, & Wenderoth, 2009). Results showed that MEPs were modulated by the 
congruency of the muscle rather than that of the direction. Extrapolating to our study, it may 
be that congruency of the hand performing the action, rather than its orientation, took 
precedence. Notably, in those studies which found an effect of orientation, only one study 
(Marzoli et al., 2011) manipulated the hand dominance of participants, thus manipulating the 
effector as well as the direction; and in Marzoli et al., only a single trial was used per 
participant. 
5.8.3. Current motor context 
The results of Experiment 2b suggest that although participants appear to adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective, this is driven by current motor context rather than long-term 
experience. In one sense then, the results support the idea of body-specificity, since an 
individual’s current actions appear to influence their linguistic representations. However in 
another sense, the results conflict with the idea of body-specificity, since we found no 
evidence that a comprehender’s history of interaction in the world influences their language 




typically observed preferences (Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011), however, trial showed no 
effect when it was included as an effect in Experiment 2b. In other words, people did not 
appear to become “more left-handed” as the experiment progressed. We will explore these 
issues further in Chapter 6. 
For now however, it is interesting to note that an influence of current motor context 
would fit well with the construal of embodiment type effects as a form of priming (section 
2.3.5): the current state of motor activation influences the current state of linguistic 
processing, but is not necessary or sufficient for language comprehension to occur (to say 
otherwise would be to imply that participants in Experiment 3 did not understand the 
sentences they were presented with). 
5.8.4. Demand characteristics 
One potential worry with the studies in this chapter is that participants may have 
guessed our intention to investigate differences in handedness (Experiment 1 and 2a), or 
response hand (Experiment 2b). Cues that unintentionally convey the experimental 
hypothesis to the participant are known as demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). Participants 
can use these demand characteristics to adjust their behaviour in order to meet what they 
believe to be the expectations of the experimenter, in particular for tasks requiring 
participants to make a subjective decision about, for example, mental imagery  
(Intons-Peterson, 1983). Given the subjective nature of the task in Experiments 2a and 2b 
(there is no objectively correct image on the critical trials), we are therefore justified in 
worrying about the potential effects of demand characteristics. I sought to rule out the effects 
of demand characteristics as much as possible in the following four ways. First, the 
repetition of sentences on one quarter of trials provided a plausible cover story to disguise 
the true purpose of the experiment. Second, the recruitment of participants was designed in 
such a way that no participant realised they had been recruited on the basis of their 




response being initiated at ~610 ms. Fourth, a thorough debriefing after the experiment 
allowed us to check whether any participant had guessed at the handedness manipulation. 
One participant in Experiment 2a mentioned that he thought we were testing whether he 
would select the right-handed or the left-handed image, and he was removed from all further 
analysis. All suitable precautions were therefore taken to reduce the possibility of demand 
characteristics affecting the results reported here. 
5.9. Summary 
In this chapter, I found that language comprehenders appear to adopt an embodied 
agent’s perspective on action language: that is, interpreting it as if they themselves were 
performing the action. This embodied agent’s perspective interacts with subject pronoun, so 
that participants’ preference for an interpretation that matches their current state of motor 
activation is stronger following first-person sentences compared with third-person sentences. 
I also found evidence that the embodied agent’s perspective is driven by current motor 
context rather than previous experience. I found no evidence for an effect of image 















6. DEFINING THE CURRENT MOTOR CONTEXT 
6.1. Overview of the chapter 
In Chapter 5, I found evidence that people interpret action language sentences in line 
with hand-in-use rather than dominant hand.  Participants were more likely to match manual 
action sentences to images that were congruent with participants’ response hand, rather than 
with their dominant hand. This preference for images depicting the hand-in-use was stronger 
following first-person sentences compared with third-person sentences. In other words, it 
appears that current motor context overrides long-term motor experience in the interpretation 
of action language. 
However, current motor context is rather vaguely defined. For example, the effects 
described in Chapter 5 were observed in image selection, after sentence processing had been 
completed. It is therefore unclear whether an effect of current motor context entails that 
motor resonance be present during sentence processing (sentence-based simulation), or 
whether motor resonance and its interaction with pronoun might arise after sentence 
processing is complete (image-based simulation). It is also unclear what the basis of this 
motor resonance might be: in Experiments 2a and 2b, hand-in-use refers to both the hand the 
participants were planning to respond with on a given trial, and the hand that participants 
had responded with on the previous trial. In this chapter, I extend the forced choice sentence-
picture matching paradigm used in Chapter 5 so that participants have one response box for 
their left hand, and one response box for their right hand.  
In this way, I aim to specify the parameters of current motor context at the following 
two levels. First, I manipulate at what point in time (before sentence processing, after 
sentence processing), participants are cued as to which hand to respond with on a given trial. 
Second, I manipulate whether response hand is randomised or blocked, in order to dissociate 




I provide evidence that the effect of hand-in-use and its interaction with pronoun disappear 
when participants do not know their respond hand until after sentence processing. In 
Experiments 5 and 6, I show that when participants know their respond hand prior to 
sentence processing, the effects of hand-in-use and pronoun reappear. Experiment 6 suggests 
that the difference between Experiments 4 and 5 is not an artefact of blocking (Experiment 
5) versus randomisation (Experiment 4), and furthermore, that current motor context is 
defined by the hand comprehenders are planning to use (prospective simulation), rather than 
the hand used to respond on a previous trial (retrospective simulation). 
6.2. Introduction 
The results from Chapter 5 suggest that comprehenders interpret manual action 
sentences according to their hand-in-use rather than their dominant hand, and that this 
tendency is stronger following self-referential language, in line with the Spatial Grounding 
Hypothesis proposed in Chapter 3. The interaction found between hand-in-use and pronoun 
is important because that it rules out the possibility that the effect of hand-in-use might 
simply be an effect of left- and right-hand based affordances in image processing (cf. 
Tucker & Ellis, 1998), with no interaction with language: at some point prior to image 
selection, the likelihood of selecting an image congruent with hand-in-use is affected by 
whether the action is described in first- or third-person language. Two factors remain 
unclear, however. First, when does this interaction between the language and action 
systems occur? Second, does hand-in-use have an effect because it represents the hand that 
participants are planning to use, or because it represents the hand used to respond on the 
previous trial?  
Regarding the first question, one possibility is that the language system represents 
first- and third-person sentences differently, but that these representations are not sensitive 
to motor activation from hand-in-use. That is, there is no hand-in-use based action 




processing (perhaps as a result of left- or right-hand based affordances), and this activation 
interacts with the different linguistic representations for first- and third-person language 
after sentence processing is complete. In other words, the effect of pronoun occurs during 
sentence processing, but the effect of hand-in-use, and its interaction with pronoun, occurs 
after sentence processing. A second possibility is that the language system is sensitive to 
motor activation from hand-in-use, and simulations based on this activation occur during 
sentence processing. Thus, comprehenders tend to represent the described action as if 
carried out by their response hand. As discussed in section 5.8.1, this motor representation 
is either stronger, or more likely to occur, for first-person compared with third-person 
language, perhaps as a result of motor representations of our own actions being stronger 
than those of other people (Jeannerod, 2006). In other words, the effects of pronoun and of 
hand-in-use, and their interaction, all occur during sentence processing. Experiments 4 and 
5 will aim to distinguish between these two possibilities. 
Regarding the second question, there is evidence to suggest that short-term motor 
experience can affect our representations of valence and affect (Casasanto & Chrysikou, 
2011), and of motor resonance in action observation (Petroni et al., 2010), supporting the 
idea that current motor context is defined by the hand used to perform previous responses. 
However, other evidence suggests that motor resonance is greater for actions we predict 
compared with those we do not predict (Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 
2004), supporting the idea that current motor context is defined by hand used to plan for 
future responses. Experiment 6 aims to shed light on this question by randomizing response 
hand so that the hand participants plan to respond with can be dissociated from their 
response hand on the previous trial. 
6.2.1. Temporal dynamics and motor resonance 
At what point does the interaction between hand-in-use and pronoun occur? Above, 




and interacts differentially with first-person and third-person interpretations; or that the 
effect of hand-in-use occurs during sentence processing, and is stronger for first-person 
compared with third-person sentences. In each of these explanations, the language system 
(pronoun) interacts with motor activation (hand-in-use). However, only in the second 
explanation (hand-in-use and pronoun interact during sentence processing), is it assumed 
that motor resonance is present during sentence comprehension. Therefore, only the second 
explanation implies a functional role of motor resonance.  
Much of the debate about the possible functional role of motor resonance in 
language processing revolves around at what point in language processing motor activation 
can be detected. For example, evidence that the motor system is activated by 250 ms (or 
earlier) after word onset, has been found using fMRI (Pulvermüller, Härle, & Hummel, 
2001), MEG (Pulvermüller, Shtyrov, & Ilmoniemi, 2005), and in behavioural studies 
(Boulenger et al., 2006). These studies are often cited as evidence that embodied 
representations play a functional role in semantic meaning, rather than being a downstream 
by-product of the comprehension process (e.g., Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010). Of course, 
evidence that motor resonance occurs early on in language processing is still compatible 
with there being no causal relationship between the two systems, since both processes may 
simply begin at the same time without interacting with one another (Mahon & Caramazza, 
2008). Therefore, demonstrating that the effect of hand-in-use occurs during sentence 
processing is not sufficient grounds for inferring a causal relationship between the action 
and language systems. However, evidence that motor resonance only occurs after language 
processing has been completed, is not compatible with the motor system playing a 
functional role in language comprehension. 
One means of discerning whether the effect of hand-in-use occurs during or after 
sentence processing is to manipulate at what point in time participants know which hand 
they will use to respond with. If motor activation from hand-in-use interacts with pronoun 




when participants know their response hand during sentence processing. If motor activation 
from hand-in-use interacts with pronoun after sentence processing, then the effects of hand-
in-use and pronoun should occur also when participants do not know their response hand 
until after sentence processing is complete. In Experiments 4 – 6 therefore, I manipulate 
whether participants know their response hand before, or after sentence processing. This 
manipulation draws on work looking at the time course of the Action-Sentence 
Compatibility Effect, where researchers manipulate at what point in processing participants 
know which in direction they should respond (towards the body or away from the body) to 
a sensible sentence (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Diefenbach et al., 2013; Kaschak & 
Borreggine, 2008).  
Recall from Chapter 2 that timing has been demonstrated to affect the presence, or 
the direction of effects in action language research. Importantly for the present chapter, 
Borreggine and Kaschak (2006) found an ACE when participants were told the response-
direction mapping at sentence onset, but not when this mapping was presented at various 
time points (50ms, 500ms, 1000ms) after the end of the sentence. According to the authors, 
the ACE occurs only when participants are given the chance to plan their motor response 
during sentence processing.  
6.2.2. Motor planning versus short-term motor experience 
Throughout Chapter 5, I described the effect of hand-in-use as an effect of current 
motor context. However, in Experiments 2a and 2b, participants responded with the same 
hand throughout the experiment. Therefore, the motor context could be defined in one of 
two ways. First, it could be that the crucial factor is the hand that was used to respond on the 
previous trial. This possibility would suggest that comprehenders make use of retrospective 
simulation, where motor resonance is based on simulation of actions performed in the 
(recent) past. Alternatively, it could be that the crucial factor is the hand that the participant 




make use of prospective simulation, where motor resonance is based on simulation of 
upcoming actions. Both of these possibilities have some support from the literature, and 
Experiment 6 will test between them. 
In favour of retrospective simulation, we know that training people to experience 
increased motor fluency in their non-dominant hand causes them to associate positive 
valence with their non-dominant hand rather than their dominant hand (Casasanto & 
Chrysikou, 2011). Glenberg, Sato and Cattaneo (2008) demonstrated that plasticity in 
embodied representations can affect language comprehension: participants spent 
approximately 20 minutes moving beans either away from their body or towards their body, 
before performing sensibility judgements on sentences depicting movements away from or 
towards the body. Results showed that participants were slower to perform sensibility 
judgements on sentences describing movement that was congruent with the movement in 
their training period. The null effect of trial over the course of Experiment 2b suggests that 
participants in that experiment did not gradually become more “left-handed” as the 
experiment progressed. However, it is possible that simulations might have been based on 
residual activation from the previous response (and that this activation did not build up 
cumulatively through the experiment, hence participants were not more “left-handed” at the 
end of the experiment than at the beginning). In this case, a single previous trial might be 
sufficient to determine to motor context. 
On the other hand, Rueschemeyer and Bekkering (2013) point to the fact that motor 
resonance in action observation is often viewed as having a predictive role (Blakemore & 
Frith, 2005; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). For example, participants were shown video clips of 
a hand, and cued at the start of each clip as to whether or not the hand in that clip would 
move. On the cued-movement clips, EEG revealed motor activation prior to the observation 
of any actual movement (Kilner et al., 2004). Evidence of anticipatory motor resonance has 
been demonstrated in infants as young as nine months old. Southgate et al. (2009) applied 




an object. On observation trials, the object was visible for 400ms before a hand appeared and 
performed the reaching movement. Results showed similar attenuation in alpha-band activity 
on observation trials as on performing trials. Interestingly, the infants showed attenuation 
during the first 400 ms of observation trials, (i.e., before any reaching movement was 
observed), but this early attentuation only occurred on later trials, when the infant had learnt 
that a reaching movement would soon occur. The effect of trial in this study suggests that 
infants did not simply respond to visible objects, but rather predicted upcoming actions 
regarding those objects.  
Finally, still in favour of prospective simulation, van Elk, van Schie and Bekkering 
(2009) describe a study in which unusual actions appear to overturn the effect of more 
typical actions rooted in long-term experience. Adult participants were instructed to perform 
actions with typical goals (e.g., bringing a cup to the mouth) or atypical goals (e.g., bringing 
a cup to the eye) in response to words that could be congruent with the typical goal based on 
past experience, or with the unusual goal based on their current motor plan. For example, 
when moving a cup to their mouth, the word mouth would be congruent with both the 
experience and motor planning based goals. When moving a cup to their eye, the word 
mouth would be congruent with the experience-based goal, and the word eye would be 
congruent with the motor planning based goal. As expected, participants were faster to 
perform usual actions in respond to words that were congruent with the experience-based 
goal. However, participants were faster to perform unusual actions in response to words that 
were congruent with the motor planning based goal, thus overriding the effects of previous 
experience. Therefore, if we conceive the task of responding with a non-dominant hand as 
an unusual action goal, it may be the case that the motor activation associated with this 






6.3. Experiment 4    
In Experiment 4, I conducted a within-subjects version of Experiments 2a and 2b, 
in which participants did not know until after sentence processing which hand they would 
use to respond with. I adapted the forced-choice sentence-picture matching paradigm used 
in the previous chapter, so that participants had a coloured response box for their left 
hand, and a different coloured response box for their right hand. Participants were shown 
a coloured screen to cue which box (and therefore hand) they should respond with, before 
sentence presentation. If the hand-in-use by pronoun interaction from Experiments 2a and 
2b was due to sentence-based simulations, which were stronger for first-person than for 
third-person language, then there should be no effect of pronoun or hand-in-use on the 
likelihood of choosing a right-handed image in this version of the task, since motor 
resonance will not be available during sentence processing. Alternatively, if the hand-in-
use by pronoun interaction in Experiments 2a and 2b was driven by image-based 
simulations interacting with different first- and third-person linguistic representations 
after sentence processing, then we should replicate the results from Experiments 2a and 




 Sixteen native English speakers (11 females, mean age = 19.3 years, age range = 
17 – 35) took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision, and no history of reading difficulties. All participants were 





Materials and design 
 I employed a two-alternative forced-choice sentence-picture matching task, as in 
Experiments 2a and 2b. All sentences and image pairs were identical to those used in 
Experiments 2a and 2b. Design was the same as Experiment 2a and 2b, with the following 
exceptions. Participants now had two response boxes, one green coloured, and one blue 
coloured. The response hand (left, right) using a particular response box (blue box, green 
box) was counterbalanced across participants so that half the participants used their left hand 
to respond with the blue box, and their right hand to respond with the green box; the other 
half of the participants used their right hand to respond with the blue box, and their left hand 
to respond with the green box. Person (I am, He is) and image orientation (internal, external) 
remained fully crossed. Response hand (and hence, screen cue: blue or green) was 
counterbalanced across filler and critical trials, and across condition (First-person + Internal, 
First-person + External, Third-person + Internal, Third-person + External).  
Procedure 
Procedure was the same as Experiments 2a and 2b, with the following exceptions. 
Participants sat with the index finger of one hand resting on, but not pressing, the middle 
button of the blue response box, and the index finger of the other hand resting on, but not 
pressing, the middle button of the green response box. A fixation cross appeared on 
screen (1000 ms), followed by the sentence (1000 ms). Next, participants were shown a 
blue or green coloured screen (1500 ms). The screen colour represented the box (and 
therefore, the hand) that participants should use to respond with their choice of image on 
that trial. The coloured screen was followed by a pair of photographs, one of the left of 
the screen, and one on the right of the screen. Participants selected the image on the right 
or left of the screen by pressing the right or left button, respectively, on the response box 
that they had been cued to use on that trial. If a response was not made within 3000ms, 




The experiment consisted of 4 blocks, with an enforced 90 second pause between 
each block. To ensure that participants attended to the subject of the sentence as well as 
the action described, and to disguise the purpose of the experiment, participants were 
required to repeat the sentence aloud following 25% trials. Participants’ oral responses 
were recorded and coded according to whether participants had recalled the sentence 
correctly or not. 
Presentation of trials was randomised. There was no mention of handedness or 
“left” and “right” prior to the experiment. The experimenter explained how the 
participant was to respond using the terms “this side of the screen” and “this button”, 
rather than “left side of the screen” or “right button”. Participants’ handedness was 
checked by observing the participant fill out a consent form prior to the experiment, and 
by completion of the EHI during debriefing following the experiment. A short practice 
session (16 trials) preceded the experimental session.  
6.3.2. Results 
Analysis 
 Image choice, sentence repetition accuracy and button press RT analyses were 
conducted in the same manner as Experiments 2a and 2b. Error rate analysis differed in 
that participants could now be incorrect on filler trials in either their image choice, or the 
response hand used to make that choice. On critical trials, participants could be either 
correct or incorrect in the response hand used to select an image.  
Predictors of interest were response hand (left-handed response, right-handed 
response), sentence pronoun (first-person, third-person), and image orientation (internal, 
external). An interaction between response hand and pronoun would demonstrate that 
image-based motor resonance could interact with sentence pronoun, after sentence 




image orientation in Experiments 2a and 2b. We also expected a spatial-compatibility effect 
as per Experiments 2a and 2b. Image-screen compatibility (CONGRUENT = right-handed 
image on right side of the screen, INCONRUENT = right-handed image on left side of the 
screen) was therefore included as a fixed effect in all models. Unless otherwise specified, all 
analyses reported below use the following model with simplified random effect structure, 
where random intercepts and slopes for image-screen congruency were removed in order to 
allow the model to converge: 
 
Model  6-1: Response hand * Pronoun * Image orientation + Image-screen congruency + 
(1+ Response hand * Pronoun * Image orientation | Subject) + (1+ Response hand * 
Pronoun * Image orientation | Item) 
Error rates 
Sentence-picture matching 
 Overall accuracy on selecting the correct image to match the sentence on filler trials 
was 94%. There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences (94%) 
versus third-person sentences (94%); for internally (94%) versus externally (94%) orientated 
images; for right-handed (93%) versus left-handed (94%) responses; or for image-screen 
congruent (94%) versus incongruent (93%) trials (all ps > .05).  
Sentence repetition 
 Overall accuracy for sentence repetition was 97% (98% on critical trials; 96% on 
filler trials, ns.). There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences 
(97%) versus third-person sentences (96%); for internally (96%) versus externally (98%) 
orientated images; for image-screen congruent (95%) versus incongruent (98%) trials; or for 






Overall accuracy for using the correct response hand was 96% (96% on critical 
trials; 95% on filler trials, ns.). There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-
person sentences (96%) versus third-person sentences (95%); for internally (96%) versus 
externally (95%) orientated images; for image-screen congruent (96%) versus incongruent 
(96%) trials; or for right-handed (96%) versus left-handed (95%) responses (all ps > .05). 
Image choice  
 In total, 1% of critical trials timed-out without a response, and could not be 
analysed. I checked for any trials where participants selected an image within 200 ms of 
image onset (0 trials). Tables 6-1 and 6-2 show the frequency with which participants 
selected a right-handed image, by condition. Table 6-3 shows the model coefficients for the 
likelihood of selecting a right-handed image, using the following model with simplified 
random effect structure (the correlation parameter, the random intercepts and slopes for 
image-screen congruency, and the by-item random intercepts and slopes for interactions 
with item orientation were removed in order to allow the model to converge): 
 
Model  6-2: Response hand * Pronoun * Image orientation + Image-screen congruency + 
(1+ Response hand * Pronoun * Image orientation | Subject) + (1+ Response hand * 
Pronoun + Image orientation | Item)  
 
 As can be seen from Table 6-3, there was no main effect of response hand, pronoun, 
nor any interaction between response hand and pronoun (all ps > .05). There was a 
significant effect of image-screen congruency (see Table 6-1). There were no effects of 





Table 6-1. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choice by image-screen 










Table 6-2. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choice by response 











Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
150 (31%) 334 (69%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
298 (63%) 178 (37%) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
153 (32%) 321 (68%) 
  
Left-handed image 





Response hand Pronoun Image 
orientation 
Image choice 




Left hand I am Internal 107 137 
 I am External 117 119 
                            Total I am (all orientations) 224 (47%) 256 (53%) 
 He is Internal 110 136 
 He is External 114 120 
                             Total He is (all orientations) 224 (47%) 256 (53%) 
   
Right hand I am Internal 123 123 
 I am External 129 114 
                            Total I am (all orientations) 252 (52%) 237 (48%) 
 He is Internal 113 127 
 He is External 109 138 




Table 6-3. Predictors of image choice in Experiment 4: Coefficients from Model 6-2 
(significant fixed effects in bold) 
 
Button Press RTs 
 I checked for trials with button press RTs of under 200 ms (0 trials), and 
winsorised remaining critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s 
mean response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that 
participant (0% trials replaced with lower cutoff; 2.25% trials replaced with upper 
cutoff). Table 6-4 and 6-5 show the mean button press RTs, by condition. There were no 
significant effects of dominant hand, pronoun, image orientation, or image-screen 
congruency, and no significant interactions between these variables using Model 6-1 (all 
ps > .05).  In addition, participants were not significantly faster to select right-handed 
images compared with left-handed images (B = -8.531, SE = 14.94, p = 0.57). 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image 
(Intercept) 0.11 0.06 0.05* 
Response hand 0.08 0.11 0.45 
Pronoun -0.15 0.10 0.15 
Image orientation 0.13 0.12 0.26 
Image-screen congruency 1.40 0.11 <.001*** 
Response hand x pronoun 0.24 0.21 0.25 
Response hand x image    
orientation 
 
0.25 0.19 0.20 
Pronoun x image orientation 0.21 0.19 0.29 
Response hand x pronoun x 
image orientation 































Left hand  Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
1251 (445) 1228 (413) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1171 (364) 1267 (435) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1288 (458) 1174 (405) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
1212 (413) 1259 (440) 
 Image choice 
 Left-handed image Right-handed image 
Pronoun  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  
Image 
orientation 
Internal Internal External External Internal Internal External External 
Left hand 1223 (414) 1235 (414) 1201 (386) 1135 (358) 1310 (478) 1236 (417) 1212 (395) 1198 (374) 





In Experiment 4, I found that when participants read simple action sentences without 
knowing which hand will be used to respond, there is no effect of response hand on image 
choice, and no interaction with pronoun. The effect of image-screen congruency remains 
significant, suggesting that the paradigm is still sensitive to some effects. Post-hoc 
simulation-based power analysis were used to check that the design of Experiment 4 had 
sufficient power to detect an effect of response hand. The effect of response hand is 
estimated based on the comparison between right-handers in Experiments 2a and 2b (b0 =  
0.79, b1 = 0.33).The standard deviation associated with subjects (0.18) and items (0.06) were 
based on the actual data from Experiment 4. Because these data are analysed using logistic 
regression, both the coefficients for the fixed effects of response hand, and the standard 
deviations associated with random effects, are specified on the logit scale. Results of this 
power analysis showed that Model 6-2 correctly detected the effect of response hand on only 
5% of 1000 simulated datasets, indicating an underpowered design. An additional power 
analysis was therefore conducted, using the following model which collapsed across 
pronoun and image orientation: 
Model 6-3: Response hand + (1 + Response hand| Subject) + (1 + Response hand| Item) 
 
Using this simplified model, the effect of response hand was correctly detected on 
>99% simulations. The actual data obtained from Experiment 4 were then reanalysed using 
Model 6-3 to check for any effect of response hand when collapsing across pronoun and 
image orientation. Results of this additional analysis showed no effect of response hand on 
the probability of selecting the right-handed image (b = 0.07, SE = 0.09, p = .41), despite the 




Together, these results support the hypothesis that the effect of response hand in 
Experiment 2a and 2b are driven by motor resonance present during sentence processing. 
However, the insertion of the coloured screen to cue response hand resulted in a 1500 ms 
delay between sentence offset and image presentation. If perspective-taking is a short-lived 
phenomenon, then the 1500 ms gap between sentence and image presentation might nullify 
any effect. Once the image is presented, the corresponding sentence might no longer be 
active enough to trigger perspective-taking in the comprehender. In Experiment 5, I tested 
this possibility by retaining the 1500 ms gap, but having participants know their response 
hand during sentence processing. 
6.4. Experiment 5 
In Experiment 5 I checked whether the delay between sentence and image 
presentation in Experiment 4 compared with Experiment 2a and 2b could explain the 
different results. I followed exactly the same procedure and importantly, timing, as 
Experiment 4, with the exception that trials were blocked instead of randomized so that 
participants knew, while reading the sentence, which hand they would use to respond 
with. Motor resonance was therefore available to interact with language during sentence 
processing. If the null results in Experiment 4 were the result of a delay between sentence 
and image presentation, then we should also observe null results in Experiment 5. If the 
null results in Experiment 4 were the result of motor resonance not being present during 
sentence presentation, then Experiment 5 should replicate the pattern of results for right-
handed participants in Experiment 2a and 2b (i.e., there should be a main effect of 









 Sixteen native English speakers (9 females, mean age = 20.9 years, age range = 18 
to 34) took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision, and no history of reading difficulties. All participants were 
right-handed according to the EHI (mean EHI score = 83, EHI score range: 53 to 100). 
Materials and design 
 Materials and design were the same as Experiment 4, with the exception that blue 
box and green box trials were blocked together rather than randomly presented. This 
blocking procedure meant that, even though the coloured screen was not presented until 
after sentence presentation, participants knew their response hand while reading the 
sentence. 
Procedure  
The procedure was the same as Experiment 4. No mention of handedness was 
made prior to testing, and no participant noticed a connection between dominant or 
response hand and hand in the experimental images. 
6.4.2. Results 
Analysis 
Analyses for error rates were the same as for Experiment 4, using Model 6-1. 
Analyses for image choice and button press RTs were the same as for Experiment 4, using 
Model 6-2. In addition, a further analysis with trial as a fixed effect was carried on each 
block separately, to check for a cumulative effect of trial over the course of a block. For 
these analyses, trial was added as fixed effect to Model 6-2 to give the following model with 




slopes for image-screen congruency, and the by-item random intercepts and slopes for trial 
and for interactions with item orientation were removed in order to allow the model to 
converge): 
Model  6-4: Pronoun * Image orientation + Trial + Image-screen congruency + (1+ Pronoun 
* Image orientation +Trial | Subject) + (1+ Pronoun + Image orientation | Item)  
Error Rates  
Sentence-picture matching 
 Overall accuracy on selecting the correct image to match the sentence on filler trials 
was 93%. There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences (93%) 
versus third-person sentences (93%); for internally (93%) versus externally (93%) orientated 
images; for right-handed (93%) versus left-handed (93%) responses; or for image-screen 
congruent (93%) versus incongruent (93%) trials (all ps > .05).  
Sentence repetition 
 Overall accuracy for sentence repetition was 98% (99% on critical trials; 98% on 
filler trials, ns.). There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences 
(98%) versus third-person sentences (99%); for internally (97%) versus externally (99%) 
orientated images; for image-screen congruent (98%) versus incongruent (99%) trials; or for 
right-handed (99%) versus left-handed (98%) participants (all ps > .05). 
Response hand 
Accuracy for using the correct response hand was 100%. 
Image choice 
 In total, 1% of critical trials timed-out without a response, and could not be 
analysed. I checked for trials where participants selected an image within 200 ms of image 




selected a right-handed image, by condition. Table 6-8 shows the model coefficients for the 
likelihood of selecting a right-handed image over the whole experiment, using Model 6-2.  
 There was a main effect of response hand: participants were significantly more 
likely to select a right-handed image when using their right hand compared with their left 
hand. There was no significant effect of pronoun, but the interaction between response hand 
and pronoun was significant. There was a significant effect of image-screen congruency: in 
the congruent condition (right-handed image on right side of the screen), participants were 
more likely to select the right-handed image, and in the incongruent condition (left-handed 
image on the right side of the screen), participants were more likely to select the left-handed 
image (i.e., they were more likely to select the image on right side of the screen, regardless 
of response hand). There was no effect of trial, and no effects of image orientation, as a main 
effect, or in interaction with other predictors (all ps > .05). 
 
 
Table 6-6. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choices by image-screen 





















Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
243 (48%) 263 (52%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
367 (72%) 138 (28%) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
148 (29%) 360 (61%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 





Table 6-7. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choice by response 




Model 6-4 (incorporating an trial as a fixed effect and by-subjects random effect), 
was run on each half of Experiment 5, as described above, to check whether participants 
showed any evidence of cumulative effect of response hand over time (see Table 6-9). For 
the right hand response block, there was a significant effect of pronoun and image-screen 
congruency; for the left hand response block, there was a significant effect of image-
screen congruency. There was no effect of trial in either block, suggesting that participants 
did not, for example, become more “left-handed” over the left-handed response block. 
 
 






Left-handed responses I am Internal 153 100 
 I am External 165 87 
                                   Total I am (all orientations) 318 (63%) 187 (37%) 
 He is Internal 147 108 
 He is External 145 106 
                                   Total He is (all orientations)  292 (58%) 214 (42%) 
   
Right-handed responses I am Internal 68 190 
 I am External 79 171 
                                    Total I am (all orientations) 147 (29%) 361 (71%) 
 He is Internal 116 141 
 He is External 108 146 




Table 6-8. Predictors of image choice in Experiment 5: Coefficients from Model 6-2 
(significant fixed effects in bold) 
 
Button press RTs 
 I checked for trials with button press RTs of under 200 ms (0 trials), and 
winsorised remaining critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s 
mean response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that 
participant (0% trials replaced with lower cutoff; 1.81% trials replaced with upper 
cutoff). Tables 6-10 and 6-11 show the mean button press RTs, by condition. I checked 
for effects of response hand, pronoun, and image orientation on button press RTs as well 
as trial and image-screen congruency, using Model 6-2. There were no significant effects 
of pronoun, image orientation, image-screen congruency, and no interactions between 
these variables (all ps > .05). The effect of response hand was marginally significant (B = 
-83.67, SE = 51.52, p = 0.1) The by-block analysis revealed no significant effects of 
response hand, pronoun, image orientation, or image-screen congruency (all ps > .05), but 
trial was significant (p <.001) for both right-handed and left-handed response blocks.
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image  
(Intercept) -0.07 0.17 0.68 
Response hand 1.21 0.39 .002** 
Pronoun 0.19 0.19 0.30 
Image orientation 0.09 0.11 0.41 
Image-screen congruency 0.99 0.10 <.001*** 
Response hand x pronoun 1.01 0.21 <.001*** 
Response hand x image 
orientation 
 
-0.05 0.10 0.81 
Pronoun x image orientation .033 0.20 0.09 
Response hand x pronoun x 
image orientation 













 RIGHT-HAND RESPONSES LEFT-HAND RESPONSES 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient=0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image    
(Intercept) 1.6 0.05 <.001*** 1.36 0.06 <.001*** 
Pronoun 0.15 0.05 <.01** -0.06 0.05 0.25 
Image orientation 0.02 0.03 0.60 0.03 0.03 0.43 
Trial <.001 <.001 0.40 <.001 <.001 0.48 
Image-screen congruency 0.16 0.03 <.001*** 0.24 0.03 <.001*** 
























Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
1289 (405) 1095 (436) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1169 404) 1227 (452) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1319 (473) 1255 (448) 
  Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
1258 (464) 1293 (430) 
 Image choice 
                 Left-handed image                       Right-handed image 
Pronoun  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  
Image 
orientation 
Internal Internal External External Internal Internal External External 
Left hand 1172 (345) 1199 (437) 1248 (457) 1249 (459) 1131 (444) 1177 (435) 1097 (420) 1149 (403) 






Between experiment comparisons 
In order to confirm that the blocking versus random manipulation led to different 
effects on image choice, I conducted a planned comparison between Experiments 4 and 5. 
Since image orientation had not been significant in any previous models, it was removed as 
a fixed effect from the model, and experiment was added as a fixed effect. Analyses were 
therefore conducted using the following model with simplified random effect structure (the 
random intercepts and slopes for image-screen congruency were removed in order to allow 
the model to converge): 
 
Model 6-5: Response hand * Pronoun * Experiment + Image-screen congruency + 





Table 6-12 shows the model coefficients for this comparison. Across both 
experiments, there was a significant effect of response hand and of image-screen 
congruency. There was a significant interaction between experiment and response hand: 
effect of response hand was significantly stronger in Experiment 5 than Experiment 4. The 
interaction between pronoun and response hand was significant across the two experiments, 
and the three-way interaction between pronoun, response hand and experiment was also 
significant.  
6.4.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 5, right-handed participants were more likely to select right-handed images 
when responding with their right hand, and left-handed images when responding with their 
left hand. This preference for images matching hand-in-use was stronger following first-
person compared with third-person sentences. These results contrasted with the null results 





interaction between response hand, pronoun, and experiment was also significant, suggesting 
that the null results in Experiment 4 cannot be attributed to increased time lapse between 
sentence offset and image presentation, compared with Experiments 2a and 2b. 
 
 
Table 6-12. Predictors of image choice across Experiments 4 and 5: Coefficients from 
Model 6-5 (significant fixed effects in bold) 
 
In summary, Experiment 5 provides a within-subjects replication of Experiments 2a 
and 2b, with significant effects of response hand, response hand by pronoun interaction, and 
image-screen congruency. Experiment 4 on the other hand, showed only an effect of image-
screen congruency. Experiments 4 and 5 differed in that in Experiment 4, we cued left or 
right response hand randomly after sentence presentation; but in Experiment 5, we blocked 
left and right response hands so that participants knew their response hand during sentence 
processing. The significant effect of this manipulation suggests that the effect of hand-in-use 
and its interaction with pronoun occur only when participants know, during sentence 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image  
(Intercept) 0.09 0.04 0.03* 
Response hand -0.62 0.22 .004** 
Pronoun 0.03 0.10 0.74 
Experiment  0.03 0.08 0.70 
Image-screen congruency -1.2 0.07 <.001*** 
Response hand x Pronoun -0.55 0.22 0.01* 
Response hand x Experiment 1.07 0.44 0.001** 
Pronoun x Experiment -0.35 0.20 0.07 
Response hand x Pronoun x 
Experiment 





processing, which hand they will use to respond with. In other words, response hand and 
pronoun affect action sentence interpretation only when participants are able to plan a motor 
response with their response hand, during sentence processing. 
However, an alternative explanation is that it is not planned response hand, but 
previous respond hand, that is responsible for the effect of response hand on sentence 
interpretation. Once again, there was again no effect of trial on the likelihood of selecting a 
right-handed image in Experiment 5, indicating the participants do no become more left 
handed over the course of a left-handed block. However, blocking response hand meant that, 
as in Experiments 2a and 2b, response hand on the previous trial coincided with planned 
response hand on the present trial. Therefore, the results in Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 may 
have been caused by response hand on the previous trial, rather than participants planning to 
respond with a given hand during sentence comprehension. Experiment 6 was therefore 
designed to distinguish between the effects of response hand on the previous trial 
(retrospective simulation) and planned response hand on the current trial (prospective 
simulation).   
6.5. Experiment 6 
In Experiment 6 I checked whether the effect of current motor context in 
Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 could be attributed to previous response hand (retrospective 
simulation) or to planned response hand (prospective simulation). We did this by 
randomly cueing response hand prior to sentence presentation. Presenting the cues before 
sentence presentation meant that, like Experiment 5, participants knew their response 
hand during sentence processing. The randomization process meant that, unlike 
Experiment 5, previous response hand could be separated from planned response hand. 
Other than randomizing the response hand cues, procedure was identical to Experiment 5. 
If the results in Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 were due to previous response hand, then there 





hand. If the results in Experiments 2a, 2b and 5 were due to planned response hand, then 




 Sixteen native English speakers (8 females, mean age = 19.2 years, age range = 17 
to 22 took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision, and no history of reading difficulties. All participants were 
right-handed according to the EHI (mean EHI score = 87, EHI score range: 58 to 100). 
Materials and design 
 Materials and design were the same as Experiment 4. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 4, with the exception that the randomly 
selected blue or green screen cues appeared before the sentence, rather than after it. This 
manipulation meant that left and right hand responses were randomized, but participants 
knew which hand they would respond with while reading the sentence. No mention of 
handedness was made prior to testing, and no participant noticed a connection between 
dominant or response hand and hand in the experimental images. 
6.5.2. Results 
Analysis 
Analyses were the same as for Experiment 4, with the exception that for image 
choice and button press analyses, we included response hand from the previous trial as a 





correlation parameter, the random intercepts and slopes for image-screen congruency and 
previous response hand, and the by-item random intercepts and slopes for interactions with 
item orientation were removed in order to allow the model to converge): 
 
Model 6-6: Response hand * Pronoun * Image orientation + Previous response hand + 
Image-screen congruency + (1 | Subject) + (1 | Item) + (0+Response hand * Pronoun * 
Perspective | Subject) + (0+Response hand * Pronoun + Perspective | Item)
  
Error Rates  
Sentence-picture matching 
 Overall accuracy on selecting the correct image to match the sentence on filler trials 
was 95%. There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences (95%) 
versus third-person sentences (95%); for internally (96%) versus externally (95%) orientated 
images; for right-handed (95%) versus left-handed (96%) responses; or for image-screen 
congruent (96%) versus incongruent (95%) trials (all ps > .05).  
Sentence repetition 
 Overall accuracy for sentence repetition was 98% (99% on critical trials; 98% on 
filler trials, ns.). There were no significant differences in accuracy for first-person sentences 
(98%) versus third-person sentences (99%); for internally (97%) versus externally (99%) 
orientated images; for image-screen congruent (98%) versus incongruent (99%) trials; or for 
right-handed (99%) versus left-handed (98%) participants (all ps > .05). 
Response hand 
 Overall accuracy on using the correct hand to respond on critical trials was 96% 
(96% on critical trials; 96% on filler trials, ns.). There were no significant differences in 
accuracy for first-person sentences (96%) versus third-person sentences (96%); for internally 





(96%) responses; or for image-screen congruent (96%) versus incongruent (96%) trials (all 
ps > .05).  
Image choice 
 In total, 1% of critical trials timed-out without a response, and could not be 
analysed. I checked for trials where participants selected an image within 200 ms of image 
onset (0 critical trials). Tables 6-13 and 6-14 show the frequency with which participants 
selected a right-handed image, by condition. Table 6-15 shows the model coefficients for the 
likelihood of selecting a right-handed image, using Model 6-6. There was a main effect of 
response hand: participants were significantly more likely to select a right-handed image 
when using their right hand compared with their left hand. There was no significant effect of 
pronoun, but the interaction between response hand and pronoun was significant. There was 
a significant effect of image-screen congruency, with participants being more likely to select 
the congruent image than the incongruent image. There was no effect of the hand used to 
respond on a previous trial, and no effects of image orientation, as a main effect, or in 
interaction with other predictors (all ps > .05). 
 
Table 6-13. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image choices by image-


















Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
320 (61%) 203 (39%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
310 (60%) 209 (40%) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
156 (30%) 370 (70%) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 





Table 6-14. Frequency of right-handed and left-handed image responses by response 
hand, pronoun, and image orientation in Experiment 6 (percentage responses in 
parentheses). 
 
Table 6-15. Predictors of image choice in Experiment 6: Coefficients from Model 6-6 
(significant fixed effects in bold). 






Left-handed responses I am Internal 170 88 
 I am External 155 105 
                               Total I am (all orientations) 325 (63%) 193 (37%) 
 He is Internal 161 105 
 He is External 144 114 
                               Total He is (all orientations) 305 (58%) 219 (42%) 
Right-handed responses I am Internal 84 177 
 I am External 82 180 
                               Total I am (all orientations) 166 (32%) 357 (68%) 
 He is Internal 109 155 
 He is External 109 149 
                               Total He is (all orientations) 218 (42%) 304 (58%) 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image   
(Intercept) -0.03 0.21 0.89 
Response hand -1.26 0.30 <.001*** 
Pronoun -0.01 0.18 0.94 
Image orientation -0.20 0.12 0.10 
Previous response hand -0.09 0.10 0.37 
Image-screen congruency 0.37 0.11 <.001*** 
Response hand x pronoun -1.01 0.39 0.007** 
Response hand x image 
orientation 
-0.39 0.20 0.06 
Pronoun x image orientation -0.19 0.20 0.35 
Response hand x pronoun x 
image orientation 






Prompted by the null effect of pronoun for left-handed responses in Experiment 5, I 
conducted an additional analysis on Experiment 6, to check for an effect of pronoun in right-
handed and left-handed responses separately using the following model with simplified 
random effect structure (the correlation parameter, the random intercepts and slopes for 
image-screen congruency and previous response hand, and the by-item random intercepts 
and slopes for interactions with item orientation were removed in order to allow the model to 
converge): 
Model 6-7:  Pronoun * Image orientation + Previous response hand + Image-screen 
congruency + (1 | Subject) + (1 | Item) + (0+ Pronoun * Perspective | Subject) + (0+ 




Table 6-16 shows the results of these analyses. For right hand responses, there was a 
significant effect of pronoun and of image-screen congruency; for left hand responses 
block, there were no significant effects on image choice. 
Button press RTs 
 I checked for trials with button press RTs of under 200 ms (0 trials), and 
winsorised remaining critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 SD for participant’s 
mean response latency were replaced with the upper or lower cutoff value for that 
participant (0% trials replaced with lower cutoff; 1.34% trials replaced with upper 
cutoff). Tables 6-17 and 6-18 show the mean button press RTs, by condition. I checked 
for effects of response hand, pronoun, and image orientation on button press RTs as well 
as previous response hand and image-screen congruency, using Model 6-5. There were 
no significant effects of previous response hand, pronoun, image orientation, previous 
response hand or image-screen congruency, and no significant interactions between these 







Table 6-16. Predictors of image choice in Experiment 6 by response hand: Coefficients from Model 6-7 (significant fixed effects in bold)
 RIGHT-HAND RESPONSES LEFT-HAND RESPONSES 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient=0) 
Likelihood of choosing right-handed image    
(Intercept) 1.63 0.04 <.001*** 1.40 0.06 <.001*** 
Pronoun 0.10 0.03 0.002** -0.05 0.05 0.36 
Image orientation -.001 0.04 0.99 -0.06 0.03 0.06 
Previous response hand -0.02 0.03 0.32 -0.001 0.03 0.09 
Image-screen congruency 0.16 0.03 <.001*** -0.01 0.03 0.59 





Table 6-17. Mean winsorised button press RTs (ms) by image-screen congruency in 








6.5.3. Discussion  
In Experiment 6, right-handed participants were cued to respond with their left or 
right hand before reading a sentence describing a manual action, and selecting a right-
handed or left-handed image to match the sentence. Participants were more likely to select 
a right-handed image when they responded using their right hand, and more likely to 
select a left-handed image when they responded with their left hand. This effect of hand-
in-use interacted with pronoun: participants were more likely to select an image that was 
congruent with their response hand following first-person than third-person sentences. 
Experiment 6 therefore provided a further within-subjects replication of the hand by 
pronoun interaction in Experiments 2a and 2b. In addition, participants were not more 
likely to select a right-handed image having used their right-hand on a previous trial. Only 
the hand that participants had been planning to use when reading the sentence had an 
effect on the likelihood of choosing a right-handed image. This pattern of results, coupled 
with the lack of a cumulative effect of trial in Experiment 5, implies that the motor 
resonance implicated in action language processing comes from motor planning rather 










Left hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
1349 (452) 1287 (468) 
 Left-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1392 (452) 1298 (470) 
Right hand Right-handed image 
on right of screen 
 
1421 (450) 1257 (447) 
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 Image choice 
                        Left-handed image                        Right-handed image 
Pronoun  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  I am  He is  
Image 
orientation 
Internal Internal External External Internal Internal External External 
Left hand 1294 (408) 1334 (479) 1420 (431) 1446 (479) 1182 (434) 1422 (526) 1262 (442) 1286 (439) 




6.6. General Discussion 
In three experiments, I manipulated at what point in time (before or after sentence 
processing) comprehenders were able to plan a motor response on a given trial. In 
Experiment 4, participants were shown a randomly selected response hand cue after 
sentence processing. There was no effect of response hand on image choice, and no 
interaction between response hand and pronoun. In Experiment 5, participants were 
shown a blocked response hand cue after sentence processing. There was a significant 
effect of response hand on image choice, and this effect was stronger following first-
person sentences (however, separate analyses of the right-handed and left-handed halves 
of the experiment found a significant effect of pronoun only in right-handed trials). There 
was no effect of trial on image choice, suggesting that the results are not due to 
cumulative short-term motor experience caused by the blocking procedure. The between 
experiments comparison of Experiments 4 and 5 was also significant. In Experiment 6, 
participants were shown a randomly selected response hand cue before sentence 
processing. There was a significant effect of response hand on image choice, and this 
effect was stronger following first-person sentences. There was no effect of the hand used 
to respond on the previous trial. 
Experiments 5 and 6 provided within-subjects replications of Experiments 2a and 
2b, and therefore support the conclusions from Chapter 5 that language comprehenders 
tend to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective on action language, and that this tendency 
is more pronounced for language that is potentially self-referential than for language that 
unambiguously refers to a third party. However, further analyses of both experiments 
show a significant effect of pronoun only in the right-handed trials (contra. Experiment 
2b), suggesting that the effects of perspective taking may be stronger when dominant 
hand and response hand coincide, than when they do not. The contrasting results of 




only affects image choice when participants are aware of their response hand during 
sentence processing; no effects are observed when response hand is specified after 
sentence processing. In other words, motor resonance must be present during sentence 
processing. The null effects in Experiment 4 cannot be attributed to delay between 
sentence presentation and image presentation (cf. Experiment 5), or the random cueing of 
response hand (cf. Experiment 6). Moreover, the results from Experiment 6 (a significant 
effect of response hand, and no effect of the hand used to respond on the previous trial) 
suggest that the source of this motor resonance is the motor planning of upcoming 
actions, rather than residual activation from short-term motor experience. 
6.6.1. Prospective versus retrospective simulation 
In Chapter 2 (section 2.4), I discussed evidence that embodied representations in 
language are extremely flexible, and that this flexibility may account for some of the 
reported inconsistencies in the literature. For example, the degree or directions of 
embodied representations appears to be affected by subject pronoun (Brunyé et al., 2011; 
Papeo et al., 2011), sentence tense (Bergen & Wheeler, 2010), timing of stimulus 
materials (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Diefenbach et al., 2013), and strategy employed 
on previous tasks (Papeo et al., 2012). 
The influence of previous tasks on language processing is of particular interest to 
this thesis, in which we aimed to distinguish retrospective simulation (simulating past 
actions) from prospective simulation (planning future events; see section 2.4.2). In 
Chapter 5, I presented evidence that people interpret manual action sentences as though 
they were performing the action themselves, with the caveat that this embodied agent 
perspective appears to be grounded in hand-in-use rather than dominant hand. In other 
words, the current motor context overrides long-term motor experience. In the present 
chapter, I aimed to define the concept of current motor context more exactly: is 




previous trial (compatible with retrospective simulation), or by the hand the 
comprehender is planning to use (compatible with prospective simulation)? My results 
suggest that it is planned actions, rather than recently performed actions, that underpin the 
motor resonance implicated in action language comprehension. In this sense, the results 
are in line with recent suggestions that embodied action representations play a predictive 
role, rather than purely simulating past events (Borghi, 2013; Rueschemeyer & 
Bekkering, 2013). 
The suggestion that motor resonance in action observation has a predictive 
function, might explain why people are better at recognizing their own actions than those 
of other people (Repp & Keller, 2010; Repp & Knoblich, 2004), namely, that the 
recognition advantage for self-generated actions is a result of our improved ability to 
predict our own actions (see also Knoblich & Flach, 2001; Knoblich & Flach, 2003). A 
predictive role for simulation might also explain why experts show increased evidence of 
increased motor resonance compared to novices during action observation (e.g., Calvo-
Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005; Calvo-Merino, Ehrenberg, 
Leung, & Haggard, 2010); the experts may be better at predicting actions (see Aglioti, 
Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008). Note that in the case of experts, the predictive 
advantage is founded on those individual’s long-term motor experience, underlying the 
fact that prospective simulation builds upon retrospective simulation to predict future 
actions (see also discussion of motor prototypes in section 2.5.4).  
Motor prototypes are central to routine actions – that is, actions or sequences of 
actions that can be executed without a high degree of concentration, such as getting out of 
bed or driving to work (Botnivik & Plaut, 2001). The critical sentences in Experiments 1 
– 6 describe routine manual actions such as buttering bread or slicing a tomato (although 
it is true that some actions used as stimuli, such as sewing a shirt, may not be routine to 
all language comprehenders). Throughout the thesis, and in line with the embodiment 




motor cortex involved in performing a particular action. However, the motor cortex is not 
the only area of interest in motor control. Evidence suggests that the cerebellum plays an 
important role in learning routine actions (Dayan & Cohen, 2011; Thach, 1998). The 
extent to which motor representations of routine actions, once learned, are stored in the 
cerebellum versus the motor cortex remains controversial (see, for example, Ashby, 
Turner, & Horvitz, 2010; Doyon & Benali, 2005;Houk & Wise, 1995). Hikosaka et al. 
(1999) proposed that the individual sub-movements entailed by an action are controlled 
by the relevant body-specific mechanisms, but that the cerebellum is responsible for 
successfully coordinating these sub-routines into an action. Resolving this debate is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and one advantage of behavioural paradigms is that they 
do not depend on prior assumptions about the neural localization of motor 
representations. However, the extent to which routine actions involve the motor cortex 
versus the cerebellum is clearly relevant to researchers aiming to provide neuroimaging 
evidence of embodied representation in language   
Interestingly, evidence for a link between retrospective and prospective simulation 
is provided by the fact that, as well as its involvement in learnt routine actions, the 
cerebellum has also been heavily implicated in sensorimotor prediction. For example, 
Wolpert, Miall, and Kawato (1998) suggest that forward models of action prediction (see 
section 2.4.2) are instantiated in the cerebellum (see also Ito, 2008). The cerebellum’s 
predictive role also appears to extend to language comprehension. In a recent paper, 
Lesage, Morgan, Olson, Meyer, & Miall (2012) found that applying TMS to the 
cerebellum prevented language comprehenders from being able to produce predictive eye 
movements in a visual world paradigm. Participants listened to sentences such as the man 
will sail the boat while viewing a display with one target object (predictable from the verb 
in the sentence, e.g., boat), and three distractor objects (not predictable from the verb in 
the sentence, e.g., bird, mountain, car). Participants in this paradigm typically show 




Kamide, 1999). However, participants undergoing TMS in Lesage et al.’s study showed 
significant delay in eye fixations, compared with control groups, suggesting that they 
were unable to predict upcoming words. Future work should therefore investigate to what 
extent the mechanisms of retrospective and predictive simulation rely on shared 
resources, with particular focus on the role of the cerebellum. 
6.6.2. Is dominant hand defined by hand-in-use? 
Results from this chapter results suggest that, when participants are planning an 
action during sentence processing, this action plan interacts with sentence processing to 
affect their interpretation of the sentence. At first glance, these results appear to be in 
conflict with research demonstrating an effect on language processing of long-term motor 
experience (e.g., Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010) and short-term motor experience 
(e.g., Glenberg et al., 2008). In fact, what these results suggest is that when retrospective 
simulation (e.g., dominant hand) is placed in direct competition with prospective 
simulation (e.g., hand-in-use), the effect of prospective simulation may cancel out any 
effect of retrospective simulation.  
The situation in which prospective and retrospective simulation conflict is 
presumably quite rare. For example, in daily life, the hand typically used to perform an 
action in the past will almost always coincide with the hand with which you plan to 
perform future actions. If previous motor experience did not provide a general heuristic 
for the way in which future actions would be performed, then canonical affordances 
(Borghi & Riggio, 2009) would have no use. In fact, canonical affordances are useful 
exactly because they provide a guide for the way in which actions are likely to occur at a 
later date, based on how they have occurred previously. Therefore, one possible 
conclusion from Experiments 1- 6 is that the context of current task to some extent 
determines, at a behavioural level at least, hand dominance. Your dominant hand in a 




majority of cases, the hand you are planning to use will be determined by the hand you 
have previously used over your life, or the hand you have been trained to use before the 
task; but when current planning is placed in opposition to previous experience, current 
planning wins out.  
However, there is some reason to suspect that the effect of dominant hand may not 
be wholly overridden, but rather mitigated, by the effect of hand-in-use. Notably, further 
analyses in Experiments 5 and 6 revealed an effect of pronoun in right-handed responses, 
but not in left-handed responses. This finding raises the possibility that, as well as a main 
effect of hand-in-use, our participants’ dominant hand might influence the sensitivity of 
action simulations to differences in self-referential and non-self-referential language. 
Perhaps, for example, when current motor plan and long-term experience coincide, the 
resulting simulation is more strongly coded for agency, compared to when current motor 
plan and long-term experience of a particular action are in conflict. 
6.6.3. Image-screen congruency 
In five experiments (Experiment 2a, 2b, 4, 5, and 6) I found that people were more likely 
to select an image when the hand in the image was congruent with the spatial lay out of the 
images. For example, right-handed images were more likely to be selected when they were 
presented on the right hand side of the screen, and left-handed images were more likely to be 
selected when they were presented on the left-hand side of the screen. These findings accord 
with an extensive body of work on spatial compatibility tasks (e.g., the Simon effect; see 
Hommel, 2001 for a review). Rubichi and Nicoletti (2006) found evidence to suggest that 
the Simon effect is moderated by an attentional bias: right- and left-handers performing a 
Simon task showed a stronger effect in the right visual hemifield and left visual hemifield, 
respectively. However, when participants performed the same task with their hands crossed, 




handers showed a stronger effect in their right visual field. Rubichi and Nicoletti explain 
their findings by positing an attentional bias towards the dominant hand.  
Numeric count of responses in Experiments 4-6 suggest that the effect of image-screen 
congruency altered depending on participant’s response hand: participants using their left 
hand tended to select a left-handed image more often when this image appeared on the left of 
the screen than the right of the screen, and participants using their right hand tended to select 
a right-handed image more often when this image appeared on the right of the screen than 
the left of the screen. These effects were not tested for significance, but they suggest that 
image-screen congruency may have interacted with response hand; perhaps the use of a 
single response hand results in an attentional bias towards that particular hand. More 
generally, the possible interaction between spatial coding and action simulation is a 
potentially fruitful avenue of future research. 
6.6.4. Strategic processing 
Recall from section 2.4.1 that Papeo et al., (2012) found that strategy on a previous 
task (motor versus visual mental rotation strategy) affected the degree of activation in a 
subsequent word reading task; they found increased activation when participants had 
employed a motor strategy on the mental rotation task. These results are in line with work 
suggesting that language comprehenders show increased levels of motor activation when 
processing words such as tennis ball, when they are asked to think about how a tennis ball is 
used, compared with its physical appearance (van Dam, van Dijk, Bekkering, & 
Rueschemeyer, 2012; see also van Dam, Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2010 for 
compatible findings in a behavioural paradigm). One possible explanation for the results in 
Experiments 2a - 6 therefore, is that participants were strategically (and consciously) 
selecting the image that matched their response hand.  
There are several reasons to be wary of such an explanation. First, over five 




of the images and the hand with which they responded, and these participants were replaced. 
There was no indication from debriefing that the remaining participants thought the 
experiment was anything other than a working memory task, in which the real task was 
correct repetition of the sentences. Second, such a consciously strategic explanation cannot 
explain the interaction with subject pronoun across 4 different experiments, or the sudden 
absence of this strategy in Experiment 4 (despite the fact that the effect of image-screen 
congruency remained constant). An explanation based on conscious, strategic choice based 
solely on image handedness would not predict any difference between first- and third-person 
sentences, and it would predict a similar strategy to be in place for Experiment 4, contrary to 
our findings. 
The data from the thesis so far, in particular the fact that interpretation of action 
language sentences seems so context dependent (in terms of both linguistic features, such 
as subject pronoun, and motor features, such as current action planning) seems to count 
against the idea that embodied representations are automatically involved in semantic 
meaning (Pulvermüller, 1999, 2005). As Rueschemeyer and Bekkering (2013) point out, 
the strength of language (not to mention our action system) is in its flexibility. It would be 
intuitively implausible to think that embodied representations in action language were 
automatic in the sense of being unaffected by context; however, they may still be 
automatic in Heyes' (2011) sense of being beyond the conscious intentions of the 
comprehender.  
6.7. Summary 
In this chapter, I found that the embodied agent’s perspective on action language 
only occurs when motor resonance is present during sentence processing, thus counting 
against explanations which view motor activation as a downstream by-product of 




Chapter 5, implying that the effect of motor resonance on sentence comprehension is 
stronger for self-referential language. Furthermore, I found that the source of this motor 
activation appears to be planned actions, rather than previously performed actions. This 

























7. A FUNCTIONAL ROLE FOR ACTION PLANNING? 
7.1. Overview of the chapter 
In Chapter 5, I reported evidence from three experiments suggesting that people 
adopt an embodied agent’s perspective on action language sentences, and that this 
perspective is grounded in hand-in-use (current motor context) rather than dominant hand 
(long-term motor experience). In Chapter 6, I reported evidence from three experiments 
showing that the key feature of current motor context is the hand participants are planning to 
use (action planning), rather than the hand used to respond on a previous trial (short-term 
motor experience). In both chapters, I reported experiments in which the effect of hand-in-
use is stronger following first-person sentences than third-person sentences, indicating an 
interaction between action planning and language processing. I also found that the effect of 
hand-in-use only occurs when participants know their hand-in-use during sentence 
processing: delaying knowledge of response hand until sentence processing is complete 
resulted in no effect of response hand or of pronoun. The time course suggested by these 
results (i.e., that motor resonance must be present during sentence processing for effects to 
occur) is compatible with a functional role for action planning in language comprehension. 
However, in the experiments described above, sentence processing was measured 
using a manual action response. Therefore, the above results, although compatible with an 
effect of action on language, might also indicate an effect of language on action. In this 
chapter, I report three experiments investigating whether there is a causal effect of action-
planning based motor resonance on online language processing. I do so by testing whether 
planning to perform a particular action (e.g., pressing a button pad with a palm or with a 
single index finger) affects the time taken to make spoken sensibility judgements on 
sentences describing congruent or incongruent actions. In Experiments 7 and 8, I find no 




In Experiment 9, when participants are expressly instructed to decide whether their planned 
action is congruent or incongruent with the action described in the sentence, I find an effect 
of response hand on accuracy, but not reaction time.   
7.2. Introduction 
   Results from Chapter 6 suggested that, in a forced-choice sentence-picture matching 
task, motor resonance needs to present during sentence processing in order for there to be 
effects of hand-in-use and of pronoun. This evidence appears to undermine suggestions that 
embodied effects in language might be a downstream by-product of comprehension, perhaps 
based on post-comprehension motor imagery (Hickok, 2010; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). 
Such downstream explanations would not predict that motor resonance must be present 
during comprehension for effects to occur. However, as we noted in Chapter 6, evidence for 
a specified temporal order, in which motor resonance must precede, or at least be concurrent 
with, sentence comprehension, does not constitute evidence for a causal relationship 
between the action and language systems. For example, both processes might begin at the 
same time and then continue without any further interaction (e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 
2008). The interaction between hand-in-use and pronoun in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests that 
motor resonance and language comprehension do indeed interact with one another, but this 
still does not necessitate a causal role of action on language. 
7.2.1. Measuring language processing 
One reason that evidence from Chapters 5 and 6 is insufficient to show a causal 
relationship is that Chapters 5 and 6 – like the majority of research in this field – 
investigated the relationship between action and language by measuring differences in motor 
responses among conditions involving linguistic manipulations. In other words, the 
dependent variable was a motor response, and the independent variable was language. The 




literature. For example, behavioural researchers have measured button release RTs 
(Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak & Borreggine, 2008), 
button press RTs (Aravena et al., 2010; Borghi et al., 2004), rotation times in self-paced 
reading (Taylor et al., 2008; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), and differences in kinematic reaching 
movements (Boulenger et al., 2006; Nazir et al., 2008). With the exception of kinematic 
tasks, the motor responses are taken as a proxy for measure of language processing time. In 
typical psycholinguistic tasks, where the effect of the motor response is assumed to be 
constant across conditions, the use of a motor proxy to measure linguistic processing is not 
problematic. However, when the experimental conditions are designed to manipulate the 
relationship between motor activation and language processing, the use of motor responses 
as a measure of sentence processing time poses a specific problem: we cannot assume, as we 
would in wider psycholinguistics, that differences in reaction time reflect straightforward 
differences in linguistic processing. Rather, they might also reflect differences in action 
planning or action execution caused by interaction between the language and motor systems.  
In order to satisfactorily demonstrate an effect of motor resonance on language 
processing therefore, we must use action as the independent variable, and language as the 
dependent variable. In the present chapter, I will explicitly test for an effect of motor 
resonance on sentence comprehension, by measuring voice onset times following 
manipulating of planned manual actions. Although voice onset, like any overt movement, 
requires the motor system to plan and execution actions, it does not require the execution or 
planning of manual actions. Therefore, by investigating voice onset times to sentences 
describing manual actions, we can avoid any confound between the effector used in response 
planning and execution, and the effector implicated in the linguistic stimuli.  
7.2.2. Evidence for an effect of action on language 
As noted above, with a few notable exceptions, the majority of the embodiment 




Chapter 2, I outlined some of those exceptions, which appear to show an effect of action on 
language, rather than the other way around. For example, a TMS study by Willems and 
colleagues found that, following TMS stimulation of the hand motor area, participants were 
faster to respond to manual action verbs in a lexical decision task than to non-manual action 
verbs (Willems et al., 2011). Similarly, Glenberg, Sato and Cattaneo (2008) found that a ~20 
minute training period of moving towards or away from the body affected response times on 
sensibility judgements on sentences describing movements towards or away from the body 
in an adapted ACE-paradigm. However, the fact that both studies only measured responses 
of right-handed participants means that we do not know whether these studies showed 
comprehenders adopting an embodied agent’s perspective, versus that of an embodied 
observer.  
Moreover, these studies cannot tell us anything about the amount of detail present in 
motor representations of action language. For example, the results from Experiments 1 – 6 
imply that participants adopt an embodied agent’s perspective, in so much as they interpret 
manual action sentences as though they were performing a manual action with the hand they 
are currently planning to use, but it is unclear whether comprehenders simulate performing 
the specific manual action described in the sentence, or merely that they simulate performing 
a manual action. In this chapter, I will investigate the effect of congruency between the 
specific handshape (POKE, with only index finger extended; PALM, with entire hand flat 
and all fingers extended) implied by a manual action sentence, and the handshape required 
by an action that participants are planning to perform. In this way, the studies in this chapter 
will elucidate (a) whether there is evidence of a functional role of motor resonance on online 
language processing; and (b) whether the perspective adopted by comprehenders specifies 
what action is performed.  
In a study published before the recent upsurge in interest in embodied approaches to 
language, Klatzky, Pellegrino, McCloskey and Doherty (1989) primed participants by 




handshape: touch – finger [POKE handshape], grasp – finger [PINCH handshape], touch – 
hand [PALM handshape]; and grasp – palm [CLENCH handshape]. Following presentation 
of the prime, participants judged the sensibility of verb-noun phrases such as Aim a dart 
(sensible) and Aim a band-aid (nonsense). Results showed that participants were faster to 
make the sensibility judgements when the handshape required to perform the action in the 
sentence was congruent with the handshape depicted in the prime. For example, participants 
were faster to judge Aim a dart as sensible following the prime grasp –finger, which 
depicted the pinch handshape, compared with other primes.  
Importantly, in Klatzky et al.’s study, the independent variable (the prime) was 
linguistic, while the dependent variable was motoric: participants responded by pressing the 
p or q keys on a keyboard (i.e., by making an overt POKE action). The results therefore 
could therefore be interpreted as demonstrating an effect of language on action, rather than 
of action on language. However, Klatzky et al.’s results do suggest that an effect of motor 
activation on language processing might be fine-grained enough to code for the specific 
handshape required to perform a described action. In the present chapter, I test this 
possibility by reworking the study by Klatzky et al. so that the independent variable (planned 
action) is motoric, and the dependent variable (spoken sensibility judgement) is linguistic (to 
the extent that an overt movement is required to make to vocal response, this response is 
none the less independent of that part of the motor system implicated in manual actions). By 
removing manual action from the response criteria, I will search for evidence of a functional 
role of motor resonance on language processing.  
 7.2.3. Long-term motor experience, revisited 
The results from Experiments 1 - 6 suggest that the effect of long-term motor 
experience (i.e., dominant hand) is overridden by the current motor context (specifically, the 
hand a comprehender is planning to use). In Experiment 3, when no overt manual response 




this chapter I will continue to test for an effect of dominant hand. There are several reasons 
for doing so. First, although Experiments 5 and 6 showed overall interactions between 
respond hand and pronoun, separate analyses of right-handed and left-handed responses 
showed an effect of pronoun only on right-handed responses (i.e., those responses that used 
the participants’ dominant hand). This finding suggests that long-term motor experience 
may, in fact, interact with simulations based on current action plan, such that the case in 
which dominant hand and hand-in-use coincide results in more detailed and sensitive action 
simulations than the case in which dominant hand and hand-in-use conflict.  
Second, as noted above, the forced-choice sentence-picture matching paradigm used 
in Chapters 5 and 6 required an overt manual response. The sensibility judgement paradigm 
in the present chapter requires no manual response to linguistic stimuli; however, unlike 
Experiment 3, participants will be planning a manual response during sentence processing. 
Therefore, the hand motor area will be active during sentence processing (unlike Experiment 
3), but sentence processing will not be measured using a manual response (unlike 
Experiments 4-6). In this “intermediate” state, it is possible that an underlying effect of long-
term motor experience on language processing, as suggested by fMRI research (Willems, 
Hagoort, et al., 2010), might become apparent. 
7.2.4. Sentence sensibility judgements 
Sensibility judgement tasks are used throughout psycholinguistics, and are assumed 
to require a reasonably deep level of semantic processing from the comprehender (Louwerse 
& Jeuniaux, 2008). Sensibility judgements have been particularly widely used to investigate 
Action-Sentence Compatibility Effects (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Gianelli et al., 2011; 
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Glenberg, Sato, & Cattaneo, 2008; Kaschak & Borreggine, 
2008). Such studies typically do not report the results for non-sensible sentences, although 
Klatzky et al. (1989) report that the priming effect in their study was limited to sensible 




using their action-planning systems to attempt to combine the sentence components into 
meaningful actions. Since nonsense sentences cannot be combined into coherent action 
plans, embodiment-type effects should, in this view, not be observed on these sentences. The 
results of Klatzky et al. therefore concur with action-plan based explanation of sensibility 
judgements. 
However, other researchers have questioned what exactly, in the context of 
embodied cognition research, sensibility judgments tap into (Adams, 2010; Shapiro, 2010). 
Adams (2010) points out that a sensibility judgement cannot, itself, directly tap into 
comprehension; in order to determine that a sentence such as I am hanging the coat on the 
teacup is not sensible, comprehenders must first understand what it means to say hang a 
coat on a teacup. In other words, the time taken to perform a sensibility judgement is not 
merely the time taken to understand a sentence, but the time taken to understand the 
sentence plus the time taken to compare the meaning of that sentence with a set of plausible 
real world scenarios. As Adams notes, there may be contexts in which a sentence such as I 
am hanging the coat on the teacup can indeed be judged sensible – for example, in the 
context of a fashionable apartment in which the interior designer has stuck teacups to the 
walls to act as coat hooks.  
In the absence of such specialised contexts, however, sensibility judgements rely on 
canonical affordances (Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Borghi, 2013). In chapters 5 and 6, I 
explored the assumption that future actions are usually planned according to canonical 
affordances, and that only in cases where the current motor context (e.g., hand-in-use) 
directly contradicts these affordances are they overridden. In the present chapter, I will test 
for a functional role of motor resonance, by manipulating the congruency between canonical 
affordance (i.e., the handshape typically adopted for a described manual action), and current 
motor context (i.e., the handshape that a comprehender is currently planning to execute). A 
functional account of motor resonance predicts that when the current motor context (e.g., 




handshape), sentence processing will be slower than when current motor context is 
congruent with the canonical affordance of the sentence. 
7.3. Experiment 7 
In Experiment 7, I tested whether planning a particular action causally affected 
sentence processing. I did this by testing whether participants who were planning to perform 
an action requiring a particular handshape (POKE, PALM) while reading manual action 
sentences, would be faster to perform sensibility judgements on sentences that described an 
action that was congruent with the planned action, compared with sentences that described 
an incongruent action. As well as manipulating handshape, I also manipulated the hand (left, 
right) that participants used to perform that handshape. One of the aims of this chapter was 
to investigate the degree of specificity captured by an action simulation. Manipulating both 
hand and handshape means we can distinguish between four possibilities: (1) action 
simulations code for affordances at both the level of handshape, and of hand; (2) action 
simulations code for affordances at the level of handshape, but not at the level of hand; (3) 
action simulations code for affordances at the level of hand, but not at the level of 
handshape; (4) action simulations do not code for affordances at the level of either hand, or 
handshape.  
This experiment will extend the findings of Chapters 5 and 6 in two ways. First, it 
will search for evidence of a functional role of motor resonance on online language 
processing. Second, it will establish whether information required to perform specific 
actions is captured by an embodied agent’s perspective. Both Klatzky et al. (1989), and 
Aravena et al. (2010) found effects of congruency for implied handshape, although both 
studies measured this congruency with a motor response. If the relationship between action 
and language is bi-directional, then we should also find an effect of congruency between 
planned action and implied handshape on VOTs in the present study. Such an effect of 




canonical affordances (i.e., handshape) for a particular action. A main effect of planned 
action on VOTs, but no interaction with implied handshape, would indicate a more general 
effect of action on language, but that does not code for the canonical affordances of a 
particular action. An effect of hand on VOTs would indicate that participants were 
producing action simulations based on long-term motor experience. Finally, an interaction 
between hand and congruency would indicate that the semantics of an event are specified at 
the level of both dominant hand and the handshape required for a particular action. 
7.3.1. Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four native speakers of British English (17 female; mean age = 22 years) 
took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, had no history of reading difficulties, and were right-handed (mean EHI score 
= 79, EHI score range = 43 to 100).  
Materials and design 
 We constructed 80 experimental sentences, each describing a first-person manual 
action. Forty POKE sentences described an action typically performed with a “poking” 
handshape, in which the index finger is extended (e.g. I am ringing the doorbell), and forty 
PALM sentences described an action typically performed with a “flat palm” handshape (e.g., 
I am giving a high five). In addition, we constructed eighty filler, non-sensible sentences in 
which the verb-noun pairing was implausible (e.g., I am folding the teapot). All verbs in the 
filler sentences could, if paired with more plausible objects, denote manual actions. A total 
of four photographs were also prepared. Two photographs (one left hand, one right hand) 
showed a hand performing a POKE handshape by pressing number 5 on a number pad, and 
two photographs (one left hand, one right hand) showed a hand performing a PALM 




required a right hand response, and photographs showing a left hand required a left hand 
response. Given the null effect of image orientation in Chapters 5 and 6, and the fact that all 
sentences in this experiment were presented in the first-person, all photographs were taken 
from an internal orientation.  
 A critical item consisted of a critical (sensible) sentence plus one of the four 
photographs. A filler item consisted of a filler (nonsense) sentence plus one of the four 
photographs. Critical trials could be either CONGRUENT or INCONGRUENT. In the 
CONGRUENT condition, the handshape implied by the sentence (POKE, PALM) matched 
the handshape shown in the photograph (POKE, PALM). In the INCONGRUENT condition, 
the handshape implied by the sentence did not match the handshape shown in the 
photograph. Congruency (CONGRUENT, INCONGRUENT) was fully crossed with hand 
(RIGHT, LEFT). Sentences rotated through each of these four possibilities in a Latin Square 
design, so that each participant saw 20 sentences per condition, and every sentence was seen 
by an equal number of participants in each condition.  
 Pre-testing was carried out to minimise the possibility of semantic priming between 
POKE and PALM handshapes in the photographs, and the verbs in the critical sentences. 
Twelve native speakers of British English were shown the four photographs, and asked to 
describe the action they saw. Participants described the POKE images using the verbs poke, 
point, prod, press, and tap. Participants described the PALM images using the verbs slap, 
wave, chop. Therefore, the critical sentences were constructed to avoid using these verbs. In 
addition, POKE sentences avoided the word “finger”, and PALM sentences avoided the 
word “palm”. A second round of pre-testing was carried out to check that people did indeed 
associate POKE sentences with the POKE handshape and PALM sentences with the PALM 
handshape. A new sample of twelve native British English speakers were given a list of all 
experimental sentences, interspersed with 80 other sentences describing manual actions, and 
were asked to mime each action. All participants mimed a POKE action for POKE 





 Participants made spoken sensibility judgements about sentences describing manual 
actions, while planning a gesture that either matched or mismatched the handshape typically 
associated with action described in the sentence. Participants sat at a computer terminal with 
a viewing distance of 60 cm. At the start of each trial a central fixation cross appeared on 
screen (1000 ms). A photograph appeared in the centre of the screen (1000 ms), followed by 
a blank screen (500 ms) and then a sentence. All text was presented in 24 point black courier 
new font, on a white background. Participants were instructed to silently read the sentence, 
and decide whether it was sensible of not.  Participants said good out loud to indicate a 
sensible sentence, and bad to indicate a non-sensible sentence. Participants were instructed 
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Following the sensibility judgement, a 
blank blue screen cued participants to perform the action they had seen in the photograph by 
using the appropriate hand to press either number 5 (POKE), or all buttons (PALM) on a 
number pad (see Figure 7-1). If the participant failed to make a spoken sensibility judgement 
within 3000 ms of sentence presentation, the sentence disappeared and the participant moved 
onto the blue action cue screen. If the participant failed to register a key press on the number 
pad within 3000 ms of the cue screen appearing, the trial timed out and the participant 
moved on to the next trial. Testing was recorded using a zoom Q3 video camera, so that 
participant’s hand responses could be coded as correct or incorrect. Voice Onset Times 
(VOTs) were recorded using the sound key on an SR response box. Auditory responses were 
recorded separately using a USB microphone to allow the experimenter to code participant’s 
spoken responses as correct or incorrect. Button press RTs were also recorded from the 
number pad. The order of sentence presentation was randomised for each participant. The 



















     
 




 I analysed VOTs and button press RTs from correct critical (sensible) trials, and 
error rates (sensibility judgment correct, performed action correct) for critical trials. 











 I am ringing the doorbell 













  I am grating the guitar. 






described action; POKE, PALM), action (i.e., the handshape participants were planning to 
make while reading the sentence; POKE, PALM) and response hand (left hand, right hand). 
An interaction between sentence and action on VOTs would constitute evidence of a 
functional role of motor resonance (based on action planning) in language processing. 
Unless otherwise specified, all analyses reported below use the following model with 
simplified random effect structure (by-items intercepts and slopes for response hand were 
removed to allow the model to converge): 
 
Model 7-1: Sentence * Action * Response hand+ (1 + Sentence * Action * Response hand | 
Subject) + (1 + Sentence * Action | Item).  
Error rates 
Sensibility judgements 
 Accuracy on spoken sensibility judgements was 95%. There no significant 
difference in accuracy between critical (95%) and filler trials (95%). Accuracy rates within 
the critical trials are shown in Table 7-1. There were no significant effects of response hand, 
sentence, planned action, or congruency (all ps > .05). Accuracy was over 90% for all 
participants, and all items. 
Table 7-1. Accuracy rates for sensibility judgments in Experiment 7 
 
Action production 
 Overall accuracy on action production (meaning that participants performed the 
correct handshape with the correct response hand) was 97% across critical and filler trials. 
Response hand Sentence Planned action Congruency 
Left  Right  POKE PALM POKE PALM Congruent Incongruent 




Participants were significantly more likely to correctly produce an action following a critical 
trial (98%) than a filler trial (97%; B = -.36, SE = 0.18, p = .04). Within the critical trials, 
participants were significantly more likely to correctly produce a POKE action (99%) than a 
PALM action (97%; B = -0.81, SE = 0.34, p = .02). There was no significant difference in 
accuracy rates for POKE sentences (98%) versus PALM sentences (98%), for right-handed 
(98%) versus left-handed (98%) responses, and for congruent (98%) versus incongruent 
(98%) trials (all ps > .05). Accuracy was over 90% for all participants, and all items.  
Voice onset times 
Analyses were carried out on correct (sensibility judgement and action production) 
critical trials. I removed 18 trials (0.6%) where the participant corrected their response, 2 
trials (0.1%) where the participant used dysfluencies (e.g., erm), and 5 trials (0.2%) where 
the participant repeated their answer (total = 25 trials; 0.9% of critical trials). In addition, 
4.2% of critical trials timed out without any VOT response, and were excluded from 
analyses. Responses were checked to ensure that no response was made faster than 400 ms. 
The responses were then winsorised so that all responses above or below 2.5 sd for that 
participant were replaced with the upper or lower cut off value for that participant (0.04% 
responses replaced with the lower cut off value, 2% responses replaced with the upper cut 
off value). Table 7-2 shows the mean winsorised VOTs by condition. VOTs were analysed 
using Model 7-1 (see Table 7-3). There was no significant effect of sentence, planned action, 








Table 7-2. Mean winsorised VOTs (ms) by condition in Experiment 7 (sd in 






Table 7-3. Predictors of VOTs by condition in Experiment 7: Coefficients from Model 
7-1. 
 
Button press RTs 
 I removed trials with button press RTs of under 200 ms (1% critical trials), and a 
further 0.5% of trials that timed out without a response. I winsorised the remaining correct 
critical trials so that RTs above or below 2.5 sd for a participant’s mean response latency 
were replaced with the upper or lower cut off value for that participant (0.18% trials replaced 
with lower cut off; 2.5% trials replaced with upper cut off).  Table 7-4 shows the mean 
winsorised button press RTs by condition. I analysed the button press RTs using Model 7-1 
 Sentence POKE Sentence PALM 
Right hand   
Action POKE  1557 (396) 1578 (415) 
Action PALM  1574 (433) 1602 (415) 
Left hand   
Action POKE  1626 (405) 1560 (411) 
Action PALM  1536 (409) 1502 (390) 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
    
(Intercept) 1576.16   59.26 <.001 *** 
Sentence       1.16   25.55 0.96 
Action    -24.91   25.54 0.33 
Hand     19.38   25.97 0.46 
Sentence x Action     25.28   51.08 0.62 
Sentence x Hand     75.26   51.03 0.14 
Action x Hand     88.42   51.04 0.08 
Sentence x Action x 
Hand 




(see Table 7-5). Participants were significantly faster to perform POKE actions compared 
with PALM actions. There was no significant effect of sentence or of hand (all ps > .05); 
however, the interaction between these two predictors was significant (right hand + POKE 
sentence = 661 ms; right hand + PALM sentence = 679 ms; left hand + POKE sentence = 
673 ms; left hand + PALM sentence = 664 ms). There was no effect of congruency; the 
interaction between planned action and sentence was not significant (p > .05). 
Table 7-4. Mean winsorised button press RTs (ms) by condition in Experiment 7 (sd in 





Table 7-5. Predictors of button press RTs by condition in Experiment 7: Coefficients 
from Model 7-1. Significant fixed effects are shown in bold. 
 
 
 Sentence POKE Sentence PALM 
Right hand   
Action POKE 626 (172) 640 (185) 
Action PALM 
 
696 (214) 717 (241) 
Left hand   
Action POKE 644 (194) 633 (176) 
Action PALM 702 (220) 694 (205) 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
    
(Intercept)  667.26   24.60 <.001 *** 
Sentence      4.21     6.80 0.53 
Action    65.83   16.72 <.001 *** 
Hand     -0.11     8.36 0.99 
Sentence x Action      4.96   14.26 0.73 
Sentence x Hand    27.66   13.59 0.04 * 
Action x Hand    13.15   13.60 0.34 
Sentence x Action 
x Hand 





In Experiment 7, I found no effect of congruency between planned action (the 
handshape that participants were planning to make), and sentence (the handshape implied in 
the sentence), on how quickly participants performed a spoken sensibility task on sentences 
describing manual action sentences. Neither was there any main effect of planned action, of 
sentence, or of the hand that participants were planning to use. These results suggest that 
action simulations do not code for affordances at the level of either hand, or handshape; in 
fact, they provide no evidence for the existence of action simulations in language processing.  
In contrast to the absence of a significant effect of action on language, analysis of 
button press RTs indicated an effect of language on action. Although there was no main 
effect of hand on button press RT, there was an interaction between sentence and hand: 
participants were faster to respond to POKE sentences when planning to use their right hand, 
but faster to respond to PALM sentences when planning to use their left hand. These results 
suggest that motor prototypes affect motor response (i.e., right-handed participants would 
typically press buttons using a poke action on their right hand). In addition, there was a main 
effect of planned action: participants were faster to reproduce POKE actions compared with 
PALM actions. This result may also reflect that in general, people tend to interact with 
number pads using a single finger button press. 
 One possible explanation for the absence of any effect of congruency on VOTs, is 
the difficulty of the task. If processing resources are allocated elsewhere, this may lead to 
more shallow processing of the sentence, and thus less detailed action simulations. Such an 
explanation is consistent with the view that comprehension is a fault-tolerant process (Taylor 
& Zwaan, 2009, 2013), and also with the view that motor activation acts as a form of 
priming in language comprehension (section 2.3.5), but not with strong embodiment 
accounts in which meaning constitutes action representations. Resource allocation might 




randomisation of response effector (e.g., Borghi & Scorolli, 2009); it could be the case that 
this procedure relieves some of the burden of the task and thus affords comprehenders a 
deeper level of processing. In addition, several participants in Experiment 7 reported during 
debriefing that they had difficulty discriminating the left or right hands (although this 
difficulty was not reflected in error rates, with all participants achieving 90% or above in 
action production). Judging whether a visual stimulus represents a left or a right hand 
appears to involve some form of mental simulation (Parsons, 1994; Parsons, 1987); it is 
conceivable that this simulation might then interfere with simulation of action sentence 
itself. For these reasons, it seemed advisable to create a less cognitively demanding version 
of Experiment 7, in which response hand was blocked. 
7.4. Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 was a repeat of Experiment 7, except that response hand was blocked 
rather than randomised. This blocking manipulation reduced the processing demands of the 
task in two ways. First, by removing one aspect of memory (left or right hand) that 
participants needed to keep in mind throughout sentence processing, and second, by 
removing any possible effect of mental rotation in order to determine the handedness of the 
stimulus hand. In this way, it was hoped that participants would have more processing 
resources available to focus on the handshape they planned to perform, and on the sentence 
processing itself. As in Experiment 7, a fine-grained, action-specific functional account of 
motor resonance would predict an effect of congruency (interaction between sentence and 
planned action) on VOTs. A more coarse-grained, generalist functional account would 









 Twenty-four native speakers of British English (18 female; mean age = 21 years) 
took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, had no history of reading difficulties, and were right-handed (mean EHI score 
= 70, EHI score range = 50 to 100).  
Materials and design 
 Materials were the same as Experiment 7. Design was the same as Experiment 7, 
except that left- and right-handed images (and therefore response hand) were now blocked. 
Whether participants saw right- or left-handed images first was counterbalanced across 
participants and lists.  
Procedure 
 Procedure was the same as Experiment 7. 
7.4.2. Results 
Analysis 
 Analysis of error rates, VOTs and button press RTs was the same as Experiment 7, 
using Model 7-1. 
Error rates 
Sensibility judgements 
 Accuracy on spoken sensibility judgements was 93%. There no significant 
difference in accuracy between critical (93%) and filler trials (94%). Accuracy rates within 




sentence, planned action, or congruency (all ps > .05). Accuracy was over 90% for all 
participants, and all items. 
 
 Table 7-6. Accuracy rates for sensibility judgments in Experiment 7 
 
Response hand Sentence Planned action Congruency 
Left  Right  POKE PALM POKE PALM Congruent Incongruent 
93% 94% 94% 93% 93% 94% 93% 93% 
 
Action production 
 Overall accuracy on action production (meaning that participants performed the 
correct handshape with the correct response hand) was 94% across critical and filler trials. 
There was no significant difference in accuracy between critical trials (93%) and filler trials 
(94%). Within the critical trials, participants were significantly more likely to correctly 
produce a POKE action (96%) than a PALM action (91%; B = -0.87, SE = 0.26, p < .001). 
There was no significant difference in accuracy rates for POKE sentences (93%) versus 
PALM sentences (93%), for right-handed (93%) versus left-handed (94%) responses, and for 
congruent (94%) versus incongruent (93%) trials (all ps > .05). Accuracy was over 90% for 
all participants, and all items. 
Voice onset times 
Analyses were carried out on correct (sensibility judgement and action production) 
critical trials. I removed 20 trials (0.62%) where the participant corrected their response, 2 
trials (0.13%) where the participant used dysfluencies, and 3 trials (0.16%) where the 




of critical trials timed out without any VOT response, and were excluded from analyses. 
Responses were checked to ensure that no response was made faster than 400 ms. The 
responses were then winsorised so that all responses above or below 2.5 sd for that 
participant were replaced with the upper or lower cut off value for that participant (0% 
responses replaced with the lower cut off value, 1.8% responses replaced with the upper cut 
off value). Table 7-7 shows the mean winsorised VOTs by condition.  
I analysed VOTs using Model 7-1 (see Table 7-8). As shown in Table 7-8, there was 
no significant effect of congruency: the interaction between sentence handshape and planned 
action was not significant. There was no significant main effect of sentence handshape, or 
hand, and no other interactions between hand, planned action, and sentence handshape were 
significant (all ps > .05). There was a main effect of planned action: participants were faster 
to respond to sentences when they were planning to make a POKE action, compared with a 
PALM action.  
 
Table 7-7. Mean winsorised VOTs (ms) by condition in Experiment 8 (sd in 










 Sentence POKE Sentence PALM 
Right hand   
Action POKE   1598 (422) 1553 (417) 




Action POKE  1557 (403) 1563 (406) 




Table 7-8. Predictors for VOTs in Experiment 8: Coefficients from Model 7-2. 
Significant fixed effects are shown in bold. 
 
Button press RTs 
 I checked that no trials had RTs of under 200 ms, and removed the 0.8% of trials 
which had timed out without a response. I winsorised the remaining correct critical trials so 
that RTs above or below 2.5 sd for a participant’s mean response latency were replaced with 
the upper or lower cut off value for that participant (0.11% trials replaced with lower cut off; 
2.3% trials replaced with upper cut off).  Table 7-9 shows the mean winsorised button press 
RTs by condition. Button press RTs were analysed using Model 7-1 (see Table 7-10). As 
these coefficients show, there was no significant effect of congruency: the interaction 
between sentence and planned action was not significant. There was no significant effect of 
hand, sentence, and no significant interactions between these variables (all ps > .05). The 
interaction between hand and planned action was marginally significant (B = -25.04, SE = 
13.55, p = 0.06). There was a significant effect of planned action: participants were quicker 
to produce POKE actions compared with PALM actions.  
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Voice onset times    
(Intercept)  1600.51 63.71 <.001 *** 
Sentence       -1.72 24.31 0.94 
Action      29.88 13.78 0.03 * 
Hand      25.21 20.76 0.23 
Sentence x Action      27.66 30.21 0.32 
Sentence x Hand       -7.89 24.20 0.74 
Action x Hand      20.55 28.17 0.47 
Sentence x Action x 
Hand 





Table 7-9. Mean winsorised button press RTs (ms) by condition in Experiment 8                 










Table 7-10. Predictors for button press RTs in Experiment 8: Coefficients for Model 7-
2. Significant fixed effects are shown in bold. 
 
7.4.3. Discussion 
 In Experiment 8, in which response hand was blocked to reduce processing 
demands on the task, I found no effect of congruency between action (the handshape that 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Button press RTs    
(Intercept)    725.68 28.23 <.001 *** 
Sentence        1.96   8.41 0.82 
Action      63.94 11.61 <.001 *** 
Hand     -22.69 23.53 0.34 
Sentence x Action     -20.73 15.17 0.17 
Sentence x Hand     -14.56 13.53 0.28 
Action x Hand     -25.04 13.55 0.06 
Sentence x Action x 
Hand 
       4.62 27.09 0.87 
 Sentence POKE Sentence PALM 
Right hand   
Action POKE 686 (208) 690 (208) 




Action POKE 688 (218) 710 (238) 





participants were planning to make), and sentence (the handshape implied in the sentence), 
on how quickly participants performed a spoken sensibility task on sentences describing 
manual action sentences. There was, however, a main effect of action: participants were 
faster to make sensibility judgements when planning POKE actions compared with PALM 
actions.  
The fact that planned action had an effect on VOT raises the possibility that there 
may be some effect of motor resonance on online language processing, but only in the sense 
of a general effect of activating the motor system – specifically, planning a typical action 
(pressing a single button on response pad with index finger) results in faster sentence 
processing than planning an atypical action (pressing an entire number pad with flat palm). 
This general effect would support accounts in the literature of general effects of language on 
action (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, et al., 2010), but falls short of 
the specificity predicted by embodied accounts that posit action simulations. The results 
suggest that although activation of the motor system may impact language processing, it 
does not do so in a way that interacts with the nature of the action described in that language. 
In other words, adopting an embodied agent’s perspective might lead to a comprehender 
simulating performing some action, but that the simulation is not detailed enough to specify 
the nature of the action being simulated. 
For button press RTs, I again found that participants were faster to reproduce POKE 
actions than PALM actions, suggesting that participants are faster to produce typical versus 
atypical actions; but this does not interact with hand. Unlike Experiment 7, there was no 
interaction between hand and sentence.   
7.5. Combined analyses from Experiments 7 and 8 
To ensure that no effects had been missed, a further analysis as conducted on the 
data from Experiments 7 and 8, by pooling the data from these two experiments and 




emerged for Experiments 7 and 8 (i.e., effect of action on VOTs in Experiment 8 but not 7; 
interaction between hand and sentence in Experiment 7 but not 8). The analysis was 
therefore rerun over the two datasets to determine whether these effects would remain 
significant across a larger number of trials. Responses to critical trials on Experiments 7 and 




 Unless otherwise stated, all analyses used the following model with simplified 
random effect structure (where the correlation parameter was removed in order to allow the 
model to converge): 
 
Model 7-2: Sentence * Action * Response hand + (1|Subject) + (1| Item)  + (0 + Sentence * Action * 
Response hand | Subject) + ( 0 + Sentence * Action * Response hand | Item). 
Error rates 
Sensibility judgements 
 There were no significant effects on accuracy of response hand, sentence, action, 
experiment, and no interactions between these factors (all ps > .05). Accuracy was over 90% 
for all participants, and all items. 
Action production 
 Participants were more likely to correctly produce POKE actions (97% accuracy) 
than PALM actions (94% accuracy), and this difference was significant (B = -1.10, SE = 




interactions between these factors (all ps > .05). Accuracy was over 90% for all participants, 
and all items. 
Voice onset times 
Analyses on trimmed data using Model 7-2 showed a significant effect of action on 
VOTs: participants faster to respond to sentences while planning a POKE action compared 
with a PALM action (B = 21.24. SE = 9.77, p = .03). There were no significant effects of 
response hand, sentence, and no interactions between these factors (all ps > .05). 
Button press RTs 
 Analyses on trimmed data using Model 7-2 showed a significant effect of action on 
button press RTs, with participants faster to perform POKE actions compared with PALM 
actions (B = 68.44, SE = 10.46, p < .001). There were no significant effects of response 
hand, sentence, and no interactions between these factors (all ps > .05) 
7.5.2. Discussion 
 Across the two experiments, there was a significant effect of action on voice onset 
time and on button press RT: participants were faster to perform spoken sensibility 
judgments while planning to perform a POKE compared with a PALM action; and were also 
faster to execute POKE compared with PALM actions. These results suggest there may be a 
general effect of the motor system on action language processing – preparing an action in 
line with canonical affordances (e.g., pressing a single button on a number pad) results in 
faster sensibility judgements than preparing an unusual action (e.g., pressing a number pad 
with a flat palm). However, this pattern of results could also be explained by an effect of 
task difficulty. Planning a canonical action is, presumably, less demanding than planning an 
unusual action, in which no motor prototype is available (see Borghi & Riggio, 2009). It 
may be that sensibility judgments were facilitated by the simpler task of planning POKE 




actions. The current data are insufficient to distinguish between these possibilities. At any 
rate, it is clear that there was no evidence for an effect of action on language that codes for 
specificity of action implied in the sentence (either in terms of the handshape, or the hand 
carrying out the action). 
7.6. Experiment 9 
In Experiments 7 and 8, participants were instructed to perform a sensibility 
judgement; the congruency of the handshape implied in the sentence, and the handshape the 
participant was planning to make was irrelevant to the task. These instructions may have 
encouraged shallower processing of the sentences, such that participants only processed the 
sentences sufficiently deeply to form good enough (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002) 
representations to complete the task at hand. In Experiment 9 therefore, I explicitly asked 
participants to judge whether the handshape in the sentence (POKE, PALM) matched the 
handshape they were planning to make (POKE, PALM). Studies have shown that embodied 
effects vary depending task demands (see section 2.4); importantly, some research suggests 
that when a semantic dimension (e.g., semantic size) is irrelevant to task goals, no effects are 
obtained, but when it is relevant, effects are found (Hoedemaker & Gordon, 2013; but see 
Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005).  
In addition, explicitly asking participants to make a congruency judgement makes it 
possible to verify to what extent participants are matching sentence handshape with planned 
action in the congruent versus incongruent conditions. Only materials which achieved 100% 
consistent responses in pre-testing were included in the experiments, but it is possible that 
under the time constraint of the task, certain sentences are not clearly associated with one 
action over another. If participants are systematically not categorising congruent sentences 
as congruent, this may explain the null effects of congruency on VOTs in Experiments 7 and 
8. Note that, since the task in Experiment 9 is an explicit congruency judgement, affirmative 




Experiments 7 and 8, when a sentence might be judged as sensible (good) on either a 
congruent or an incongruent trial. Therefore, in order to demonstrate a functional role of 
motor resonance on online sentence processing in Experiment 9, we must also show either a 
main effect of hand or an interaction between hand and congruency, in order to rule out a 
simple advantage for affirmative responses. 
7.6.1. Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four native speakers of British English (11 female; mean age = 23 years) 
took part in return for course credit or payment. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, had no history of reading difficulties, and were right-handed (mean EHI score 
= 79, EHI score range = 45 to 100).  
Materials and design 
 Materials and design were the same as Experiments 7 and 8, with the exception that 
filler trials were discarded so that only sensible sentences remained. So that the overall 
length of the experiment remained consistent with Experiments 7 and 8, the experiment was 
repeated, with each sentence appearing once in each half of the experiment, once in the 
congruent condition, and once in the incongruent condition. Each half of the experiment 
contained equal numbers of congruent and incongruent trials. Design was the same as 
Experiment 7, with left- and right-handed images (and therefore response hand) randomised 
once again.  
Procedure 
 Procedure was the same as Experiment 7 and 8, with the exception that participants 
were instructed to respond whether than handshape implied by the sentence (POKE, PALM) 








Analyses were similar to Experiments 7 and 8, except that because participants’ task was 
an explicit congruency judgement, the interaction between sentence handshape and image 
handshape represented not only a congruency effect, but also an effect of response (good or 
bad). Unless otherwise stated, all analyses used the following model, with maximal random 
effect structure: 
Model 7-3: Sentence * Action * Response hand + (1 + Sentence * Action* Response hand | Subject) 
+ ( 1 + Sentence * Action * Response hand | Item). 
Error rates 
Congruency judgements 
 Accuracy on spoken congruency was 92%. Two items had accuracy 50% or lower (I 
am admiring my new engagement ring; I am inspecting the mantelpiece for dust), and were 
removed from all further analyses. All remaining items had accuracy of 80% or above, and 
all participants had an accuracy rate of 85% or over. Accuracy rates are shown in Table 7-
11. Participants showed a weak tendency to make more correct congruency judgements on 
congruent trials (93%) than on incongruent trials (90%), although this difference was only 
marginally significant (B = 0.37, SE = 0.23, p = .09). Participants were more likely to 
respond correctly to sentences while planning an action with their right hand (94%) than 
their left hand (92%), and this difference was significant (B = 0.24, SE = 0.11, p = .02). 
There were no significant effects of sentence or of action, and no significant interactions 





Table 7-11. Accuracy rates for sensibility judgments in Experiment 9 
 
Action production 
 Accuracy on action production was 97%. Participants were more likely to correctly 
produce an action on congruent (98%) compared with incongruent trials (96%), and this 
difference was significant (B = 1.14, SE = 0.40, p < .01). There were no significant 
differences in accuracy between right-handed (98%) and left-handed (97%) trials, between 
POKE sentences (98%) and PALM sentences (97%), or between POKE actions (98%) and 
PALM actions (97%), and no interactions between these factors (all ps > .05). Accuracy was 
over 90% for all participants, and all items. 
Voice onset times 
 Of critical trials, I removed 19 trials (0.63%) where the participant corrected their 
response, 1 trial (0.03%) where the participant used a disfluency, and 6 trials (0.20%) where 
the participant repeated their answer (total = 26 trials; 0.86% of critical trials). In addition, 
2.1% of critical trials timed out without any VOT response, and were excluded from 
analyses. Analyses were carried out on correct (congruency judgement and action 
production) critical trials only. Responses were checked to make sure there were no 
responses made faster than 400 ms. The remaining responses were then winsorised so that 
all responses 2.5 sd above or below a participant’s mean were replaced with the upper or 
lower cut off value for that participant (0.04% responses replaced with lower cut off; 2.19% 
Response hand Sentence Planned action Congruency 
Left  Right  POKE PALM POKE PALM Congruent Incongruent 




responses replaced with upper cut off). Table 7-12 shows the mean winsorised VOTs by 
condition.  
 VOTs were analysed using Model 7-3 (see Table 7-13). There was a significant 
effect of congruency: participants were slower to respond to sentences when planning a 
congruent than an incongruent action. There was also a main effect of image gesture, in the 
opposite direction to Experiments 7 and 8: participants were quicker to respond to action 
sentences when planning a PALM compared with a POKE action. There was no significant 
effect of sentence handshape, image handshape, hand, nor any further interactions between 
these factors (all ps > .05). 
Table 7-12. Mean winsorised VOTs (ms) by condition in Experiment 9 





Button press data 
 Analyses were carried out on correct (sensibility judgement and action production) 
critical trials only. I excluded 1.3% trials where a response was made faster than 200 ms. 
The remaining responses were then winsorised so that all responses 2.5 sd above or below a 
participant’s mean were replaced with the upper or lower cut off for that participant (0.09% 
responses replaced with lower cut off; 1.8% responses replaced with upper cut off).  Table 7-
12 shows the mean winsorised button press RTs by condition. Button press RTs were 
analysed using Model 7-3 (see Table 7-13). As these coefficients show, participants were 
significantly slower to produce actions on congruent than incongruent trials. There was a 
significant effect of action, but in the opposite direction to Experiments 7 and 8: participants 
were quicker to execute PALM actions than POKE actions. There was no effect of response 
 Sentence POKE Sentence PALM 
Right hand   
Action POKE 1442 (359) 1501 (361) 




Action POKE 1434 (369) 1458 (388) 
Action PALM 1469 (365) 1377 (386) 




hand, sentence, and no further interactions between action, sentence, and hand (all ps > .05). 
The effects on button press RTs therefore echo those found on VOTs in the same 
Experiment. 
Table 7-13. Predictors for VOTs and button press RTs in Experiment 9: Coefficients 




Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p (coefficient = 0) 
Voice onset time    
(Intercept)  1452.82 38.78 <.001 *** 
Sentence     19.75 25.62 0.44 
Action    -30.52 11.78 .001 ** 
Hand     18.29 17.45 0.29 
Sentence x Action   120.31 29.34 <.001 *** 
Sentence x Hand    -32.84 35.89 0.36 
Action x Hand    -19.08 17.33 0.27 
Sentence x Action 
x Hand 
    23.35 32.47 0.47 
    
Button press RT    
(Intercept)   701.45 55.52 <.001 *** 
Sentence       9.63   5.26 0.06 
Action    -55.97 14.24 <.001 *** 
Hand      -1.41   9.69 0.88 
Sentence x Action     87.86 18.03 <.001 *** 
Sentence x Hand    -28.47 17.19 0.10 
Action x Hand     25.58 13.10 0.05 
Sentence x Action 
x Hand 




Table 7-14. Mean winsorised button press RTs (ms) by condition in Experiment 9 






 In Experiment 9, I found an effect of hand-in-use on how accurately participants 
performed a spoken congruency judgement: participants were more likely to correctly 
identify a sentence as congruent with their planned action with they were planning to 
perform that action with their right (dominant) hand, compared with their left (non-
dominant) hand. For VOT analysis, an effect of congruency was observed, with participants 
faster to respond to congruent versus incongruent trials. However, there was no effect of 
hand nor any interaction with hand, therefore this finding might also be explained without 
positing any interaction between action and language. For example, it could be the result of 
increased processing difficulties for negative compared with affirmative concepts (e.g., 
Wales & Grieve, 1969) or the fact that the congruency between action and sentence may 
have led to an increased feeling of perceptual fluency in participants compared to 
incongruent conditions (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). Further research, in which 
congruency (congruency, incongruent) could be distinguished from response (good, bad) are 
required to resolve this issue.  
 Experiment 9 also showed an effect of planned action on both sensibility judgment 
and action execution, however this effect was in both cases in the opposite direction to that 
found in Experiments 7 and 8. Participants in Experiment 9 were faster to respond to 
sentences while planning PALM actions compared with POKE actions. Both of these effects 
(congruency, planned action) remained when analysing only the first half of the experiment. 
 Sentence POKE Sentence PALM 
Right hand   
Action POKE  712 (294) 746 (276) 




Action POKE  726 (230) 762 (279) 




The reversal in effects of planned action on both VOTs and button press RTs between 
experiments 8 and 9 is unexpected. One possibility is that in the explicit congruency task, 
participants were more likely to use motor imagery to consciously visualise the actions 
described in the sentences. In this case, if PALM actions tended to be more clearly 
associated with the PALM sentences than POKE actions were with the POKE sentences, this 
might result in longer processing times when participants planned a POKE action. However, 
there is no evidence of increased difficulty associating POKE actions and sentences in the 
error rates (section 7.5.2). 
 The effect of hand on accuracy (more correct responses when planning to execute a 
right-handed response) suggests a possible effect of long-term motor experience on language 
processing. In particular, it suggests that participants might run action simulations that code 
for the hand typically used to perform an action, but not for more detailed information such 
as handshape. The fact that this effect emerged when the task was an explicit congruency 
judgment, but not when it was a sensibility judgment (Experiments 7 and 8), suggests that 
participants may only assign a handedness representation when the task requires them to pay 
attention to the hand implicated in the sentences. Other behavioural research also indicates 
that attention may influence how likely embodied effects are to emerge (Hoedemaker & 
Gordon, 2013; Tomasino et al., 2007). Interestingly, the Linguistic Focus hypothesis (Taylor 
& Zwaan, 2008; Zwaan, Taylor, & de Boer, 2010) provides evidence that motor simulations 
occur when the comprehender’s attention is drawn to the action in the sentence, and subside 
once linguistic focus shifts attention to other aspects of the sentence (e.g., what the agent in 
the sentence is thinking). Explicit tasks such as the congruency judgment in Experiment 9 
may serve a similar function as linguistic focus in directing the comprehender’s attention to 
aspects of the sentence most relevant for action simulations (see Tomasino & Rumiati, 2013, 
for a recent doscussion of possible top-down influences on motor activation in language). 
Future research should therefore aim to elucidate the role of attention in moderating 




7.7. General discussion 
 In three experiments, I tested for evidence of a functional role for motor resonance 
on sentence processing. I tested whether congruency between the handshape implied in a 
sentence and the handshape a participant planned while reading the sentence, affected 
language processing. In Experiments 7 and 8, where congruency was irrelevant to the task, I 
found no evidence of any effect of congruency or hand-in-use on sentence processing, in 
either accuracy or VOTs. In Experiment 9, where participants made an explicit congruency 
judgement, I found an effect of response hand on accuracy, but not on VOTs.  
 The lack of an effect of congruency in Experiments 7 and 8 runs counter to the 
predictions of embodied theories that posit an action-specific causal role of motor resonance 
on online language comprehension. The fact that, in Experiments 8 and 9, the speed of 
spoken sensibility judgments was influenced by which action (POKE, PALM) participants 
were planning to perform while reading the sentence, hints at the possibility of a very 
general effect of motor activation in which the comprehender simulates that she will perform 
some kind of action, but this simulation does not code for either the hand or the handshape 
typically associated with that specific action. However, the reversal of the effect direction 
(faster judgments while planning POKE actions in Experiment 8; faster judgements while 
planning PALM actions in Experiment 9) makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions 
about the effect of action on language. 
7.7.1. Effects of planned action 
As noted above, in two of the three experiments in this chapter, there was a 
significant effect of the action that participants were planning to perform on the VOT 
measure of sentence processing. However, the direction of this effect was inconsistent. In 
Experiment 8, when congruency was irrelevant to task, participants were faster to respond 




a number pad). However, in in Experiment 9, when the task was an explicit congruency 
judgement, participants were faster to respond to sentences when planning a PALM action 
(presumably, an atypical affordance for interacting with a number pad). Interestingly, in both 
experiments, the same effect of planned action was found on button press RTs as on VOTs: 
faster responses for POKE actions in Experiment 8, and faster responses for PALM actions 
in Experiment 9. The fact that the direction of effect switched for both sentence processing 
and action execution suggests that the effects on VOTs may in fact have represented a wider 
effect of the task on processing in general, rather than an effect on language processing in 
particular. For example, in Experiment 8, when handshape was irrelevant to the task, 
participants may simply have found it easier to plan a canonical action (POKE) than a non-
canonical action (PALM), thus facilitating downstream processing (both linguistic and 
action execution). In contrast, in Experiment 9, when handshape was relevant to the task, 
participants may have found PALM sentences were more clearly associated with PALM 
actions than POKE sentences were with POKE actions, thus facilitating processing on both 
the language and action parts of the task.  
The fact that participants did not appear to simulate the specifics of a particular 
action is perhaps surprising given that motor resonance seems to be sensitive to distinctions 
between precision grips and power grips in both action observation (di Pellegrino et al., 
1992; Giacomo Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), and in language based tasks (Maurizio 
Gentilucci & Gangitano, 1998; Glover et al., 2004). Note however, our study used POKE 
versus PALM gestures as these were judged to be maximally dissimilar to one another. It is 
possible that using equivalents of the precision grip (PINCH) and power grip (CLENCH), 
may have led to more conclusive results. Use of PINCH and CLENCH might also allow the 
materials to describe functional, rather than non-functional actions. Recent research suggests 
that function actions (in which an object is used) may result in increased motor resonance 
than non-functional actions (e.g., an object being moved or displaced (Bub et al., 2008; 




functional actions, but very few of the PALM sentences did so. Future research ought 
therefore to try and look for effects using functional sentences implying two different 
handshapes.  
7.7.2. Effects of response hand  
 In Experiments 7 and 8, I found no effect on sentence processing of the hand 
participants were planning to use. However, in Experiment 9 I found participants were 
significantly more accurate when planning an action with their dominant hand. As outlined 
above, these conflicting findings suggest that participants only assign a handedness 
explanation when the task required them to explicitly consider the handshape implied in the 
sentence. In Chapter 6, I found an overall interaction between response hand and pronoun, 
indicating that comprehenders assign a handedness representation to language based on the 
hand they are currently planning to use, rather than the hand they have typically used in the 
past. However, further analyses revealed that the effect of pronoun, although still significant 
for right-handed responses, was not significant for left-handed responses. This further 
finding suggested that the sensitivity of embodied representations might be stronger when 
the current motor plan coincided with long-term experience. Similarly in Experiment 9, 
participants’ representations may have been more sensitive to congruency when their current 
motor plan (response hand) matched their long-term experience (dominant hand).  
However, it is important to remember that the effect of hand in the present chapter 
was very weak, and was restricted to accuracy data rather than VOTs. One obvious question 
is why there were no effects on VOT, when Chapters 5 and 6 had found consistent effects in 
a forced-choice sentence-picture matching task. There are several possible answers to this 
question. One possibility is the differences were there, and that the VOT paradigm used in 
the present chapter was simply not sensitive enough to pick up differences. This possibility 
could be easily tested by having participants perform manual sensibility judgements while 




differences were found in Experiment 9 precisely because we separated the effector used to 
respond (mouth), and the effector that formed the basis of our congruency manipulation 
(hand). In contrast, Chapters 5 and 6 employed a forced-choice sentence-picture matching 
task in which the type of effector (i.e., hand) implicated in the sentences was the same as 
that used to respond. The experiments reported in Chapters 5 and 6 may, therefore, have 
shown an effect of language on action, rather than the other way around. It is also possible 
that in studies in which a motor response is required (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan & 
Taylor, 2006), the findings are in fact the result of a two-way interaction of language on 
action and also of action on language. A third possibility is that the results from Experiments 
1 – 6 demonstrate an effect of action on how language is interpreted, after initial 
comprehension has occurred. Image selection in Experiments 2a – 6 occurred after sentence 
processing was complete. Although the interaction with pronoun rules out an image-only 
based explanation, it is possible that role of motor resonance may change over time, such 
that online sentence processing relies on more on heuristics, based on long-term motor 
experience (i.e., dominant hand) and that, only once sentence processing is complete and 
participants shift their attention from sentence processing to motor execution, does hand-in-
use become the dominant force in how a sentence is interpreted. Thus, Experiments 1 – 6 
may have shown offline effects of action on language. The fourth possibility is that the 
results from Experiments 1 – 6 are due to an explicit strategy of the participants. However, 
this possibility is unlikely for the reasons given in section 6.6.4, namely: the absence of any 
reported strategy during debriefing; the interaction with pronoun in Experiments 2a, 2b, 5, 
and 6; and the sudden null effect of response hand and pronoun in Experiment 4. 
 7.8. Summary  
In this chapter, I failed to find evidence of a functional role for action-planning 
based motor resonance on online language processing. Specifically, there was no effect of 




action or not. There was some evidence suggestive of a general effect of motor activation 
on language processing, but no evidence that this codes for individual actions. In other 
words, there is some rather weak evidence that adopting an embodied agent’s perspective 
has a functional role on language processing, but no evidence that adopting an embodied 
agent’s perspective involves simulating fine-grained information about the specific action 
being described. One possible avenue for future research is how the level of detail in action 
simulations might be moderated by attention (driven by, for example, task demands or 
























8.1 Thesis aims 
 In this thesis, I have explored the constraints governing the interaction between the 
language and action systems by tackling the following three questions. First, what 
perspective do comprehenders adopt when processing simple action sentences? Second, is 
this perspective grounded in motor activation from long-term motor experience, short-term 
motor experience, or current action plan? Third, is there any evidence that the motor system 
plays a functional role in online language comprehension? In the following section, I 
provide a summary of these results.  
8.2. Summary of results 
 We saw in Chapter 3 that the embodiment literature often assumes that a 
comprehender will represent a described action as though she were carrying out that action 
herself (i.e., adopt an embodied agent’s perspective; Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008); we also 
saw that in fact, this is not necessarily the case. A comprehender could equally adopt the 
perspective of an observer or, in sentences featuring an animate patient, the perspective of 
that patient. To investigate what perspective was adopted, I used a verification sentence-
picture matching task (Experiment 1), and a two-alternative forced-choice sentence-picture 
matching task (Experiments 2a – 6).  
Experiments 1 – 2b took advantage of the fact that left- and right-handed people 
typically perform actions with different hands, but (presumably) both observe other people 
performing a majority of right-handed actions. The two possible perspectives in our 
sentences (embodied agent, embodied observer) make different predictions as to how left- 
and right-handed participants will behave in a sentence-picture matching task. If 




handed participants should each respond in a similar way to left- and right-handed images. If 
comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s perspective, then right- and left-handed 
participants should respond differently to right- and left-handed images. Experiment 1 
showed an interaction between participant’s dominant hand, and the handedness of the 
image, suggesting that comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s perspective, in line with 
the Body-Specificity Hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009, 2011).  
In a two alternative forced-choice sentence-picture matching task, Experiment 2a 
found that the effect of dominant hand was stronger for first-person sentences then for third-
person sentences, supporting the suggestion the self-referential language is “more” 
embodied, because the comprehender can ground the representation in their own body (see 
Chapter 3). However, Experiment 2b suggested that these results were due to response hand 
rather than dominant hand, and Experiment 3 found no effect of dominant hand when 
responses were measured using voice onset time, thus eliminating manual responses from 
the task. Both of these findings, especially that of Experiment 3, run counter to the Body-
Specificity Hypothesis’s prediction that the way in which we interpret action language is 
shaped by our long-term motor experience. 
In Chapter 6, I investigated whether the effect of response hand in Experiment 2b 
was due to short-term motor experience (the hand used to respond on a previous trial) or to 
current motor plan (the hand the participant was planning to use while reading the sentence). 
I recruited right-handed participants and manipulated at what point during a forced-choice 
sentence-picture matching task the participant was able to form a motor plan for the correct 
response hand. Results replicated the response hand by pronoun interaction from 
Experiments 2a and 2b, but crucially, only when participants knew their response hand 
during sentence processing (and were thus able to form a motor plan for that hand). There 
was no effect of the hand used to respond on the previous trial, and no effect of dominant 
hand. These findings suggest that the interaction between action and language is based on 




(either accumulated long-term experience, or immediate short-term experience). One 
implication of these results is that motor resonance in language may have a predictive role, 
rather than merely simulating past experiences. The effect of pronoun in the right-handed, 
but not left-handed responses of right-handers in Experiments 5 and 6 suggests that action 
simulations may code features such as agency in more detail when motor planning and 
motor experience coincide. 
In Chapter 7, I tested for a causal effect of planned action on language processing. 
Right-handed participants performed a sensibility judgement on manual action sentences, a 
paradigm which has consistently shown an effect of language on action (Borreggine & 
Kaschak, 2006; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak & Borreggine, 2008). In order to test 
for an effect of action on language, rather than the other way round, participants were 
required to plan a manual action and then make a verbal response on the sensibility 
judgment. In other words, the dependent measure of sentence processing was not a manual 
action. In Experiments 7 and 8, I found no evidence to support a functional role of action 
planning in language processing. In Experiment 9, participants were explicitly asked to 
assess whether their planned action was congruent with the action described in the sentence. 
Results showed that in Experiment 9, participants were more likely to make a correct 
judgment when planning to perform an action with their right hand, compared with their left 
hand. These findings suggest that comprehenders assign a handedness to linguistic 
representations only when the task explicitly requires them to compare their linguistic 
representation with their motor representation. 
 8.3. Implications and future research 
In this section, I will discuss the implications of these results for our understanding 
of language processing in general, and embodied cognition in particular. I will also discuss 




8.3.1. Perspective-taking in action language 
The results from Experiments 1 - 6 imply that, in simple action sentences, 
comprehenders adopt the perspective of an embodied agent – in other words, they interpret 
the sentence as though they were performing that action themselves. These results are in line 
with two assumptions in the embodied cognition literature. First, that comprehenders do 
adopt an embodied perspective on action language. And second, that this perspective is most 
likely to be that of the embodied agent. Had participants in Experiments 1-6 not adopted an 
embodied perspective, then participants would have shown no effect of either dominant hand 
or the hand they were planning to use. Had participants adopted the perspective of an 
embodied observer, then they would have shown a preference for right-handed 
interpretations, regardless of their dominant hand or the hand they were planning to use. 
However, the results go further than simply confirming the wide-spread assumption that 
comprehenders adopt an embodied agent’s perspective. The results also highlight some of 
the constraints under which this embodied perspective-taking operates.   
Pronoun 
Across 4 experiments (Experiments 2a, 2b, 5, 6), whenever an effect of response 
hand was found, this effect interacted with pronoun such that the effects were stronger 
following first-person sentences (e.g., I am slicing the tomato) than following third-person 
sentences (e.g., He is slicing the tomato). Other work in the literature has also found 
differential embodied effects for first- versus third-person sentences (Brunyé et al., 2009, 
2011; Ditman et al., 2010), although the explanations these researchers give are somewhat at 
odds with present findings. For example, Brunyé  et al. (2009) found that participants were 






. They argued that their results show that comprehenders adopt 
an embodied agent’s perspective for first-person language, but an embodied observer’s 
perspective for third-person language. However, we noted in the discussion of Chapter 5 that 
our pattern of results cannot be explained by participants adopting an embodied observer’s 
perspective on third-person sentences, because the embodied observer’s perspective would 
also lead to a preference for right-handed interpretations (since most observed actions are 
right-handed), whereas in fact, participants using their right-hand showed a weaker 
preference for right-handed intepretations of third-person sentences.  
Rather, our results support the possibility that for third-person language, the 
embodied perspective is either less strongly embodied, or less likely to be adopted, 
compared with first-person language. Papeo et al. (2011) using TMS found increased 
cortical excitability on action versus non-action verbs only when those verbs were presented 
in the first-person; third-person action verbs showed no increased compared with third-
person non-action verbs. From this finding, Papeo et al. conclude that action simulations are 
not automatically generated, but depend on, amongst other things, whether the implied agent 
of the action is self-referential or not. Our behavioural results support this interpretation. 
Importantly, Experiments 4- 6 suggest that the motor resonance implicated in language 
comprehension is based on prospective simulation (action planning) rather than retrospective 
simulation (reenacting previous experience), adding weight to recent proposals that motor 
resonance in language may have a predictive role (Pickering & Garrod, 2009; Rueschemeyer 
& Bekkering, 2013). We saw in section 2.2.4 that people are better at predicting their own 
actions than those of other people. Given this first-person advantage in prediction, it follows 
that if motor resonance has a predictive function – perhaps acting, as Pickering and Garrod 
(2009) propose, as a type of emulator, or forward model (Grush, 2004) – then it makes sense 
that embodied representations might be stronger for self-referential language compared with 
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 While writing this thesis, I became aware of several failures to replicate these findings: Beveridge, 
Nieuwland, Santesteban & Pickering (unpublished); Vukovic (2013, personal communication); 




third-person language. Note that, although I have limited discussion to the contrast between 
first- versus-third person language, we should expect similar findings if the first-person 
stimuli were replaced with second-person stimuli.  
Hand orientation 
In work by Brunyé and colleagues (Brunyé et al., 2009, 2011; Ditman et al., 2010), 
the orientation of hands depicted in images (internal, external) appeared to cue whether 
participants adopted an embodied agent’s perspective, or an embodied observer’s 
perspective. Based on these findings, and similar effects of hand orientation in action 
observation (e.g., Vogt et al., 2003), we predicted that image orientation might act as a cue 
for agency attribution (perhaps, for example, participants would be more likely to adopt an 
embodied agent’s perspective on internally orientated images). However, there was no such 
evidence of an effect of image orientation in this thesis – in none of the 5 experiments 
manipulating image orientation was there any effect of this manipulation, either alone or in 
interaction with other variables.  
The lack of any effect of internal versus external orientation led to the suggestion 
that orientation might only act as an inconsistent cue to agency attribution, but it is unclear 
why this might be the case. In section 5.8.2, I hypothesised that congruency with the effector 
(right or left hand) took precedence over congruency with orientation (internal or external): 
in Experiments 2a- 6, two different effectors were presented simultaneously, compared with 
a single effector in studies by Brunyé and colleagues. One explanation of our null finding for 
orientation is therefore that agency attribution might operate on different levels of 
specificity, with more general information (e.g., effector) used as a cue where possible, and 
more finely-coded information (e.g., effector orientation) used when this coarser information 
is not available. In cases where different levels of information contradict one another (e.g., a 




might override the more specific cues. Of course, such an account is speculative, and would 
require further testing.  
A further explanation is that, rather than categorising effector and orientation as 
more or less general cues, we could categorise them as motor and visual cues, respectively. 
In Experiments 2a – 6, participants were required to perform a manual action to select one of 
two stimuli. Due to the manual response, the motor cue (is this the same as the hand I am 
moving?) may have taken precedence over the visual cue (is this hand in the same position 
as my own hand?). There is some support for a motor versus visual cue explanation, from 
research into action-recognition. Jeannerod (2003) reviewed studies in which adults are 
required to categorise actions as either their own actions or those of other people (Daprati et 
al., 1997; Sirigu, Daprati, Pradat-Diehl, Franck, & Jeannerod, 1999). He concluded that 
when self- and other-generated actions were the same, participants used visual cues (such as 
hand orientation) to determine agency. However, when self-generated actions differed from 
other-generated actions, participants used efferent signals about their own movement to 
determine agency. In Experiments 2a – 6, only one of the two hands in critical trials matched 
the effector that the participant was planning to move. Participants may therefore have 
ignored visual signals such as orientation, and focussed on motor signals (e.g., which 
stimulus hand matches the hand being activated).  
The Theory of Event Coding 
In section 2.2.2, I outlined the Theory of Event Coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001; 
Prinz, 1987) as a possible explanation of the link between action and perception. TEC 
accounts stress the shared code between language simulation, and what the intended 
outcome of an action will look like. In other words, effects such as the ACE might be 
explained by the perceptual consequences of an intended action (i.e., having your hand in a 
far position rather than a near position, for example), rather than by a motor representation 




Diefenbach et al., 2013). Although Diefenbach et al. explain the ACE effect in terms of TEC 
rather than motor resonance, they admit that their data do not allow them to distinguish 
between these possibilities, since the motor representation (making a far movement) and the 
intended action effect (having your hand in a far position) overlap completely.  
One means of distinguishing between these two possible explanations (perceptual 
consequences versus motor resonance) might be to manipulate hand orientation (internal, 
external). Presumably, only internally orientated images would correspond to the expected 
perceptual outcome of an agent’s action, since externally orientated hands cannot easily be 
interpreted as the viewer’s own hands. In Experiments 2a – 6, participants matched manual 
action sentences to pairs of internally or externally orientated images. Given that externally 
orientated images seem less likely to capture the expected perceptual consequences of an 
action, accounts of action language understanding that stress those perceptual consequences 
(e.g., Diefenbach et al., 2013; Kaschak & Borreggine, 2008) might predict an interaction 
with image orientation (i.e., weaker effects on trials with externally orientated images).In 
contrast, accounts of action language processing that focus on motor activation (Glenberg & 
Gallese, 2012; Taylor & Zwaan, 2013) might predict embodied effects regardless of 
orientation. Over five experiments, I found no effect of image orientation on the way that 
participants interpreted manual action sentences. Rather, comprehenders seem to interpret 
the sentences by adopting an embodied agent’s perspective, based on the hand for which 
they have a current action plan. Note that our results do not rule out the possibility that 
planned actions might share a common coding scheme with the perceptual consequences of 
those actions (e.g., Prinz, 1997). However, the results do suggest that this coding scheme 
does not capture fine-grained information about the particular hand (left or right) that would 






8.3.2. Spatial grounding and good enough representations 
Chapter 3 introduced the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis – the suggestion that, in 
order for comprehenders to adopt an embodied perspective, the motor simulation must be 
spatially grounded. For self-referential language, this grounding can occur via the 
comprehender’s own body; however, for third-person language, additional information about 
the action (e.g., direction) may be required. This information could be presented through 
additional utterances integrated into a suitably detailed situation model (e.g., Taylor & 
Zwaan, 2009), or perhaps also through visual cues such as avatars (Gianelli et al., 2011). We 
might suppose that Taylor and Zwaan’s (2013) construal of comprehension as a fault-
tolerant process could be applied to the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis: in the absence of 
suitable spatial grounding, participants could adopt an unembodied perspective. This 
unembodied perspective would allow comprehension to occur, albeit perhaps not so rich as 
comprehension resulting from an embodied perspective.  
If the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis is correct, then participants should have failed 
to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective in the third-person sentences in Experiments 2a- 6, 
and instead performed at chance. However, although this might appear to be the case for 
right-handed participants in Experiment 2b (52% preference for right-handed image), it is 
less clear, for example, that this is the case for left-handed participants on Experiment 2a 
(65% preference for left-handed images). There are two possible explanations for the weaker 
(but still present) preference for hand-in-use based interpretations of third-person sentences. 
First, that participants do adopt an embodied agent’s perspective on third-person sentences, 
but that this is less embodied that the corresponding representation for first-person 
sentences. Second, that comprehenders are less likely to adopt an embodied agent’s 
perspective on third-person sentences. Current data are insufficicent to distinguish between 
these alternatives. However, it is clear that the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis requires at 




chance performance on the third-person sentences, despite the absence of any apparent 
grounding material. 
The idea that comprehension is fault-tolerant is reminiscent of good-enough 
representations in sentence processing (Ferreira et al., 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). The 
concept of good-enough representations emerged from research into syntactic processing, 
which suggested that comprehenders often misinterpret sentences, and retain incorrect 
interpretations in memory once sentence processing is complete (Christianson, 
Hollingworth, Halliwell, & Ferreira, 2001; Ferreira, 2003). Traditional theories of sentence 
processing stress that comprehension results from a series of algorithms performed on 
amodal symbols, resulting in “complete, detailed, and accurate representations of the 
linguistic input” (Ferreira et al., 2002, p.11). Embodied accounts reject such theories on the 
basis of the computations over amodal symbols; however, the conception that 
comprehension is fault tolerant suggests that embodied theories might also reject the premise 
that comprehension typically provides complete and accurate representations.  
The good-enough approach to language comprehension argues that language 
processing is shallower, and less complete than traditional theories assume; representations 
are merely good-enough for the task at hand (e.g., Sturt, Sanford, Stewart, & Dawydiak, 
2004). In conversation, the goal may be to provide an approporiate response, and in a 
psycholinguistics experiment, the goal might be to execute a suitable motor movement; 
neither of these tasks necessarily requires participants to provide evidence that they have 
constructed a complete and detailed representation of the sentence in question (Ferreira & 
Patson, 2007). This being the case, the language system may simply provide the most 
detailed representation necessary to fulfill the current goal: comprehension might only need 
to be “good enough for current purposes” (Clark & Schaefer, 1987, p. 19). Thus, the good-
enough account implies a good deal of flexibility in the depth of language processing, and 
this flexibility might be invoked in order to explain the fact that so many embodied effects 




not have shown any effect of dominant hand, because they were able to perform the task 
without assigning any long-term handedness representation to the sentence. All the situation 
required was an interpretation based on the hand that participants were planning to use. In 
contrast, when participants were explicitly instructed to judge the congruency between action 
and sentence in Experiment 9, participants assigned a handedness representation to the 
sentence. It should be noted that, the effect of pronoun in Experiments 2a – 6 occurred in a 
task which explicitely required participants to attend to the pronoun of the sentence, in order 
to successfully recall the sentences. In section 3.4., I suggested that the disparity between 
those studies that found a difference between first- and third-person lanaguge (e.g., Papeo et 
al., 2011) and those which did not (e.g. Tomasino et al., 2007), might be explained in terms 
of whether or not the task required participants to pay attention to whether the stimuli were 
presented in first- or third-person. It should therefore be tested whether the effect of pronoun 
in Experiments 2a – 6 can be replicated in a task that does not require overt attention to 
pronoun; or alternatively whether, when such attention is not needed, comprehenders simply 
form good-enough representations which are not coded for person. 
As Ferreira et al. (2002) suggested, good-enough representations are even more 
likely in real-life language use than in idealised laboratory conditions, due to the amount of 
noise in the signal (disfluencies, backgournd noise, accents, etc.). One implication of this, is 
that comprehenders may be more likely to rely on predicitive mechansims to aid their 
understanding. Therefore, if motor resonance does have a predictive function, then 
comprehenders may show stronger effects of action on language outside the laboratory 
compared with inside. After a decade in which countless articles have demonstrated specific 
instances of embodied effects, some researchers are beginning to challenge the usefulness of 
an embodied versus non-embodied division in the literature (Willems & Francken, 2012). It 
should by now be clear that language and action do interact – but it should be equally clear 
that this interaction only occurs in certain circumstances. Future research should, of course, 




to integrate findings from the embodiment literature with existing frameworks and concepts 
in wider psycholinguistics. The application of good-enough processing to action-language 
comprehension would constitite an obvious starting point. 
8.3.3. Action planning and affordances 
Results from Experiments 4 – 6 suggest that the interaction between action and 
language is driven by prospective simulation. In other words, the embodied agent’s 
perspective appears to be grounded in a comprehender’s motor plan at the time of 
comprehension, rather than their motor experience (short-term or long-term). The finding 
that the interpretation of action sentences is affected by upcoming actions is suggestive of a 
predictive function for referential motor resonance. Borghi (2013) stresses the fact that 
simulation can involve both reenactment of previous sensorimotor experience (Barsalou, 
1999), and preparation for future actions (Grush, 2004). Canonical affordances capture, 
according Borghi and colleagues (Borghi & Riggio, 2009; Borghi, 2013), information about 
how we typically interact with an object, for use in future interactions. For example, we 
typically use a knife by holding the handle towards us. In other words, canonical affordances 
use long-term experience to predict future actions.  
However, results from Experiments 1 – 6  indicate that there is more to it than this. 
Canonical affordances capture the way we are most likely to interact with an object, based 
on previous interactions; but when a non-canonical motor plan is active, the affordance 
adapts and captures instead the way we are most likely to interact with the object at that 
point in time. For example, based on canonical affordances, I would usually understand a 
sentence such as I am slicing the tomato as though I were slicing a tomato with my dominant 
hand. However, if, while processing this sentence, I planned to perform an action with my 
non-dominant hand, then I would understand the sentence as though I were slicing a tomato 
with my non-dominant hand (although the relevant action simulations might be less sensitive 




all, an action system in which we were unable to adapt to the constantly changing motor 
context in which we operate would be of little use.  
One possible mechanism for allowing such flexibility in affordances is attention. 
Research into affordances has typically used items with handles on one side (e.g., cups) to 
allow the object’s orientation to be congruent or incongruent with a particular hand; 
participants tend to show an advantage when the orientation of the object is congruent with 
their response hand (Symes, Ellis, & Tucker, 2005; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Such results are 
then usually interpreted in terms of affordances – in other words, a cup automatically 
generates a motor code based on its associated action (e.g., being held by its handle). 
However, Anderson, Yamagishi and Karavia (2002) argued that the use of asymmetric 
objects in such studies could have resulted in asymmetric distribution of attention across 
those objects, and that these differences in attention could account for the congruency effects 
without invoking automatically generated action codes. In support of this theory, Anderson 
et al. found that participants showed a left or right hand advantage for asymmetric non-
objects, as well as objects such as cups: the non-objects were computer generated and were 
therefore not associated with any particular actions. Future research should therefore seek to 
investigate the role of attention on affordances described in language, as well as those 
depicted in visual objects. Indeed, it may be possible to integrate such work with an account 
of good-enough representations in embodied language (see section 8.3.2), given evidence 
that linguistic focus appears to influence both depth of processing (Sturt et al., 2004), and 
the effect of motor resonance (Taylor & Zwaan, 2008). 
8.3.4. Implications for naturalistic language processing 
Experiments 2a – 6 showed a robust pattern of results, in which participants tended to 
select an image that was congruent with their response hand, only when they had an action 
plan available during sentence processing; and that this preference was stronger in first- 




forced choice paradigm, which has been successfully used to investigate psycholinguistic 
phenomena (e.g. Raffray et al., 2007). I have argued that the pattern of results obtained 
cannot easily be attributed to demand characteristics or strategic processing on the part of 
the participants (sections 5.8.4, and 6.6.4, respectively). Nonetheless, forced-choice 
paradigms can be criticised due to the unnatural nature of the task: language comprehension 
is an online process, a fact which is not captured in the forced-choice paradigm, where 
image selection takes place after sentence processing is complete. The task therefore gives 
us no measure of the timing of particular aspects of processing. In Experiments 7-9, I used a 
sensibility judgement task, extensively used in the embodied literature (e.g., Glenberg & 
Kaschak, 2002), in order to give us an arguably online measure of sentence processing 
(Voice Onset Time). I found no significant effects of motor plan on this measure.  
However, Zwaan and Taylor (2006) argue that sensibility judgements do not, in fact, 
reflect online processing. This argument is based on the fact that Zwaan & Taylor’s reading-
by-rotation paradigm appears to show that motor resonance is a short-lived phenomenon: the 
congruency effect they observed (participants were faster, in a self-paced reading paradigm, 
to read about actions involving clockwise hand movements while themselves performing a 
clockwise hand movement) was limited to the action verb, and the effect had dissipated by 
the end of the sentence. They therefore argue that the effects found in tasks occurring after 
sentence presentation is complete, such as sensibility judgements, might instead be attributed 
to a post-sentential re-simulation of the described action, performed in order to complete the 
task. If this is the case, then our task in Experiments 7-9 failed to find an effect of action 
plan on this second “re-simulation” stage of motor resonance, but did not tap into the first, 
online stage. One avenue for future research would therefore be to develop a paradigm that 
can investigate this posited first, localised stage of motor resonance, perhaps through the use 
of eye-tracking in a silent reading task. The use of eye-tracking would allow researchers to 




the extent to which motor resonance is a short-lived and localised phenomenon as proposed 
by Zwaan and Taylor. 
A second potential criticism of the tasks used in this thesis, is that stimuli were limited 
to descriptions of very simple, manual actions, such as slicing a tomato or ringing a doorbell. 
More complex actions involving numerous sub-goals over variable time periods (e.g. 
carrying a parcel to the post-office), or non-action descriptions using abstract or 
metaphorical language (e.g. understanding the theory about unicorns), were not considered. 
It is certainly true that embodied theories of language must provide an account of how more 
complex language is understood. However, the relationship between motor activation and 
language comprehension has not yet been clearly established even in the most 
straightforward case – that of simple action descriptions. As a first step in establishing these 
basic constraints, I sought to clarify the role of motor context on embodied perspective-
taking in this most straightforward case. Whether the results obtained in Experiments 1 – 6 
will generalise to more naturalistic language comprehension, with an online measure of 
processing and more complex linguistic stimuli, is not yet clear.  
Certainly, evidence for a role of motor activation in abstract or figurative language is 
mixed. On the one hand, strongly embodied theories of language, in which motor resonance 
is required for comprehension, seek to show that abstract language involves the same motor 
circuits as concrete action descriptions (e.g. Glenberg et al., 2008), and there is some 
evidence from fMRI studies to support the view that motor activation occurs in response to 
metaphorical language (e.g., the woman grasped the idea; Desai et al., 2011), and idiomatic 
language (e.g., the man kicked the bucket, Boulenger, Hauk, & Pülvermuller, 2009). On the 
other hand, many studies aiming to demonstrate a role of the motor system in action-
language understanding have used abstract or figurative language as controls, and found no 




al., 2009). A recent fMRI study found evidence for motor activation in the processing of 
metaphorical, but not idiomatic language (Cacciari et al., 2011).  
It is not yet clear whether the view of motor resonance as a form of priming (section 
2.3.5) predicts an effect in non-concrete language, but what is clear is that, under the priming 
account, such an effect is neither necessary not sufficient for comprehension to occur. The 
results from Experiments 1 – 6 imply that motor resonance may only interact with language 
processing when an action is being planned concurrently during sentence processing. The 
role of motor resonance in naturalistic language comprehension may therefore depend on the 
extent to which a comprehender formulates a motor plan during naturalistic language use.  
8.3.5. Motor resonance and prediction 
This thesis did not explictly test for a predictive role for motor resonance. However, 
the suggestion that the language- action interaction may involve prospective simulation, 
rather than retrospecitve simulation, adds weight to recent suggestions that this may be the 
case. To my knowledge, no published article has explictly tested this hypothesis; doing so 
seems like a natural next step in the embodied cognition research programme. Throughout 
this thesis, I have argued that motor resonance is not necessary for language comprehension, 
but serves to prime one sort of interpretation over another when it is present. However, it is 
possible that motor resonance does more than prime participants to select a particular agent’s 
perspective (e.g., left-handed, right-handed) in an otherwise ambiguous situation such as the 
forced-choice sentence-picture matching task. Motor resonance might also be useful to the 
comprehender, by allowing her to better predict upcoming speech. This interpretation is 
more in line with Taylor and Zwaan’s notion of fault-tolerant comprehension than with a 
functionally neutral priming account: motor activation is not necessary to language 
comprehension, but when present, improves comprehension through better prediction. 




understanding how comprehenders might use communicative motor resonance (i.e., 
activation in response to the articulations involved in producing speech) to predict what a 
speaker is going to say and thus aid their comprehension. Future work should aim to extend 
this framework by seeking to integrate referential motor resonance into such an account.  
For example, an obvious question concerns the relationship between the two types 
of motor resonance. Research suggests that comprehenders automatically imitate the 
articulatory gestures of incoming speech (Fadiga et al., 2002); Pickering and Garrod (2007) 
therefore suggest that comprehenders predict upcoming speech using their own speech 
production systems (comminicative motor resonance). However, research also suggests that 
language comprehension involves fast and apparently automatic prediction based on 
referential meaning, implying something akin to referential motor resonance (Altmann & 
Kamide, 1999; Kamide, 2003). How then, do these two levels of prediction interact with one 
another? One possibility is that the two sources of motor resonance (referential versus 
communicative) occur in different situations (isolated comprehension versus dialogue or 
production) and therefore do not interact. For example, I noted in section 8.3.5 above, that 
whether or not there is an effect of motor resonance on language may depend on whether or 
not the language user has formulated a particular motor plan during comprehension. In 
Experiments 1-9, I encouraged participants to form a motor plan to move a particular hand. 
However, in a more natural dialogue situation, comprehenders may produce motor plans of 
what their interlocutor is going to say, based on their own production system (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2013). Thus, the manual action plans formulated during sentence processing in 
Experiments 1-9 may translate to forward models of language production in situations where 
more than one interlocutor is present. This would involve a transition from referential motor 
resonance in isolated comprehension tasks such as used in Experiments 1-9 thesis (and 
throughout embodiment research) to communicative motor resonance in dialogue settings.  
A second possibility is that both levels of motor resonance operate simultaneously. 




simultaneous use of the two systems would entail, and whether one type of motor resonance 
precedes the other. Of course, language comprehension is not unique in requiring 
simultaneous levels of motor activation. Trivially, any time in which we conduct two actions 
at once, such as walking while eating an apple, requires us simultaneously predict and react 
to feedback from two different actions involving different effectors and goals. However, 
language poses particularly interesting issues, because of the fact that in only one of the 
levels (communicative motor resonance), is there any direct perceptual or proprioceptive 
feedback. The other level (referential motor resonance) operates without motor feedback 
(but see Pickering & Garrod, 2013, for an account of how referential motor resonance might 
involve cognitive feedback). The lack of motor feedback is of particular interest given its 
posited role in prediction of motor actions (Grush, 2004; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 
1995). Investigating the possible predicitive role of referential motor resonance, may 
therefore inform not only embodied cognition, but wider language processing and motor 
planning as a whole. 
8.3.6. A functional role for motor resonance? 
One of the aims of this thesis was to investigate the possibility of a functional role 
for referential motor resonance in action language understanding. The results from 
Experiments 1 – 6 suggest that planning to perform an action with a particular hand affects 
the way in which comprehenders interpret action sentences. However, these effects are 
found in a task requiring a manual response, and in which image selection occurs after 
sentence processing is complete. In Experiments 7 – 9, I used a task measuring online 
sentence processing in the absence of a manual response. Some findings (i.e., that 
participants are faster to perform spoken sensibility judgments when planning a particular 
type of action) could be interpreted as weak evidence for a general effect of motor activation 
on language processing. However, these findings could equally be interpreted as an effect of 




The only finding from Chapter 7 that does suggest some effect of action on 
language, is the fact that right-handed participants were more likely to make a correct 
congruency judgment when planning to execute an action with their dominant right hand, 
compared with their left hand. There was however, no effect of hand on the latency of 
congruency judgments. Taken together, the results from this thesis show that motor 
activation from current motor plan affects the way people interpret action sentences, in 
offline tasks, and that this effect interacts with sentence pronoun so that comprehenders are 
more likely to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective on first-person versus third-person 
sentences. However, evidence for an effect of action on language in online comprehension is 
much weaker, with accuracy rates affected only when the task requires an explicit 
comparison between the action described in the sentence, and the action the comprehender is 
planning to make. In tasks where this comparison is irrelevant (Experiments 7 and 8), there 
is no effect of hand on accuracy rates. Based on the current data therefore, there is 
insufficient evidence to answer the question: to what extent do comprehenders routinely 
adopt an embodied perspective on action language, and to what extent do they adopt a non-
embodied perspective? 
In section 3.6, I argued that it is important for embodied approaches to language to 
allow for a non-embodied perspective, otherwise they must make the problematic claim that 
motor resonance is necessary for comprehension. But under what circumstances would we 
adopt an embodied perspective, and under what circumstances would we adopt a non-
embodied perspective? The results from Experiments 1 - 6 suggest that, in the forced-choice 
task at least, comprehenders adopted an embodied perspective (namely, that of the agent) in 
line with their current motor plan. If, during sentence processing, there was no motor plan to 
move a particular hand, then an unembodied perspective was adopted (i.e., participants did 
not show a preference for the image congruent with their response hand, which would 
indicate an embodied agent’s perspective; and they did not show a preference for right-




visual experience). Once a motor plan is formed, the Spatial Grounding Hypothesis predicts 
that the effect of this plan will be stronger following self-referential language (which 
provides a means of grounding the simulated action in space, since the agent of the action is 
interpreted as the comprehender) compared with third-person language. Results from 
Experiments 1 - 6 mostly support this claim, with the preference for images that matched 
participant’s current motor plan interacting with pronoun in Experiments 2a, 2b, 5, and 6 
(see section 8.3.2 for discussion).  
Throughout the thesis, I have argued that motor resonance is not necessary for 
comprehension. The results of Experiments 1 – 9 support this claim by finding an effect of 
motor activation on sentence interpretation only in certain circumstances (i.e., when an 
action plan was present during sentence processing). Thus, motor activation is not necessary 
for language comprehension, unless we change our definition of what it means to 
comprehend a sentence. I have argued that conceiving of motor activation as a type of 
priming allows us to acknowledge the fact that motor resonance can influence 
comprehension, without being either necessary or sufficient for comprehension to occur. In 
this simple priming account, motor activation primes the comprehender to adopt a particular 
perspective, but does not serve any useful function. The idea of fault-tolerant comprehension 
on the other hand (Taylor & Zwaan, 2009, 2013), proposes that although motor activation is 
not necessary for language comprehension, it does provide a useful function: comprehension 
is more efficient in the present of motor resonance than in its absence. I suggested in section 
8.3.5 above that one conduit for this increased efficiency might be improved prediction. It is 
not clear whether fault-tolerant comprehension applies to abstract and metaphorical language 
as well as concrete action descriptions: one possibility is that comprehension of abstract 
language is generally impoverished compared with concrete language for which simulations 
are readily available, thus explaining the well-document differences in processing for 




The idea that motor resonance allows better prediction might explain the finding that 
participants were more likely to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective for self-referential 
language compared with third-person language. One of the reasons for predicting a 
difference between first- and third-person language was the evidence that first-person (self-
generated) actions are more tightly connected to the motor system than third-person (other 
generated) actions (see section 2.2.5). Specifically, people are better at predicting their own 
actions than those of other people (Knoblich & Flach, 2001). Therefore, if motor resonance 
plays a predictive role, and if first-person actions result in better predictions, then it follows 
that there might be a stronger effect of motor resonance in first-person than in third-person 
language. This prediction is borne out by the findings from Experiments 2a -6. However, if 
motor resonance does aid prediction (presumably in an online capacity, since retrospective 
prediction would appear to be of little use), is not clear why the effects of action plan were 
limited to the forced-choice task in Experiments 2a – 6. If language comprehension is fault-
tolerant in the sense that comprehension is achievable, but less optimal without the 
predictive advantage supplied by referential motor resonance, then we might expect to see 
some effect of motor resonance in the sensibility judgement task (Experiments 7 – 9). No 
such effect was obtained.  
One explanation for this pattern of results is that, as Zwaan and Taylor (2006) point out, 
sensibility judgements are made once participants have finished reading the sentence, and 
might well consist of post-sentential re-imaginings, in order to complete the task. Any 
predictive advantage afforded by referential motor resonance may occur earlier in the 
sentence – perhaps captured by the localised, verb-specific effects found by Zwaan & Taylor 
(2006; Taylor & Zwaan, 2008). Eye-tracking methods should therefore be used to test this 
possibility using an online measure of sentence processing. However, the argument that the 
null effects in Experiments 7 – 9 were due to us tapping into a later, post-sentential 




since the task in Experiments 1 – 6 also involved a post-sentential judgement, but did pick 
up an effect of response hand (see section 7.7.1 and 7.7.2 for further discussion of the null 
effects in Experiments 7-9).  
In this thesis I have argued against motor resonance (and therefore, an embodied 
perspective) being necessary for action language understanding; I have also provided some 
evidence that, using an off-line task, an embodied perspective is adopted in line with the 
following constraints: (1) the comprehender has a motor plan present during sentence 
comprehension; (2) the comprehender is able to sufficiently ground the action simulation in 
space, for example by reference to her own body. I have found little evidence to suggest that 
this embodied perspective plays a functional role in action language comprehension. 
8.4. Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, I set out to specify some of the constraints governing the interaction 
between language and action. Through a series of sentence-picture matching studies, I have 
demonstrated that comprehenders tend to adopt an embodied agent’s perspective on action 
sentences, that the evidence for this perspective is stronger following self-referential 
language than third-person language, and that this perspective appears to be grounded in the 
comprehender’s current motor plan rather than their motor experience. Contrary to the 
predictions of the Body-Specificity Hypothesis, I found no effect of dominant hand (i.e., 
motor experience) in the absence of manual responses. However, in a different task, which 
explicitly required participants to judge the congruency between their planned action and the 
sentence they were reading, there was some evidence of an effect of dominant hand on 
sentence processing. In other words, comprehenders seem to assign a handedness 
representation to action language only when required to do so by the task. These results 
support weak embodied accounts in which the way we interpret action sentences is 




and language is sensitive to the distinction between self and other. The results provide no 
evidence in favour of strong embodied accounts, where motor activation is necessary for 
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APPENDIX A: THE EDINBURGH HANDEDNESS 
INVENTORY (from Oldfield, 1971) 
    
Participant number:    
 
Please indicate with a check () your preference in using your left or right hand in 
the following tasks. 
 
Where the preference is so strong you would never use the other hand, unless 
absolutely forced to, put two checks ().  
 
If you are indifferent, put one check in each column (  |  ). 
 
Some of the activities require both hands. In these cases, the part of the task or object 
for which hand preference is wanted is indicated in parentheses. 
  
Task / Object Left Hand Right Hand 
1. Writing   
2. Drawing   
3. Throwing   
4. Scissors   
5. Toothbrush   
6. Knife (without fork)   
7. Spoon   
8. Broom (upper hand)   
9. Striking a Match (match)   
10.  Opening a Box (lid)   
Total checks: LH =  RH =  
Cumulative Total CT = LH + RH =  
Difference D = RH – LH =  
Result R = (D / CT)  100 =  
Interpretation: 
(Left Handed: R < -40) 
(Ambidextrous: -40  R  +40) 









APPENDIX B: MATERIALS IN EXPERIMENTS 1-6 
SENTENCES 
Experiment 1 used only first-person sentences. Experiments 2a – 6 used both first-person 
and third-person sentences. In Experiment 1, a sentence was matched with an image 
showing the matching action on critical trials, and with an image showing the object 
mismatch or action mismatch action on filler trials. In Experiments 2a – 6, a sentence was 
matched with a pair of images showing the matching action on critical trials, and with one 
image showing the matching action and one image showing an object mismatch or action 
mismatch on filler trials.  




I am/ He is slicing the bread Slice bread  Butter bread 
I am/ He is slicing the tomato Slice tomato Slice bread  
I am/ He is buttering the bread Butter bread  Cut bread 
I am/ He is examining the paper Examine paper  Staple paper 
I am/ He is glueing the envelope Glue envelope  Write on envelope 
I am/ He is glueing the paper Glue paper  Examine paper 
I am/ He is cutting the paper Cut paper Cut plant  
I am/ He is cutting the plant Cut plant  Rake plant 




 Write in notebook 
I am/ He is holepunching the paper Holepunch paper Holepunch 
notebook 
 
I am/ He is ironing the cloth Iron cloth Iron shirt  
I am/ He is ironing the shirt Iron shirt  Sew shirt 
I am/ He is lighting the candle Light candle Light cigarette  
I am/ He is lighting the cigarette Light cigarette Light candle  
I am/ He is opening the bottle Open bottle Open can  
I am/ He is opening the can Open can Open bottle  
I am/ He is peeling the carrot Peel carrot Peel potato  
I am/ He is peeling the potato Peel potato Peel carrot  
I am/ He is picking up the gherkin Pick up gherkin Pick up olive  
I am/ He is picking up the olive Pick up olive  Scoop olive 
I am/ He is scooping up the olive Scoop up olive Scoop yoghurt  
I am/ He is scooping up the 
yoghurt 
Scoop yoghurt Scoop olive  
I am/ He is sewing the cloth Sew cloth  Iron cloth 
I am/ He is sewing the shirt Sew shirt  Scrub shirt 
I am/ He is scrubbing the pan Scrub pan  Wipe pan 
I am/ He is scrubbing the shirt Scrub shirt  Iron shirt 
I am/ He is stapling the paper Staple paper  Cut paper 
I am/ He is stapling the envelope Staple envelope  Glue envelope 
I am/ He is wiping the glass Wipe glass Wipe pan  
I am/ He is wiping the pan Wipe pan Wipe glass  
I am/ He is writing on the envelope Write on envelope Write in notebook  







Experiment 1 used only internally orientated images. Experiments 2a – 6 used both 
internally and externally orientated images. 






















































APPENDIX C: MATERIALS IN EXPERIMENTS 7 - 9 
POKE sentences 
I am buzzing the guard on the intercom 
I am calling the lift down to the lobby 
I am cancelling the print job to the printer 
I am choosing a mars bar from the vending machine 
I am clicking on the link to the website 
I am dabbing some lipbalm on my lips 
I am dialling 999 for an ambulance 
I am dividing up the bill on the calculator 
I am drawing a heart on the window 
I am entering the security code for the building 
I am fast-forwarding the tape in the stereo 
I am following the line of text as I read 
I am hitting escape on the keyboard 
I am liking my friend’s status on facebook 
I am loading the weather app on my i-phone 
I am navigating the touchscreen display 
I am opening the DVD player on my laptop 
I am opting for A5 on the photocopier 
I am ordering a latte from the coffee machine 
I am picking my nose in the lecture 
I am pressing send on the email 
I am programming the new burglar alarm 
I am pushing my glasses up my nose 
I am putting in my contact lens 
I am requesting the elevator on the top floor 
I am ringing the doorbell at my auntie’s house 
I am saving the taxi number on my phone 
I am scratching inside my ear 
I am scrolling down through the pdf 
I am seeing whether the piano is tuned 
I am setting the microwave to defrost 
I am sounding the bell to stop the bus 
I am spraying air-freshener in the kitchen 
I am switching off the lamp at the plug socket 
I am taking a photograph on the monument 
I am turning on my laptop in the library 
I am typing my pin number at the cashpoint 
I am updating the central heating timer 












I am admiring my new engagement ring 
I am blaring my horn in the traffic 
I am bouncing a basketball in the gym 
I am checking if my housemate has a fever 
I am clasping the baby tightly to my chest 
I am cleaning the mirror in the hallway 
I am clinging onto my hat in the blizzard 
I am clutching my stomach after the meal 
I am covering my eyes at the bright light 
I am ensuring the wallpaper is smooth 
I am feeling my pregnant sister’s stomach 
I am flattening creases in the tablecloth 
I am giving my brother a high five 
I am greeting my friend across the street 
I am having my fortune lines read 
I am playing the tambourine in the concert 
I am pledging the oath of allegiance 
I am plumping up the pillow in the hospital bed 
I am protecting my face as I fall 
I am reaching for the book on the shelf 
I am receiving the change from the shopkeeper 
I am removing the smears from the window 
I am ruffling my dog’s head after the walk 
I am saluting the general in the parade 
I am serving in the volleyball championship 
I am shaking my boss’s hand after the meeting 
I am shielding my eyes from the sun 
I am slamming shut the car door 
I am slathering suntan lotion onto my neck 
I am smacking my boyfriend in the face 
I am smoothing my hairstyle down in the bathroom 
I am squashing the hamburger before biting it 
I am stifling a yawn in the seminar 
I am stopping a goal in the penalty shootout 
I am straightening out the bedspread 
I am stroking my neighbour’s cat 
I am swatting a fly away from my face 
I am swearing on the bible to tell the truth 














I am activating the alligator for my uncle I am hammering insider the tennis ball 
I am beating the picture frame into a mousse I am hanging the lamppost outside the flat 
I am beginning through the light socket I am hiding the lighthouse by the sea 
I am bending the shirt in the garage I am ironing the boiler in the airing cupboard 
I am breaking the custard into a bowl I am joining the goldfish and the worktop 
I am bringing the housing estate to the meeting I am knitting the taxi on the road 
I am burning the drinking water in the canteen I am knocking the postage stamp in the tea 
I am burying the paperclips in the drawer  I am knitting the bungalow doorstep 
I am carrying the ship in a picnic basket I am laying the bed in the toilet 
I am catching the space shuttle in a net I am leading the milk in the fridge 
I am cheering the lemonade on the mat I am lighting the hosepipe in the greenhouse 
I am chopping a saucer for my neighbour I am loading the lorry on the notebook 
I am conducting a bottle of orange juice I am melting the library at the meeting 
I am counting the ladder on the windows I am messing a carrot from the greengrocer’s 
I am cracking the syrup in the cupboard I am mining my Walkman in the theatre 
I am crashing the blossom on the trees I am mowing the scientific calculator 
I am crunching the mobile phone into a ball I am offering the milkshake to the wall 
I am cutting the cupboard with a cake fork I am operating on the rusty mail 
I am digging the shoe on the pavement I am packing the Eiffel Tower into the train 
I am dragging the puddle after the rain I am parking the blanket on the motorway 
I am draining the whiskey on the sunbed I am peeling the kitchen with a knife 
I am dressing the saucepan under the carpet I am piling the pineapples in the thimble 
I am drilling the paper by the motorway I am planning the vacuum cleaner for dinner 
I am drinking the biro for desert I am pouring a wardrobe down the drain 
I am dripping a ceiling fan on the floor I am practicing the television remote control 
I am driving the antique grandfather clock  I am raising the tin of beans under the oven 
I am drumming the best-selling cookery book I am raking the lions on the front lawn 
I am dusting the chicken with a mop I am reading a spoon in the nursery 
I am feeding the moustache in the mirror I am recording the chopping board speak 
I am filing the macaroon in the documents folder I am repairing the strawberry ice cream 
I am filling the widescreen television  I am riding an apple by the canal 
I am fisting the button onto the shirt I am rippling a typewriter under my arm 
I am firing the spaniel with pinewood I am sawing the pond behind the house 
I am fishing the cushion with blue cement I am scraping the furniture on the pizza 
I am flapping the velvet three piece suite I am screwing the orange into the lounge 
I am flying in the coffee table I am sewing the juice into a cocktail 
I am folding the fridge into three pieces I am snapping the scarf into chocolate 
I am freezing my colleagues who lost her wallet I am threading the door handle on the dew 
I am grading the police station on its essay I am tightening the coin into the freezer 






                                                
    PALM-left              PALM-right               POKE -left                POKE-right 
